N20367

Destroyed
Serious

Cameron CAN-56 S/N: 5385

Accident Details

Date
Saturday, June 25, 1994
NTSB Number
CHI94FA209
Location
WEST CHICAGO, IL
Event ID
20001206X01487
Coordinates
41.880229, -88.219039
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Serious
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
3
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
3

Probable Cause and Findings

the pilots failure to maintain vertical clearance above powerlines which bordered the field in which he intended to land. A factor associated with the accident were the powerlines.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N20367
Make
CAMERON
Serial Number
5385
Model / ICAO
CAN-56

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
JAMES DAVID LEE
Address
5875 W 50 SOUTH
Status
Deregistered
City
LARWILL
State / Zip Code
IN 46764
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 25, 1994, at 0715 central daylight time, a Cameron Balloons CAN-56 free balloon, N20367, owned and operated by Mr. David L. James of Larwill, Indiana, contacted powerlines during approach to an open field in West Chicago, Illinois. The balloon caught fire and was destroyed. The commercial certificated free balloon pilot and two passengers sustained serious injuries. Visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident. The flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 as part of the Geneva, Illinois, Swedish Day Balloon Festival. The flight departed from an open field in Geneva, Illinois, at 0602 along with 20 other free balloons.

The event was a "Hare and Hound" race, and the lead balloon had dropped a target at a golf course, 1/2 mile south of the Dupage Airport. The accident balloon passed north of this site, and the pilot remarked to his passengers that "we aren't in the competition." They then continued beyond the airport after crossing one of the runways south of the Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), and began to look for a landing site.

After passing Dupage Airport, the pilot disconnected the main fuel line to one burner from the #1 tank (right front position) and reconnected it to the #3 tank (right aft position). The pilot stated he made this tank change when the tank gauge indicated 10% fuel. He stated that he left reserve fuel in the tank to ensure he would have some available if he needed it later. After this tank switch, all occupants described 1 more burn of the blast valves to initiate an ascent. No line changes were made to the left burner or #2 tank (aft left position).

According to the festival coordinator, once a tank gets down to 40% fuel level, longer burns are required to produce an equivalent amount of heating compared to short burns at higher fuel levels. He stated that this is due to reduced fuel pressure within the tanks.

A low pass was made in a residential area, and the pilot remarked to the passengers that he would land there if alone, but not with passengers. Another ascent was described, and then the target landing field was sighted. The balloon ground crew was in the field, and had established communications with the pilot on a handheld radio.

A low pass was made over another crop field, the pilot stated he did not want to land there due to crop damage and recovery difficulty. Another burn was initiated to clear trees beyond this field, which bordered the target landing field where his ground crew was now stationed. The pilot described clearing the trees by 30 or 40 feet. None of the occupants described any further burning of the blast valve after the ascent to clear these trees. The pilot and 1 passenger stated they had seen the power poles near the landing field earlier. The pilot described the balloon beginniung to descend as they crossed the trees. As the road was crossed the balloon contacted the powerlines.

All three occupants described the flight as uneventful until contact was made with the powerlines. The passengers stated that they felt electricity pass through their bodies and then jumped or fell from the gondola. One passenger stated he consciously climbed out of the gondola, and when he jumped, his watch got stuck on the basket. He hung on the outside until his watch broke, then fell to the ground. He described the fire as coming up from below the basket and burning his legs. Both passengers sustained spinal and leg injuries and the pilot-in-command sustained head and arm injuries.

The balloon reascended and travelled downwind another 5 miles, coming to rest in trees alongside a highway. The basket was consumed by fire, two of the three fuel tanks exploded and detached from the balloon. The third fuel tank was recovered intact along with the balloon envelope.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot was a commercially certificated free balloon pilot with no other aeronautical ratings. He had been a crewmember on balloons since the mid-1980's, and began to pilot balloons in September of 1993. He had accumulated 65 hours of flight time in free balloons, all in the accident balloon.

The Balloon Festival Organization Manual, Section III, specified that:

"Only crewmembers may be carried on board an aircraft operating under the Certificate of Waiver. All crewmembers must be designated by the Pilot-in-Command and have been given appropriate training in the conduct of their duties. These designated crewmembers must sign a statement that they have been trained in balloon operations, and that they understand the limitations of the waiver under which they are operating, and that they are designated crewmembers for the purpose of the specific flights."

