C-GXXJ

On January 8, 2016, at 1538 eastern standard time, a Cirrus SR22, Canadian registration C-GXXJ, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Concord, North Carolina. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Near the end of a cross-country, instrument flight rules flight, the pilot was conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 36R at Charlotte/Douglas International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina, in instrument meteorological conditions. The pilot provided a narrative description of the flight in writing and during an interview. According to the pilot, during the ILS approach, both flags on the primary flight display (PFD) were white and centered, which indicated that the autopilot was engaged, and the glideslope was captured. He then saw a "vertical flag drop" on the PFD, which indicated that the airplane was below the glideslope, but the autopilot did not correct for the deviation. As the airplane broke through a cloud layer and entered visual meteorological conditions, the pilot noted that, although the PFD was showing the flag white and centered, indicating that the airplane was laterally on course, the runway was actually to his right.

Review of data downloaded from the airplane’s PFD, multi-function display, and autopilot, as well as air traffic control voice communication and radar data recordings provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), revealed that at 1509:00, the airplane descended through a pressure altitude of 3,200 ft about 1.4 miles before the final approach fix (HAYOU) for the ILS approach to runway 36R. At that time, the autopilot mode changed from GPS Steering-Vertical Speed mode (GPSS-VS) to GPSS-Approach (APP)-VS mode. The primary navigation source, which was selectable on the PFD, was in the VHF/VLOC 1 mode. In this condition, the autopilot would not automatically transition from the GPSS mode to the navigation (NAV) mode for the ILS approach, and the glideslope would not arm. If the primary navigation source had been set to GPS, the autopilot would have automatically transitioned to NAV mode and captured the glideslope. In this case, with no other intervention, after the airplane passed the final approach fix, the GPS unit would no longer provide navigation/steering guidance to the autopilot, and the PFD would annunciate a yellow “GPSS Invalid” message. The recorded data indicated this message was displayed at 1509:39, just after the airplane passed HAYOU. At that time, the airplane was on the localizer centerline, and above the glideslope with a full “fly down” indication on the PFD. In this condition, the autopilot would attempt to maintain wings-level (laterally) and continue to maintain the selected vertical speed. After passing HAYOU, the airplane continued toward CLT, drifted right of the localizer course, and continued to descend at about 500 ft per minute. At 1510:08, about 1.5 miles and 32 seconds after passing HAYOU, the autopilot was disconnected, and the airplane drifted further to the right of the localizer course, reaching a 60% scale “fly left” indication on the PFD. At 1510:16, the autopilot was re-engaged in the Pitch-Roll (attitude hold) mode, which holds the pitch and roll attitude at the time of activation. At the time, the roll attitude was about 15° left wing down, the pitch attitude was about 2° nose down, and the airplane drifted left of the localizer course. At 1510:44, the PFD indicated a full scale “fly right” indication.

At 1510:52, as the airplane descended through the glideslope, the CLT tower controller advised the pilot that that the airplane was left of course and asked if he was still receiving the localizer. The pilot responded “yeah, off course.” The controller advised that he saw that the airplane was correcting and asked the pilot if he wanted to continue. The pilot responded, “we’re trying to correct.” At 1511:08, the PFD displayed a full scale “fly up” indication. At 1511:20, the autopilot was disengaged. Two seconds later, the controller advised the pilot that the airplane was still drifting left, canceled the approach clearance, and instructed the pilot to turn right to a heading of 090° and climb and maintain 4,000 ft. The pilot responded, “we’ve got the airport in sight”. The controller replied, “unable, turn right 090, climb and maintain 4,000 ft. The controller subsequently asked the pilot to “turn right immediately” three times, and at 1511:36, the airplane began a turn to the right started to climb.

Following the missed approach at CLT, the pilot recalled that he flew the airplane without the assistance of the autopilot and that air traffic control provided him with radar vectors to Concord-Padgett Regional Airport (JQF), Concord, North Carolina. The controller asked him if he was able to fly a GPS approach to runway 2, and he replied that he could. The controller provided an approach fix; however, the pilot was initially unable to look it up, as he thought the controller indicated that it was for runway 20. After clarifying, the pilot found the appropriate fix. He input the runway into his GPS unit and loaded the approach.

