Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
the pilot's lack of situational awareness (becoming lost/disoriented during the approach), his failure to fly the approach as charted, and his failure to maintain aircraft control, while attempting an abrupt turn toward the airport, which led to an inadvertent stall/spin. The pilot's lack of recent instrument experience was a related factor.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 21, 1996, at 1636 hours Pacific standard time, a Beech 95-C55, N3774Q, collided with the approach end of runway 8L at Brown Field, San Diego, California, while attempting a circling instrument approach to runway 26R. The aircraft was owned and operated by the pilot. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an IFR flight plan was filed for the personal cross-country flight. The aircraft was demolished in the impact sequence and postcrash fire. The instrument rated private pilot, the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. The flight originated at Imperial, California, on the day of the accident at 1545 as a flight to San Diego.
Records maintained at the San Diego AFSS disclosed that the pilot (using the aircraft registration number) contacted the facility twice for weather information.
In the first morning call, the pilot requested an outlook briefing for a flight in the afternoon. Recordings of the telephone conversation note that the pilot was given the outlook that IFR conditions prevailed, VFR flight was not recommended, and that the forecast conditions in the San Diego area were expected to be 500 scattered with ceilings 1,000 feet. The pilot was advised to call after 1300 when an updated forecast would be available.
At 1538, the pilot telephoned San Diego AFSS, filed an instrument flight rules flight plan and requested a full weather briefing for the proposed flight. Review of the recorded conversation disclosed that he was advised that the current Brown Field weather included a visibility of 2 miles, with a 900-foot broken ceiling and the expectation that conditions would deteriorate (the VOR-A approach is the only one at Brown Field and the minimums are a visibility of 2 3/4 mile). At the conclusion of the full briefing, the specialists noted that the visibility at the San Diego area airports varied from 5/8 mile to less than 3, and ceilings were from 200 feet at the lowest to the 900-foot report from Brown, which was the highest. The briefing specialists also noted that it was "raining like crazy all over."
During the telephone conversation in which the pilot filed his flight plan, he told the FSS briefing specialists that he did not have his charts with him. The FSS specialists had to look up all the airway and fix designations for the pilot's route as he described it.
After completing the en route portion of the instrument flight, the pilot was cleared for the VOR-A approach to Brown Field, circle to land runway 26R by the Southern California TRACON. According to the approach chart, the minimums for the approach are a minimum descent altitude of 1,220 feet (700 agl) and a visibility of 2 3/4 miles. Just prior to issuing the approach clearance, the controller told the pilot that the last three aircraft that tried the approach into Brown executed missed approaches without ever seeing the ground. The controller then asked the pilot "where do you want to go after the missed." The pilot responded that he didn't know where to go. In the subsequent exchange, the pilot said that his car was parked at Brown. The controller then gave the pilot the weather at the surrounding airports, noting which ones were below minimums. The pilot selected Lindbergh Field as his alternate choice, but also told the controller that he could not reach his charts and might need some help to get on the approach. The controller reassured the pilot that they would get him set up.
Review of the recorded air-to-ground communications tapes revealed that at initial contact with the Brown Field Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), the local controller instructed the pilot to report the Poggi VOR (missed approach point), and reminded the pilot that the airport weather was "measured ceiling 300 feet, visibility less than a mile." The pilot responded "how far down can I go." The local controller said that he did not know how far down the pilot could go and restated that the weather was 300 overcast. In response, the pilot said "oh I got it I'll go down to about eight."
At 1633:07, the pilot called the tower and stated he was about 2 miles north of Poggi, to which the controller responded that the pilot should report Poggi and executing the missed approach. One minute later, the TRACON facility called the ATCT on the land line and told the local controller that radar showed the aircraft 5 miles south of the airport in Mexican airspace (the airport is on the international border), and to instruct the aircraft to make a missed approach. The local controller immediately advised the pilot of his location and to make an immediate right turn. The pilot responded with "I guess I don't know where I am." Fifty seconds later the pilot stated "I think I'm over the field." The aircraft impacted the end of the runway 4 seconds later. The engines were found buried 18 inches into the asphalt at a 35-degree angle.
