N135CC

Substantial
Fatal

JetProp DLX Piper PA46S/N: 4636192

Accident Details

Date
Monday, May 3, 2010
NTSB Number
CEN10FA233
Location
New Albany, IN
Event ID
20100503X93719
Coordinates
38.197776, -85.886947
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
2
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed in instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N135CC
Make
JETPROP DLX PIPER
Serial Number
4636192
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Year Built
1999
Model / ICAO
PA46M600
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
DEEMS HOLDINGS LLC
Address
1422 ASH DR
Status
Deregistered
City
BOZEMAN
State / Zip Code
MT 59715-5901
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 2, 2010, about 2016 eastern daylight time (EDT), a JetProp DLX Piper PA-46-350P, N135CC, sustained substantial damage on impact with terrain near New Albany, Indiana. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight was operating on an instrument rules (IFR) flight plan. The flight departed from Barkley Regional Airport (PAH), Paducah, Kentucky, about 1836 central daylight time (CDT) and was en route to Bowman Field Airport (LOU), Louisville, Kentucky.

About 1800 CDT, an employee of a fixed base operator at PAH stated that he directed the parking of the airplane. The pilot requested 40 gallons of fuel per side. The employee did not see any leaks from the airplane, and the airplane looked to be in “real good shape.”

About 1801-1805 CDT, the Washington Automated Flight Service Station, WS030 position, provided a weather briefing to a caller who had represented N135CC. The caller requested to be provided with “just a metar” at Louisville so he could see if he needed to go under visual flight rules (VFR) or IFR. When asked by the briefer if the caller was leaving soon, the caller said “yes.” The conversation continued and WS030 stated:

“uh looks like you’ll have to go i f r *(louisville’s) callin it wind one seventy at five nine miles light rain ceiling nine hundred broken one thousand one hundred overcast temperature an dew point both twenty one… however at standiford they have six miles moderate rain an mist uh one thousand three hundred broken an one thousand nine hundred overcast”

The caller then filed an IFR flight plan with a “filed off” time of “twenty minutes thirty minutes,” an altitude of “two one zero,” direct to “louisville bowman,” and a time en route of 45 minutes. The alternate airport was Louisville International Airport-Standiford Field (SDF), Louisville, Kentucky.

WS030 stated, “an ya got the airmet sierra for i f r ceilings below a thousand visibilities below three precipitation an *(mist) an uh conditions are forecast to continue through o three hundred both for turbulence an the i f r”

At 1826 CDT, N135CC requested an IFR clearance to LOU from PAH air traffic control. The clearance was, “cleared to bowman airport at filed maintain three thousand expect flight level two one zero within one zero minutes….” At 1833 CDT, N135CC was cleared for takeoff.

A transcription of transmissions by N135CC and Louisville/Standiford Air Traffic Control Tower, Departure One Radar, at the following times, states, in part:

2002:30 EDT, N135CC, “louisville approach jet prop one three five charlie charlie with you one three thousand for one one thousand”

2002:36 EDT, DR1, “november one three five charlie charlie lousiville approach information romeo is current at bowman expect a v o r approach runway two four

2002:43 EDT, N135CC, “five charlie charlie has romeo now sir

2002:46 EDT, DR1, november five charlie charlie roger

2004:26 EDT, DR1, november five charlie charlie descend and maintain seven thousand

2004:30 EDT, N135CC, (unintelligible) thousand five charlie charlie

2009:20 EDT, DR1, november five charlie charlie descend and maintain four thousand

2009:23 EDT, N135CC, four thousand for five charlie charlie

2010:35 EDT, DR1, november five charlie charlie fly heading zero five zero it’ll be vectors north of Louisville international

2010:39 EDT, N135CC, zero five zero on the heading five charlie charlie

2014:17 EDT, DR1, novenber five charlie uh sierra is now current at bowman they just went i f r uh i believe the ceiling was eight hundred it’ll be coming out here shortly on my system you can go ahead and pick up uh sierra if you like

2014:30 EDT, N135CC, five charlie charlie getting sierra

2016:54 EDT, DR1, (unintelligible) five charlie charlie uh fly heading zero six zero descend and maintain three thousand

There were no further recorded transmissions by N135CC.

A witness reported that the airplane approached from the southeast with a “loud” engine sound. The airplane then went “upside down” and entered a “spiral nose-dive." The witness also reported that there was no smoke or fire from the airplane.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 59, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, glider, and instrument airplane ratings. On November 13, 1986, he was issued a private pilot certificate with a glider rating. On January 28, 1994, he was issued an airplane single-engine land rating. On April 28, 1998, he was issued an instrument airplane rating.

