N187EH – Aérospatiale AS-350-B2 – 1998-05-31 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 30, 1998, at 1611 Alaska daylight time, an Aerospatiale AS-350-B2 helicopter, N187EH, and a Cessna 172RG airplane, N4948V, collided in midair, approximately four miles southeast of downtown Juneau, Alaska. The helicopter sustained substantial damage to the right-side doors and fuselage. The commercial pilot and four passengers were not injured. The remaining helicopter passenger sustained serious injuries. The helicopter made an emergency landing at a mine site about 1/2 mile north of the collision point. The airplane impacted the water in the Gastineau Channel, about one mile west of the collision point, and was destroyed. The airplane's private pilot, seated in the left seat, and the commercial pilot/flight instructor, who was seated in the right-front seat, both sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. A company flight plan was on file for the helicopter, and a VFR flight plan had been filed by the airplane pilot.

The helicopter flight was being conducted under 14 CFR Part 135 as an air tour flight, transporting cruise ship passengers to the Juneau ice fields. The helicopter was operated by ERA Aviation, Inc., of Anchorage, Alaska. The flight departed the ERA heliport, 10 miles west of the collision point, as the third ship in a flight of three. The first two helicopters departed at 1602 and 1603. The accident helicopter was delayed on the pad while the pilot adjusted a passenger's seat belt, and departed at 1606.

The airplane flight was conducted under 14 CFR Part 91 as a U.S. Government civil flight. The airplane was owned by Take Flight Alaska, Inc., of Anchorage, and was rented and operated by the Federal Aviation Administration, Alaskan Region, in Anchorage. The accident flight was the second flight of the day for the airplane occupants. The flight departed Sitka, Alaska, for Petersburg, Alaska, at 1343. Then departed Petersburg at 1525, for the Juneau International Airport, Juneau, Alaska. The airplane's pilot contacted the FAA Juneau Flight Service Station (AFSS) on 122.2 MHz at 1608, said that N4948V was 15 miles down Gastineau Channel, and closed the VFR flight plan. No other transmissions were received from the airplane.

The helicopter pilot stated to the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) during an interview on May 31, that he had just crossed Gastineau Channel from Treadwell on a magnetic heading of about 040 degrees at 2,000 feet above sea level (msl), and was beginning a climb, when the helicopter was impacted from the right side. The pilot stated that the passenger's audio narration tape ended just as the helicopter crossed the channel, and he had just asked how his passengers were doing.

None of the helicopter occupants said they saw the airplane prior to the collision. The passenger seated in the right-rear seat told the IIC that he was looking 30 degrees to the right of the helicopter's nose at the moment of impact. He said "I saw a flash of something white and angular, to the right, which I thought was a large bird."

The helicopter pilot indicated that at the time of collision, the helicopter was thrown onto its left side, pitched about 70 to 80 degrees nose down, and his feet were knocked off the pedals. He said that he regained control of the helicopter, immediately began an emergency descent to land, and transmitted that "187 is going down" on 123.05 MHz, 118.7 MHz, and on the company FM radio frequency. The pilot related that he entered an autorotative descent, recognized that the helicopter was controllable, and completed a power-on landing.

After landing, he noted that the passenger seated in the right-rear seat was injured, and that there was debris, including a wingtip light, in the aft cabin. He told the NTSB IIC that it was at that point he realized his helicopter had collided with an airplane.

Witnesses on the ground heard a loud noise, looked up, then saw the airplane on a westerly heading, and the helicopter on a northerly heading, flying away from each other. The airplane was described as momentarily remaining level, appearing to lose a piece of wing, then spiraling vertically into the water.

An air taxi pilot told the IIC that as he was exiting the Gastineau Channel northeast bound up the Taku Inlet about 1605, he saw a white Cessna enter the Gastineau Channel westbound. He said he did not hear any transmissions from this airplane on 123.05 MHz.

INJURIES TO PERSONS

The two occupants of the Cessna 172RG sustained fatal injuries. Both were attached to their seats by seatbelts and shoulder harnesses. The pilot was seated in the left pilot seat, and the pilot-rated passenger was in the right pilot seat.

The passenger seated in the right-rear seat of the helicopter sustained a closed fracture to his right lower leg. The remaining five occupants of the helicopter were not injured.

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The helicopter sustained substantial impact damage to the right side of the cabin and fuselage, damage to antennas mounted under the tail boom, and surface scratches to the lower vertical stabilizer and both tail rotor blades.