The 2 non-pilot occupants were on board in a crew capacity. They both signed a required "Crewmember Statement" which designated them with specific functions.

Neither non-pilot occupant had previous balloon experience. According to the pilot, the duties assigned to qualify them as crewmembers were for one to be the lookout for power lines, and the other to be the lookout for towers. The pilot stated that he gave the other occupants a brief on duties prior to departure. One of the other occupants stated he had received a safety/duty brief, but it was treated as a formality, not taken seriously, and "made light of."

Both passengers wore prescription glasses, and had them on during the flight. The pilot did not wear glasses. The pilot did not have, nor was he required to have, a current FAA medical exam.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The balloon was Cameron CAN-56, special shape balloon (Coffee Can). The pilot described a total volume of 90,000 cubic feet, and a heated volume of 70,000 cubic feet. The Pilot Operating Handbook described a heated volume of 77,000 cubic feet. CAN-56 blueprints specify an effective volume of 77,000 cubic feet. Cameron marketing technical data specifications described the CAN-56 as a 12 gore, 56,000 cubic foot envelope. The balloon was configured with 2 rotation vents, in addition to a control and "rip" vent. The envelope had 12 primary vertical support cables, which attached in clusters of 3 at each corner of the basket/burner frame.

The balloon was equipped with a MK-IV Double Burner, and 3 ten gallon Worthington aluminum propane fuel tanks (1 master and 2 standard). The liquid fuel fittings were threaded fittings, and the vapor lines had quick disconnect fittings at the tanks. Each tank was provided with an overpressure relief valve. Each burner was equipped with a vapor pilot light and a main liquid fuel line, separated by a crossfeed valve. The burners could be operated individually or in tandem.

The gondola was a Cameron 42" x 58" "Aristocrat" semi-rigid basket. The gondola was supported by 4 primary support cables, 2 per side, which attached to the envelope support cables via carabiners at the burner corner plate. The basket support cables each had a slip prevention fitting swaged to it in the gondola floor. The gondola itself was a wicker weave vegetable material.

The burner support frame rested on 4 semirigid support tubes which mounted to the gondola corners. These provided rigidity, but were not weight bearing structure. All structural support from the envelope was borne by the cables.

All support cables (envelope and gondola) were steel.

COMMUNICATIONS

The pilot maintained radio contact with his ground crew on a handheld radio. The passengers remarked that there were discussions between the pilot and his crew concerning landing sites.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The double burners were recovered with the envelope. Both fuel valves were open (valves in the in-line position) and the crossfeed valve was closed. Both blast valve handles were in the closed position. The Double Burner assembly was recovered, and both pilot light valves were in the ON position.

The #1 position fuel tank (forward right) was recovered approximately 1/4 mile downwind from the original impact site. The fuel valve was in the closed position. This tank was ruptured outward at a point just above the equator of the cylinder. The #2 position fuel tank (aft left) was located with the main and vapor fuel valves on. This tank had a 1/4 inch hole in the bottom, with metal loss similar to an electrical arc welding burn through. The #3 position fuel tank (aft right) was not recovered. Review of a video taken by a witness showed 2 distinct explosions each followed by what appeared to be a cylinder falling from the balloon.

Neither of the pressure relief valves on the recovered tanks were open.

The balloon envelope was recovered from a tree approximately 5 miles downwind from the original impact site. The envelope received substantial tear damage during recovery. Post crash inspection of the envelope revealed large areas of burned and melted nylon, concentrated on the lower horizontal (bottom of the can) panels, and on the vertical panels extending as high as panel "I" along cables 11, 12, and 1. "A" is the bottom panel and "M" is the uppermost.

The distance between the lowest 3 power lines which carried 12 Kilovolts (KV) and were phased (A, B, C), and the ground was 30 feet. The next 2 higher lines carried 34 KV and were 36 feet high. The next highest line also carried 34 KV and was located 42 feet 10 inches above the ground. This wire displayed visible burn marks.

Beginning at the lower 3 wires, the vertical distances between wires is 6 feet, then 6 feet 10 inches.

The distance from the bottom of the gondola to the carabiner cable attachment at the burner plate was approximately 6 feet 11 inches. Envelope support cable #6 was melted at the carabiner. The distance from the burner plate to the location of melted envelope support cable #7 and #8 was 7 feet.

One basket support cable on each side was severed by melting. The location of these severed cables was under the floor of the gond...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CHI94FA209