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, on March 13, 2007, the pilot was involved in a runway incursion at Tucson International Airport, Tucson, Arizona. The pilot received an air traffic control clearance to taxi to runway 11L, which he read back correctly. The pilot stated that although he read the clearance as given, he taxied onto runway 11L expecting an immediate takeoff as he was aware of and saw air traffic on final approach for the same runway. The pilot was piloting a PA-46, N870FS, at the time of the runway incursion.

On March 8, 2010, the pilot began JetProp Factory Training, which included 7 flights and 8.5 hours of flight time in the accident airplane.

The president of JetProp stated that most of its customers received 5-10 hours of flight training, the amount of which depends on their ability. Most customers convert the airplane they have been flying so their panels are virtually the same. The pilot purchased an existing JetProp to train in, so the airplane and panel were new to him. The pilot was an average pilot with fairly good pilot skills, but he was always hunting around the panel for radios, switches, and navigation equipment. Because of this, it was recommended to the pilot that he should accumulate 25-50 hours under VFR before flying in instrument meteorological conditions without a safety pilot, to which the pilot agreed.

The JetProp Factory Training endorsement in the pilot's logbook was dated March 11, 2010. From March 12 to April 25, 2010, there were 5 entries logging flights of the accident airplane, of which only three entries had an associated flight time, which totaled 5.6 hours.

The pilot's total flight time, based upon logbook entries, was about 2,493.7 hours, which included entries for a Piper PA-46, N870FS.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was manufactured in 1999 as a Piper PA-46-350P, serial number 4636192, and was modified by Rocket Engineering Corp. under supplemental type certificate (STC) ST00541SE at a total time and Hobbs time of 354.8 hours, dated January 21, 2002. Under STC ST00541SE, the design change was for the installation of a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-34. The airplane was equipped with a Hartzell HC-E4N-3M, 4-blade composite propeller. Piper Aircraft had not provided any PA-46-350P engineering and/or flight test data to Rocket Engineering Corp. for its STC ST00541SE.

An Aircraft Registration Application by Deeems Holdings, LLC was signed by the pilot on March 8, 2010.

The airplane received its last annual inspection, dated May 21, 2009, at a Hobbs and total time of 1,396 hours. The engine received its last annual inspection, dated May 21, 2009, at a Hobbs time of 1,396 hours and a total time of 1,041.2 hours. According to aircraft and engine logbook entries, dated March 8, 2010, the Hobbs time was 1,388 hours.

A FlightSafety International JetProp DLX Pilot Training Manual recovered from the airplane states that the airspeed indicator green arc (normal operating range) is 68-172 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) and the white arc (flaps down) is 57-117 KIAS.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The LOU automated surface observing system (ASOS), located about 10.7 nautical mile (NM) and 80. 4 degrees from the accident site at an elevation of about 546 feet mean sea level (MSL), recorded at:

2014 EDT: wind - 180 degrees from 5 knots; visibility 10 statute miles (SM); light rain; broken – 800 feet above ground level (AGL); overcast – 1,300 feet AGL; temperature - 21 degrees Celsius (C); dew point – 21 degrees C; altimeter – 29.68 inches of mercury; remarks - rain began at 2008, ceiling varied from 600-1,100 feet AGL.

The SDF ASOS, located about 6.9 NM and 99.8 degrees from the accident site at an elevation of about 501 feet MSL, recorded at:

1856 EDT: wind – 200 degrees at 6 knots; visibility – 10 SM; overcast – 1,100 feet AGL; temperature – 21 degrees C, dew point – 20 degrees C; altimeter setting 29.68 inches Hg; remarks – rain ended 1823.

2054 EDT: wind – 030 degrees at 5 knots; visibility – 10 SM; light rain; broken – 1,200 feet AGL, overcast – 1,900 feet AGL; temperature – 21 degrees C, dew point – 20 degrees C; altimeter – 29.69 inches Hg.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The main wreckage was located 38 degrees 11 minutes 52 seconds North, 85 degrees 53 minutes 13 seconds West at an elevation of 337 feet. The airplane was on a field in an upright position with a tail to nose heading of about 329 degrees. Ground scarring was limited to an approximate area surrounding the main wreckage, which consisted of the fuselage, wings, empennage, and engine. The area surrounding the main wreckage had a smell consistent with Jet A fuel.

The left wing and right wings were attached to the fuselage. The left wing tank was broken open and deformed outwards above and along the leading edge. The right wing was separated about mid-span and displaced aft. The right wing flap was attached to both right wing sections.

The empennage was separated from the fuselage near the aft pressure bulkhead. The vertical stabilizer was attached by its spar, and the remaining section of vertical stabilizer was displaced towards the right side of the fuselage as viewed from tail to nose.

Flight control continuity from the control surfaces to the cockpit controls was confirmed. The flaps, cockpit flap indicator, and handle were in the 10...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN10FA233