Ground witnesses reported that the aircraft nearly collided with the top of a convenience store located just off the southwestern corner of the airport as it flew northward at very low altitude. A second witness located in a junk yard about 300 yards off the departure end of runway 26R stated he heard the aircraft fly over "very low and very loud," then caught a glimpse of a "shadow airplane shape in the clouds" as it turned "very steeply on a wing tip" toward the runway. A few seconds later the aircraft hit the ground and exploded.
Recorded radar data was obtained from the Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) and plotted using the commercial computer software Radar View. Both the raw data and the plotted charts are appended to this report, in addition to the VOR-A approach chart for Brown Field. The aircraft's position and mode C reported altitude versus time were compared to the approach chart. The following table illustrates the aircraft's reported altitude at the various fixes in comparison to the minimum charted values for the identified segment (it should be noted that the VOR is the missed approach point):
(5.9nm) (4.4nm) (2.3nm) IAF to FAF to VOR to AIRPORT Min Charted Alt /------2,400------/--------1,220------/---------1,220------------/ A/C Mode C Alt 3,200 3,000 2,700 2,300
Detailed review of the radar data from the point the aircraft crossed over the airport at 1634:39 until the last return at 1636:09 disclosed the following mode C altitude reports (dashed line indicates no altitude return):
TIME ALTITUDE REMARKS 1634:39 2,100 Over airport 1634:41 2,100 1634:46 2,000 G/S averages 155kts 1634:50 1,900 1634:55 2,200 Told entering Mexico by ATC and to execute missed approach 1635:00 ------ 1635:04 ------ G/S computed at 75kts 1635:09 3,100 Told to turn right by ATC 1635:13 ------ 1635:18 3,100 1635:23 ------ 1635:28 ------ 1635:32 ------ 1635:35 1,600 A/C has reversed course 180 degrees in a 0.2nm radius right turn from the last return to this. 1635:37 1,600 1635:39 2,300 1635:41 ------ 1635:46 2,800 1635:51 ------ 1635:55 2,100 1636:00 1,100 1636:02 800 Target is just south of the runway 26R departure end. 1636:04 800 Transmits "I think I'm over the field." 1636:09 1,000 Last mode C return. Time on transcript that Ground Controller announces crash.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot was a 63 year-old retired physician, who had been an FAA designated Aviation Medical Examiner. Review of the FAA airman records file for the pilot disclosed that he held a private pilot certificate with airplane ratings for single engine land, multiengine land and instruments. The file revealed that his original private certificate was issued in 1965, with the instrument rating added in 1968, and the multiengine rating in 1983.
A copy of the pilot's FAA medical file was obtained from the FAA Aeromedical Certification Division in Oklahoma City. The last medical certificate of record was a third class, issued without limitation on February 8, 1996. On the application form for the medical certificate, the pilot answered "yes" to the question concerning current use of medications. The pilot reported using Cardizem 60mg b.i.d. for control of blood pressure. Under total pilot time, he reported 1,000 total hours, with 12 flown in the last 6 months.
The pilot's logbook was recovered from the aircraft and examined. The entries were consistent and covered the period from the pilot's first flight in 1965 to the last entry on October 1, 1996. The logged hours totaled 547.4, with 319.1 in multiengine airplanes. The instrument hours totaled 48.1. Detailed review of all entries disclosed that following issuance of his instrument rating in 1968, no further instrument flights were logged until June 1987, when 1 hour of instrument work was recorded in a dual flight in the accident aircraft. The next instrument activity found in the log was 2.9 hours of dual instruction in 1991. No further instrument activity was recorded until August 1995, when the pilot completed a combined BFR and instrument recurrency check in 12 total flight hours, 8.2 of which were listed as instrument time. The pilot logged instrument flights on April 17 and September 15, 1996, which totaled 2.5 hours. An additional 2.5 hours of instrument time was recorded in the last log entry on October 1, 1996.
The pilot's logbook was compared to the aircraft maintenance records and the recent activity was consistent in both records.
AIRCRAFT INFO...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# LAX97FA049