The airplane was destroyed by a combination of collision and water impact forces.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Helicopter

The pilot of the helicopter has a commercial helicopter pilot certificate, and a private pilot certificate for single-engine land airplanes. He holds instrument ratings in both helicopters and single-engine airplanes. In addition, he was rated as a flight instructor in helicopters. He had a first class medical certificate issued on July 18, 1997, with no limitations. The pilot is 75 inches tall, with a sitting height of 33 1/2 inches from the seat pan to his eyes.

The helicopter pilot was hired by the company on April 19, 1997, and originally assigned to the Anchorage, Alaska base. He was authorized to fly AS-350, BH-212, and BH-412 helicopters for the company. The helicopter pilot's last flight review was his annual 14 CFR Part 135.293 and 135.299 competency and line checks. These were performed by a company check airman on March 20, 1998, in an AS-350-B2 helicopter.

At the time of the accident, the helicopter pilot had accumulated about 2,350 total flight hours, 2,250 in helicopters, and 403 hours in the AS-350. In the 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, he had flown 35 and 23 hours, respectively. On the day of the accident, the pilot had flown 2.5 hours on four previous air tours in the accident helicopter. The accident flight was his fifth flight of the day. This was the second season that he flew tours for the company in the Juneau area. He had acquired 17 hours flying in the Juneau area this season, all within the previous 7 days.

The pilot told the NTSB IIC during an interview on June 10, that he normally sleeps five to six hours per night, from midnight until 0600. He said that the night prior to the accident he attended a concert, and slept his normal amount. On the day of the accident, he preflighted his helicopter, and then slept another hour before he began his flights. He also indicated his sleep patterns were normal the previous two nights.

Airplane

The pilot of the airplane held a private pilot certificate with privileges for single-engine land airplanes which was issued on April 19, 1977. In addition, he held a certificate as an FAA control tower operator. According to the pilot's personal flight logbook which was found in the airplane, he had accumulated 433 hours of flight experience at the time of the accident. The last entry in this logbook was the previous flight on May 30, 1998. The pilot's logbook indicated that he had flown 20 hours in the previous 90 days, all accumulated in the previous 30 days.

The pilot held a third class medical certificate issued on June 13, 1996, with the limitation that he have glasses available for near vision. His medical certificate, and Alaska driver's license, indicated his height to be 72 inches. His estimated sitting height, from seat pan to eyes, was 33 1/2 inches.

A review of the pilot's logbook, which was found in the airplane, had entries from Sept 23, 1969, to the day of the accident. No entries indicated any flights had been conducted in the Juneau, or southeast Alaska, area.

The pilot was employed by the FAA as a budget coordinator for the National Airspace Implementation Center, located at the FAA Alaskan Region headquarters in Anchorage. Each summer the pilot would travel to all facilities he was responsible for to assess future budgetary requirements. The operation of the airplane was for transportation in support of the pilot's job. A review of FAA purchase order records revealed that the accident airplane's rental and fuel purchases on this trip had been paid with U.S. Government SF-44 "purchase order-invoice-vouchers."

The sole passenger in the airplane held a commercial pilot certificate issued on August 30, 1991, with ratings for single-engine land and sea airplanes, multiengine airplanes, and instruments. She also held a flight instructor certificate with privileges for single-engine airplanes, with an instrument rating. She held a first class medical certificate issued on February 20, 1998, with the restriction that she wear corrective lenses. Her uncorrected distant vision was 20/200, corrected to 20/20. She possessed a Statement of Demonstrated Ability (SODA) for visual acuity, issued on February 9, 1977. Her height was 64 inches.

According to her logbook, the passenger had accumulated 1,795 hours of flight experience. In the previous 90 and 30 days, she had flown 32 and 28 hours, respectively. A review of her pilot logbook, which was found in the accident airplane, showed that she had logged pilot-in-command and flight instructor time for all previous flights on this trip. No record was found of previous flight experience in the Juneau, or southeast Alaska, area.

The passenger was employed by Lockheed-Martin, Inc., as a support contractor assigned to the FAA Alaskan Region. Her place of employment was at the FAA Alaskan Region headquarters, where she was a communications specialist. According to her supervisor, she was assigned to the trip as a support specialist for assessing budget and technical needs, and was not assigned as a flight crewmember.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Helicopter

The helicopter was equipped with white, high-intensity strobe lights located on top of the fuselage aft of the main rotor mast and on the tips of both horizontal stabilizers. Red, rotating beacons were located under the fuselage and on the top of the vertical stabilizer. Navigation lights were located on the tail and ends of the horizontal stabilizers. Two pulsating landing lights were located under the fuselage and projected forward through an arc of 180 degrees. All light bulbs on the accident helicopter were inspected after the accident; all were intact and operative.

