UNREG

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 20, 1999, about 1430 Eastern Standard Time, a homebuilt, unregistered Sprint 1000 airplane was destroyed during a forced landing in Lakewood, New Jersey. The certificated private pilot was fatally injured, and the passenger received serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan was filed for the local flight, which originated from the Jackson Ultralight Center, Jackson, New Jersey. The flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to the passenger, he had approached the pilot a few days earlier at the ultralight center to set up a familiarization ride. He had read a number of articles about the pilot over the previous years, and felt he would be the best person to fly with. The pilot showed the passenger a number of videos about ultralight flying, and gave him a tour of the facilities. The pilot also showed the passenger the ultralight to be used for the familiarization flight, but the passenger said he wanted to fly in something "more substantial." The pilot showed him the Sprint 1000, and said he'd have to get permission from the owner to fly the passenger in it. Permission was granted, and the flight was scheduled. On the morning of the accident, the passenger called the pilot. The pilot informed the passenger that he decided not to fly at that time because of the high winds. He told the passenger to come over to the ultralight center later, when the wind conditions were expected to improve.

The passenger arrived at the ultralight center between 1300 and 1330. As he was pulling into the parking lot, the owner of the airplane and the pilot also arrived. The pilot looked toward the windsock, said he thought it would be all right to fly, and then asked for, and received permission again from the owner to use the airplane. The passenger was outfitted, and the owner started the airplane's motor. The motor then stopped. The motor was restarted, but no one said anything as to why it stopped.

Before climbing onboard, the passenger asked the pilot: "You sure this isn't dangerous?" To which, the pilot answered: "What do you think I want to do, lose a student?" At this point in the interview, the passenger stated that he wanted to make it clear that he was not a "student" on the accident flight.

The passenger stated that no emergency procedures were discussed, and that the only way he got information was by asking what to do if something happened to the pilot. The pilot explained the control functions, and then they got into the airplane, with the pilot in the left seat and the passenger in the right seat. The pilot told the passenger to hold on to the wing struts during the takeoff, and not to touch any of the controls, which the passenger said he complied with during the entire flight.

The airplane began to taxi toward the runway, and on the way, the pilot checked the dual ignition switches. The airplane kept moving, reversed direction, and began the takeoff roll at full power. As the speed increased, the passenger felt gusts of wind. Once airborne, the airplane climbed straight ahead, then began a right turn. It felt like a gust of wind turned the airplane to the right, and other gusts were forcing the airplane up and down. Then, while still in the right turn, the engine stopped. The passenger asked the pilot: "Did you do that on purpose?" When the pilot did not answer, the passenger again asked the question, to which the pilot responded: "No." The pilot didn't say another word, nor did he make any attempt to restart the engine. The passenger felt the airplane go out of control, and afterwards, only remembered looking forward, at the ground, before the impact.

Just prior to the engine failure, the passenger noticed a digital gauge with readouts of 1,163, then 1,167, and finally, 1,168.

The owner of the airplane stated that he had performed a preflight on it about a half hour before the flight. He said he took fuel samples, and drained about a cup of fuel from each of the two tanks. He found no water, dirt, or debris. He started the engine while the passenger was present, and then shut it down to save fuel. He started it up again when the pilot was ready to depart. He saw the airplane back-taxi, then take off downwind. It took longer than normal, and required "the whole field to climb out." He heard no strange noises; the engine sounded "throaty," and not abnormal from what he had heard during previous flights. He watched the airplane until it started a right turn, and then disappeared behind trees.

A witness was parked in a car at the back side of a golf course, north of, and facing the ultralight center. He was accustomed to the ultralight activity, and helped remove an ultralight that had landed on the golf course previously. He watched the airplane from just after the takeoff, until just before impact. After the takeoff, the airplane headed over the golf course, then began a right turn. The airplane was still climbing out, and was an estimated 60 to 70 feet over 40-foot trees, when the engine stopped. The airplane appeared to glide for 2 to 4 seconds, then began a gradual left turn. The turn then increased sharply, and the airplane appeared to half-cartwheel. The left wing remained down until the witness lost sight of the airplane behind trees.

The accident occurred during daylight hours, in the vicinity of 40 degrees, 03.72 minutes north, and 74 degrees, 15.02 minutes west.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to the pilot's son, the pilot's logbook could not be located. Through other sources, it was revealed that the pilot held an advanced flight instructor qualification for ultralight aircraft, from the United States Ultralight Association, Inc. (USUA). For airplanes, the pilot held an Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) private pilot certificate with single-engine land, single-engine sea, and multi-engine land ratings. On his latest third class medical certificate application, dated April 4, 1997, the pilot stated that he had 6,500 hours of flight time.

In 1998, the pilot received USUA's highest recognition, the John J. Moody Award, for having made significant contributions to the sport. In December of that year, he was quoted as saying: "You're in control of your safety. You're as safe as your skill and training. Your engine could stop, but it means nothing. You can easily glide down to a safe landing if you have the skills."

According to the pilot's son, the pilot would take off downwind at times in order to be over less hostile terrain, should an emergency occur.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane had a Rotax 582-series engine. According to the technical data provided in the operator's manual, the normal exhaust gas temperature range was 930 to 1,150 degrees Fahrenheit, and the maximum exhaust gas temperature was 1,200 degrees Fahrenheit.

The engine's light alloy cylinders had cast iron sleeves, and a consistent bore diameter from top to bottom. The aluminum pistons were tapered at the top, and were ground slightly more in the area of the exhaust port. The piston rings were pinned so they could not revolve.

The engine operator's manual stated: "It is recommended to use full throttle during take-off climb. Slight throttle reduction may create a leaner mixture and should be avoided."

It further stated:

"During cruise and descending, it is very important not to create a lean condition with high rpm and low throttle opening. The less fresh charge the engine gets, the more hot residual gas remains in the cylinder. This raises the temperature to a critical level."

The owner stated that he and several other people had put the airplane together under the direction of the pilot. He also stated that he had flown with the pilot about five or six times, and that the pilot had never demonstrated a glide with the engine shut down. During takeoffs and climbs with the accident pilot onboard, the owner said he always used full power, and remembered that the exhaust gas temperature would rise to about 1,150 degrees Fahrenheit during the climb.

The owner also said that there were no logbooks or maintenance books, but estimated that the airplane had no more than 20 hours of flight time. After the accident, the Engine Information System (EIS) was sent to its manufacturer, and hour meter indicated 51.4 hours of operation. However, the airplane's owner stated that the EIS had originally been installed on another engine. He also stated that the gear oil had been changed at 10 hours, and to his knowledge, the engine had never had an unintentional stoppage.

The owner stated that he paid for the airplane and considered it his. He put it together, with some help from others, under the guidance of the pilot. He noted that that were some difficulties in putting the airplane together because the manuals were incomplete.

The purchase arrangement for the kit involved the fact that the pilot wanted to become an authorized dealer of the kits. Since he had to sell three kits to become a dealer, he told the owner he could pay for it "at cost," but the pilot would then also be able to use it in his business.

In a later letter to the Safety Board, the owner stated that he was not, in fact, the owner. However, in a subsequent conversation with the pilot's son, the same individual sought compensation from him for the loss of the airplane.

METEROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Winds recorded about 25 minutes after the accident, at an airport 10 nautical miles northeast, were from 330 degrees magnetic, at 10 knots. Witnesses stated that there were wind gusts in the area at the time of the accident.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The wreckage was located about 1/2 mile northeast of the ultralight center. It was about 15 feet below the crest of a grass-covered hill, on about a 10-degree slope. Primary ground scars were oriented up-slope, in a direction of ap...