Review of the recorded data showed that, following the missed approach at CLT, the approach controller asked the pilot where he would like to go and suggested the GPS approach to runway 2 at JQF. At 1515:44, the controller instructed the pilot to proceed direct to ECEGA, which was the final approach fix for the GPS approach to runway 2 at JQF. The pilot responded, “what runway?”, the controller advised that it was runway 2, then repeated and spelled out ECEGA. At 1516:24, the controller asked the pilot if he was descending to get on the approach, the pilot confirmed he was, and asked for the “initial fix.” The controller responded that the fix he wanted the pilot to go to was ECEGA, which he again spelled out. The pilot asked if that was for the ILS approach to runway 20, and the controller advised that it was for the GPS approach to runway 2 at JQF. The pilot responded, "[unintelligible] two zero approach."

At 1516:48, the pilot began to explain to the controller that he wasn’t able to look up the ECEGA fix and listed other fixes that he could find (MEATT and NASCAR), which were associated with the GPS approach to runway 20 at JQF. The controller inquired if the pilot was able to fly a GPS approach and asked if he instead needed an ILS approach; the pilot did not respond. The controller again called the pilot, and over several radio transmissions, the pilot confirmed that he could fly a GPS approach. By this time, the airplane had flown too far to the east to make the left turn toward ECEGA. At 1517:48, the controller began vectoring the airplane south and then west to return toward the approach. At 1519:44, the controller asked the pilot to verify that he had the approach “plugged in” and was ready for the approach. The pilot responded that he had the GPS approach plugged in for runway 20, but he did not have the initial fix that the controller had previously provided. The controller clarified that the approach should be for runway 2, not runway 20. The controller and the pilot then discussed the names of the fixes for the runway 2 approach, and the pilot confirmed that he now had the appropriate fixes.

In his written statement, the pilot described that, as he proceeded to establish the inbound course for the instrument approach, he engaged the autopilot to fly direct to ECEGA, which was the final approach fix (FAF) for the GPS runway 2 approach at JQF. As he engaged the autopilot, the airplane began to climb and turned sharply to the right. He tried to engage the autopilot’s “straight and level” mode, but there was no response from the autopilot.

Review of the recorded data revealed that, at 1521:00, the controller advised the pilot that he was 4 miles from ECEGA, instructed him to fly heading 360° and maintain 3,000 ft until established on the final approach course, and cleared the pilot for the GPS approach to runway 2 at JQF. The pilot acknowledged. At 1521:24, the autopilot was in the GPSS-Altitude (ALT) mode, and the next waypoint was set to ECEGA. At 1523:04, the pilot transmitted “ok now I have to activate my appro[ach].” About 8 seconds later, the next waypoint changed from ECEGA (the final approach fix) to LALEC (the initial approach fix), with the autopilot in the GPSS-ALT mode. At that time, LALEC was about 9 miles behind and to the east (right) of the airplane’s position. The airplane began a turn to the right. At 1523:07, the controller instructed the pilot to contact the JQF tower, and the pilot acknowledged. At 1523:32, the autopilot was disconnected, and the airplane turned back to the left, toward COKBA, which was the next step-down fix on the approach after ECEGA. About ½ mile south of COKBA, the autopilot was re-engaged in the Roll-Pitch mode, and the airplane entered a turn to the right and began heading southeast. At 1525:08, the autopilot was disconnected, and the airplane made a sharp turn to the left, reversing course toward the northwest. During the turn, the roll attitude reached a peak value of 73° left, and the pitch attitude oscillated between 5° nose down and 25° nose up. At 1525:09 the autopilot straight and level mode was activated. At the time of activation, the roll attitude was about 36° left, the pitch attitude was about 25° nose up. About 7 seconds after activation, the roll attitude was 0°, and about 4 seconds later, the pitch attitude was 2° nose up, which were the target values for the straight and level mode.

At 15:25:52, the JQF tower controller advised the Charlotte approach controller that the pilot had “just lost his course guidance for some reason” and advised that he instructed the pilot to discontinue the approach to JQF. The two controllers then agreed to instruct the pilot to fly northwest and climb to 3,000...