The helicopter's color scheme was white and red. The upper surface of the helicopter main rotor blades were painted in an alternating white and black, high-visibility paint scheme.

Item 1 on the AS-350 pilot ENGINE START/SYSTEMS CHECK checklist used by ERA is: "Anti Coll. Lt. ... ON." Item 7 on the BEFORE TAKEOFF checklist is: "Landing / Pulse Lights ... AS REQUIRED." The company procedure is that all lights must be on and functioning prior to departure. Immediately prior to takeoff the company lineman ensures the lights are on and all operating. If any lights are not operational, the company requires the flight to be delayed to replace them.

Airplane

The FAA Alaskan Region had rented the airplane for business use by the pilot as a means of transportation for the duration of this trip.

The airplane was equipped with a landing light and a taxi light, both located in the nose of the airplane facing forward. The airplane had a high-visibility, white strobe light mounted on each wingtip, standard red/green/white navigation position lights, and a red, anti-collision rotating beacon on top of the vertical stabilizer.

The airplane's color scheme was white, with burnt orange stripes and highlights.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The closest weather observation station is located at the Juneau International Airport, located 13 miles west of the accident site. At 1613 a special observation indicated winds from 280 degrees at 14 knots, broken ceilings of 4,000 feet, and 10 miles visibility. A review of photographs taken from the helicopter passengers' cameras show gray, overcast clouds, and ridgetops at 4,000 feet msl visible. Visibility in the photographs from the Juneau-Douglas bridge in downtown Juneau was beyond the eastern entrance of Gastineau Channel to Williams Mountain, a distance of 14 nautical miles.

The pilot of the helicopter told the NTSB IIC on May 31, that the tops of the ridges were visible, and that because of the overcast there was no direct sunlight, and good visibility.

AIDS TO NAVIGATION

No radar coverage exists in the area of the accident.

COMMUNICATIONS

Postaccident investigation on June 22, 1998, of the Allied-Signal, King KX-155 Navigation-Communications radios, revealed the following frequencies captured in the nonvolatile memory chips:

Com-1 Active: 118.7 MHz Standby:121.9 MHz Nav-1 Active: 116.5 MHz Standby:113.8 MHz

Com-2 Active: 122.2 MHz Standby:126.4 MHz Nav-2 Active: 116.5 MHz Standby:113.8 MHz

The closest geographic frequencies which match those selected are as follows:

Communication:

118.7 MHz Juneau Air Traffic Control Tower 121.9 MHz Juneau Ground Control 122.2 MHz Juneau Radio (Flight Service Station) 126.4 MHz Juneau ATIS

Navigation:

116.5 MHz Level Island VOR (20 miles southeast of Petersburg, Alaska) 113.8 MHz Biorka VOR (13 miles west of Sitka, Alaska)

At 1521, the pilot of the airplane contacted the Sitka FSS, and transmitted "Sitka radio, this is Cutlass 4948V on 122.35 at Petersburg. We'll be off here at ah (15)25, would you please activate my flight plan to Juneau, please."

Three minutes prior to the collision, at 1608, the pilot of the airplane contacted Juneau AFSS on 122.2 MHz and transmitted "(yeah) we're about 15 miles ah down Gastineau Channel would you cancel our flight plan please." The Juneau AFSS radio frequency depicted on the VFR sectional chart for the Juneau downtown RCO area is 122.15.

The Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) for the Juneau Harbor Seaplane Base is 123.05. This is also the frequency depicted in the "Alaska Aviation Information 1998" booklet which provided local traffic information, and in the Juneau Area local air taxi operator's Letter Of Agreement (LOA) for traffic transiting the harbor area. This frequency was not selected in any of the frequency bins of the accident airplane.

The first helicopter in the flight of three made departure and traffic calls for all the helicopters on 118.7 MHz (tower), and then on 123.05 MHz (Juneau Harbor CTAF). The accident helicopter pilot told the NTSB IIC during an interview on May 31, that because he was delayed three minutes, and behind the first two helicopters in the flight, he made all of his own traffic calls as well when departing the helicopter pad, when crossing the Juneau-Douglas bridge, and when crossing Gastineau Channel at Treadwell. He said that when he was crossing Gastineau Channel, the first two helicopters had already crossed over a ridge and were no longer in sight.

According to the FAA coordinator, the accident helicopter pilot told him on May 30, that he did not make his own radio transmissions prior to the collision. He indicated that the first helicopter in the flight made calls for all three helicopters.

