N224MD

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 25, 2011, about 1550 mountain standard time, an Embraer-Empresa Brasileira DE EMB-500 airplane, N244MD, sustained substantial damage during a runway overrun during landing at the Sedona Airport (SEZ), Sedona, Arizona. The captain, who was the flying pilot, and two of the three passengers were not injured. The first officer and one passenger sustained serious injuries. The airplane was registered to a private individual and operated by Superior Air Charter LLC., doing business as Jet Suite Air, Long Beach, California, under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated from San Jose, California, about 1420 Pacific daylight time, with an intended destination of SEZ.

Information provided by a Jet Suite representative indicated that the on-demand charter flight originated from San Jose, California, and the purpose of the flight was to transport three passengers to Sedona, Arizona. After arrival in Sedona, the flight was scheduled to depart for Oakland, California, to pick up additional passengers before returning to Los Angeles, California.

The captain reported that following an uneventful flight, he briefed the first officer about the arrival to SEZ. About 20 miles from the airport, the flight crew notified air traffic control that they had the airport in sight and subsequently canceled their instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan and proceeded on a visual approach to the airport. The captain said that the flight overflew the airport and entered a left downwind leg for runway 21 while conducting the descent and approach checklist. The captain stated that when they were established on downwind, the landing checklist was completed and a calculated 99 knot landing reference speed (vREF) was determined. The captain further reported that as he turned base leg at an airspeed of about 120 knots, he thought the airplane was low, and applied slight back pressure on the control yoke to arrest the descent prior to turning final to runway 21.

Upon turning final, he thought the airplane was high and reduced the power to idle. The captain stated that as the airplane neared the approach end of the runway, it felt like it was "pushed up" by a wind shift to a tailwind or an updraft and that the airplane touched down firmly near the runway number markings and he immediately applied brakes. During the landing roll, the captain felt that the initial braking was effective; however, he noticed the airplane was not slowing down, and applied maximum brakes. The captain stated that during maximum brake application, the airplane began to veer to the right three times. He said that each time, he was able to steer the airplane back to the runway centerline, however, during the third time, the right main landing gear exited the runway surface; he steered the airplane back onto the runway surface; however, the airplane subsequently exited the departure end of the runway and traveled down an embankment.

The captain added that during the landing roll, he felt a loss of braking effectiveness from the left side that he corresponded with the antiskid system actuating. The captain could not recall the exact speed of the airplane at the time of touchdown, but recalled that the airplane was at about 120 knots during final approach and was slowing at the time of the landing.

The first officer reported that following an uneventful flight, air traffic control kept the airplane at 11,000 feet mean sea level (msl) until they had established visual contact with the airport. He recalled that when the flight was about 6 to 8 miles from SEZ, they informed air traffic control they had the airport in sight and subsequently canceled their IFR clearance. The first officer stated that the airplane was already slowed and that they extended the landing gear and lowered the flaps to the number one flap setting in order to descend. The first officer said that they entered the airport traffic pattern for runway 21 on a left crosswind prior to turning left downwind. After the airplane was established on the left downwind, a number two flap setting (26-degree deflection) was selected. The first officer further stated that the base leg and final approach was normal, noting the approach speed was 120 knots. During final approach to landing, the first officer felt the "wind pushing the airplane" followed by a firm landing around the 1,000-foot runway markers.

In a written statement, an airline transport pilot rated passenger seated in the left aft forward facing seat reported that they had an uneventful flight until the approach segment started. The passenger said that he started monitoring the flight closer when the pilot lowered the landing gear before they entered the airport traffic pattern. The passenger said that while looking out the window, he noted that the airplane seemed high. Shortly after this he could see the runway from a distance and assumed they would be landing on runway 3 since the runway had better terrain clearance and was uphill.

The passenger further reported that as the approach to landing began, he noticed that the flight was going to land on runway 21. As the flight started on the downwind leg, he thought the flight was high and felt that the excessive altitude continued through and into the base to final turn. The passenger stated that the bank angle of the base leg to final turn seemed greater than 45 degrees and that he was uncomfortable with the steep angle on the final approach. The passenger said that as the flight continued the descent on final and crossed high over the threshold, he thought the flight crew would initiate a go-around, however, the flight continued the approach to touchdown.

The passenger stated that the flight continued the landing roll and started to swerve both left and right. He said that this continued to get worse as the airplane progressed down the runway. He added that in addition to the lateral movement, the airplane banked severely in both directions.

A witness, located in the airport terminal building, reported that he had received a landing request from the accident airplane on the common traffic advisory frequency. The witness responded to the landing request with the current automated weather observing system (AWOS) and informed the pilots that runway 3 was the uphill runway. The witness said that he attempted to transmit this information twice with no response. He further stated that he then observed the accident airplane land within the touchdown area on runway 21 and "fish tail" on the runway at a "high rate of speed" until it exited the departure end of the runway. The witness further reported that he observed the airplane strike a chain link fence and continue out of sight down an embankment.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain, who was the flying pilot, age 62, held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multi-engine land ratings, and a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine landing rating. The captain also held multiple type ratings in various transport category aircraft. A first-class airman medical certificate was issued to the pilot on March 10, 2011, with no limitations stated.

Review of company training records revealed that the captain underwent his most recent CFR Part 135 proficiency check for the accident make/model airplane on March 8, 2011. Company records showed that at the time of the accident, the captain had accumulated 23,970 hours of total flight time, of which 570 hours were in the accident make/model airplane, 51 hours in the previous 30 days, and 2 hours within the previous 24 hours.

The first officer, who was the non-flying, age 32, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi-engine land rating, and a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine landing rating. The first officer also held type ratings for various corporate jet aircraft. A first-class airman medical certificate was issued to the pilot on April 22, 2011, with the limitation stated "must wear corrective lenses."

Review of company training records revealed that the captain completed his most recent CFR Part 135 proficiency check for the accident make/model airplane on March 31, 2011. Company records showed that at the time of the accident, the captain had accumulated 1,886 hours of total flight time, of which 74 hours were in the accident make/model airplane, 38 hours in the previous 30 days, and 2 hours within the previous 24 hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The six-seat, low-wing, retractable landing gear, pressurized t-tail airplane, serial number (S/N) 50000057, was manufactured in 2009. It was powered by two Pratt & Whitney Canada PW617F-E turbofan engines.

Review of the pilot operating handbook (POH) revealed that the main brakes are a brake-by-wire system controlled by either the Pilot or Copilot via rudder pedals. The rudder pedals actuate the pedal transducers that in turn send the brake inputs to the Brake Control Unit (BCU). The BCU, which is connected to the DC BUS 2, receives all brake interface signals and controls the Shutoff Valve (SOV) and both Brake Control Valves (BCV’s) for braking capability. The POH states that "In case of hydraulic system failure, the Emergency/Parking brake is available and must be used carefully to stop the airplane."

The POH states in part, "...the antiskid protection system prevents tire skidding and maximizes brake efficiency according to the runway surface." The system controls the amount of hydraulic pressure applied to the brakes and, if necessary, reduces the wheel brake pressure in order to recover wheel speed and prevent tire skidding. The antiskid system is deactivated for wheel speeds below 10 knots. In addition, the antiskid protection is not available fo...