N8460S

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 27, 1998, a Cessna 182H, N8460S, registered to Fellow Travelers, Inc., failed to arrive at the intended destination of Georgetown, Exuma Island, Bahamas. Weather conditions are unknown and an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The airplane has not been located and is presumed to be destroyed and the commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant, has not been located and is presumed to be fatally injured. The flight originated at 1430 eastern standard time, from the Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica.

The aircraft was fueled at the Tinsen Pen airport then flown to the Norman Manley International Airport, where an individual filed an international IFR flight plan through Ajax Ltd., of the Norman Manley International Airport, Kingston, Jamaica. The flight plan indicated that the name of the pilot was C E Wegereef, and the route of flight after takeoff was to fly the Eneka Two departure, G633 BENET, UB882 MEDON, A315 Great Inagua, A756 Stella Maris, Great Exuma. The four letter identifier on the flight plan indicated that the destination airport was MYEF, which according to the March 1998 edition of the International Flight Information Manual (IFIM), is Moss Town, Exuma Island. The alternate airport on the flight plan was listed as MYIG, which according to the IFIM, is Matthew Town, Great Inagua Island. The flight plan listed the time en route as 4 hours 30 minutes with 5 hours 30 minutes of fuel on board. The total distance for the flight as listed on the flight plan was calculated to be about 576 nautical miles. The flight plan listed the true airspeed as 120 knots.

According to an individual who drove to the Norman Manley International Airport and put the pilot in touch with personnel from Ajaz Ltd., the pilot was confident about the flight and he provided him with a six-person covered liferaft and three lifejackets. He had also flown the airplane 18 days earlier and reported during that time there was no airframe or engine malfunctions. The airplane was equipped with long range fuel tanks and had two VOR receivers with two omni-heads. He also stated that both were functioning when he last flew the airplane. When asked about additional navigational capabilities of the airplane he reported that the airplane was equipped with an antenna for a GPS receiver; however, the receiver had been removed from the airplane and sent to the manufacturer's facility for repairs and to upgraded. He last saw the pilot performing a preflight to the airplane and observed the flight depart. When asked about the purpose of the flight he reported that the airplane was being flown to the United States to have maintenance performed and for a conversion.

Review of the Enroute High Altitude Caribbean and South America chart revealed that UB882 is a VHF/UHF ATS Route between BENET and MEDON. That chart is for use above flight level 180. The planned altitude for the flight per the flight plan was 8,000 feet.

According to transcripts of communications with the Port Au Prince Air Traffic Control facility, the flight was at the BENET intersection at 1545 local. At 1558.36, the pilot attempted to contact the controller which was unsuccessful and at 1611.48, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was at 11,000 feet and flying direct to MEDON with an expected arrival time of 1655. The controller attempted to contact the pilot directly then attempted to communicate through the flightcrew of an American Airlines (AA) airplane, asking the flightcrew to obtain the altitude and position of the airplane. At 1619.00, the accident pilot stated "fly radial from Guantanamo 114.6", and he again stated on the frequency that he was expecting the MEDON intersection at [1655 hours local]. At 1620.10, the AA flightcrew was able to make contact with the pilot and when he was asked his position he responded "position right now is, I am at LODMA Intersection at the altitude one one thousand expecting MEDON Intersection at 2155 Zulu." The controller heard the transmission from the pilot and through the AA flightcrew, advised the pilot to climb to 12,000 feet, and to report MEDON intersection. The pilot acknowledged hearing the controller and read back the clearance to climb and report the intersection. At 1621.28, the controller questioned the pilot on his estimate for the JOSES intersection and the pilot responded 1610, which the controller corrected for the pilot, 1710 hours. The controller advised the pilot to maintain 12,000 feet and the pilot responded at 1623.49, that he wanted to descend to 10,000 feet which was approved by the controller and acknowledged by the pilot. At 1623.07, the pilot questioned the controller if his airplane was observed on radar and the controller responded "We are not, we are not radar equipped sir, at Port-au-Prince." The pilot acknowledged this and at 1624.35, the controller questioned the pilot about what time was the flight at the BENET intersection and the pilot responded 1545 local. The pilot reported reaching the MEDON intersection at 1642.59, and estimated the JOSES intersection at 1655. The controller advised the pilot to contact Miami Center on 123.92, which was acknowledged by the pilot. At 1649.33, the pilot advised the Port-au-Prince controller that he was unable to contact Miami Center on 123.92, and the controller gave the pilot two additional frequencies 118.4, and 124.2 for Nassau Radio, with the pilot acknowledging the last frequency.

The pilot again advised the Port-au-Prince controller that he was unable to establish contact on 124.2, and the controller advised the pilot to continue the flight, squawk 4444, and to attempt contact again with Miami Center on 123.92. The pilot advised the controller several more times that he was unable to contact Miami Center and at 1704.55, the pilot stated "Port-au-Prince Center Cessna 8460S, I can't get radio contact with Miami Center, do you have maybe another frequency" to which the controller immediately responded "8460S, good day." There was no further attempt by the controller to assist the pilot, and there was no further communication with the Port-au-Prince Air Traffic Control facility.

Review of the transcription of communication with the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) revealed that at 1707.38, the pilot requested that the controller provide him a heading direct to Great Inagua, his current heading was 338 degrees. The controller advised the pilot to squawk 4444, which he acknowledged. At 1817. 47, two-way radio communication was established with the Georgetown sector ARTCC controller and at 1819.25, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was about 70 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Great Inagua, and he was unable to receive the navigation signals from Great Exuma. The controller advised the pilot that he would not be able to locate the airplane on radar until the airplane was near the DUNNO intersection, and to report the ACMEE intersection, which the pilot acknowledged. The distance from the navigation aid on Great Inagua to the ACMEE intersection is 106 nm. At 1821.17, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was over the ACMEE intersection. That communication was only 1 minute 52 seconds after the time when the pilot advised the controller that the flight was about 70 nm northwest of Great Inagua, which from that position is about 36 nm from the ACMEE intersection. The controller again advised the pilot that the airplane would not be in radar contact until near the DUNNO intersection and to proceed direct to Great Exuma. The pilot responded that he did not have GPS, and asked the controller for a suggested heading. The controller advised the pilot that he did not have radar contact with the airplane but suggested a heading of 335 degrees to Exuma, which was acknowledged by the pilot. At 1832.15, the pilot advised the controller that he was not receiving the VOR signal from Great Exuma, to which the controller replied that it is typically out of service half the time and that Nassau had requested the flight land in Nassau. The pilot advised the controller that he did not think he had enough fuel to land there and at 1833.00, the controller advised the pilot to "...resume your own navigation", which he acknowledged. The flight continued and at 1853.23, the pilot advised the controller that he wanted to descend to 5,000 feet; the controller cleared the flight to descend to 7,000 feet. The controller questioned the pilot if the airplane was equipped with RNAV and the pilot responded "negative I have only one VOR and thats the problem and I don't have a VOR fix."

At 1857.38, the pilot reported that the flight was at 7,000 feet and the controller advised the pilot to tune one of the VHF radios to 122.8, to turn the runway lights at Mosstown, and at 1907.46, the controller questioned a military aircraft that was flying near Nassau, if they could attempt to locate and assist the airplane, which the flightcrew complied with. The missing pilot reported to the controller that he did not observe any lights from his attempt to activate them using the VHF frequency. At 1909.09, the pilot advised the controller that the flight was low on fuel and requested clearance to descend and at 1911.59, the controller advised the pilot to tune in the Georgetown NDB and that the lights were on at the Georgetown airport. The pilot then reported that his ADF was inoperative and at 1913.15, the pilot advised the controller that the flight needed to descend "...my engine is ah its making strange noises so I don't trust it anymore." The controller asked if the flight would climb and the pilot responded "...I'm running out of fuel...." The pilot of another airplane flying over Great Exuma Island reported seeing "...all the lights...." The flightcrew of the mi...