Immediately after the collision, the pilot of the helicopter transmitted "going down in Sheep Creek, at the mine." He told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that he did not receive any response. The other two helicopters in his flight overheard his distress call on the company frequency, as did dispatchers at the company heliport.

Once he landed, he notified his company that they were safely on the ground, and the company immediately dispatched another helicopter to assist him. This was relayed to the other helicopters in his flight, and they continued on their respective tours. Both of these pilots told the IIC that they were unaware that a collision had occurred until they returned from their tours, and believed the landing was precautionary due to a mechanical problem.

None of the helicopter pilots, nor the air taxi airplane pilot who exited the eastern end of Gastineau Channel at 1605, indicated they heard any transmissions from the accident airplane on 123.05 MHz.

AERODROME / AIRSPACE INFORMATION

The collision occurred beyond the lateral limits of the Juneau International Airport Class D airspace, three miles southeast of downtown Juneau, and the Juneau Harbor Seaplane Base (5Z1). The Juneau Harbor Seaplane Base is an uncontrolled seadrome which serves a high volume of seaplane traffic providing services to cruise ships during the summer tourist season. This seadrome utilizes a common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) of 123.05 MHz, which is published on the Juneau VFR Sectional navigation chart. A copy of this chart was found loose in the cockpit of the airplane.

An explanation of air tour routes, and recommended altitudes for entry to the Juneau area through the Gastineau Channel is shown in chart form in the "Alaska Aviation Information 1998" booklet published by the FAA Juneau FSDO. A copy of this booklet was recovered from the seatback pocket of the airplane's right seat.

This information booklet contains several guidelines for local operations. These are, in part: (1) Page 2: "All aircraft should fly with their lights on at all times." (2) Pages 3, 7, and 9: Charts showing the Gastineau Channel area using 123.05 MHz as a common frequency. (3) Pages 11 and 13: Charts showing the Gastineau Channel area using 123.05 MHz as a common frequency. These charts also depict traffic crossing the channel northbound at Treadwell. (4) Page 23: Chart depicting downtown Juneau and Gastineau Channel. This chart depicts the CTAF as 123.05 MHz, and recommends aircraft crossing the Gastineau Channel operate between 1,500 feet and 2,000 feet. It depicts aircraft transiting the north side of Gastineau Channel toward Juneau fly above 2,000 feet, or below 1,000 feet.

The Gastineau Channel is a salt water channel bounded by mountain ridges on either side which extend up to 3,800 feet msl. The surrounding ridges form a channel through which all air traffic to and from the Juneau International Airport must fly. During the summer months, the density of air taxi, air tour, and general aviation air traffic is extremely high.

In order to smooth the flow of this traffic, air taxi operators and the FAA Juneau FSDO authored a voluntary Letter Of Agreement (LOA), dated May 29, 1997, "for the purpose of establishing safe operating practices in uncontrolled airspace in the geographic areas surrounding Juneau, Alaska." This LOA recommended routes to be followed in uncontrolled (Class G) airspace outside the Class D surface area. Page 1 of this LOA states, "The topography and prevailing weather surrounding Juneau, Alaska, channels aircraft into common routes, creating potential conflicts between aircraft regardless of the type of operation being conducted. The largest concentration of aircraft is comprised of VFR commuter traffic, and air tours. However, all aircraft are geographically required to use the same routes."

The three helicopters from the company were operating in accordance with the voluntary route specified in the LOA. This route calls for helicopter traffic to cross Gastineau Channel from Treadwell, to the area of the accident, between 1,500 and 2,000 feet msl. This route is specified in company procedures, and pilots are trained to adhere to it unless weather forces a deviation. Once across the channel, helicopters begin a climb up a ridge. The same agreement calls for aircraft inbound to Juneau from the east to cross this area either below 1,000 feet msl, or above 2,000 feet msl. The accident occurred at 2,100 feet msl.

There is no air traffic radar coverage in the Juneau area. The air traffic control tower at the international airport has no radar capability, and separates inbound and outbound VFR and IFR traffic by pilot provided position reports. Tower personnel are not able to see the western edge of the Class D surface area, due to a 500 feet high peninsula located one mile to the west, which obstructs the field of view from the tower. Tower personnel are not able to see downtown Juneau, beyond the eastern edge of the Class D surface area, due to a bend in the mountains which border the Gastineau Channel. The nearest air route traffic control center radar is located on Biorka Island, about 80 miles south. This radar site is separated from Juneau by several sets of 5,000 feet msl high mountains. Because of the topography, no radar coverage is available in the Juneau area below about 7,000 feet msl.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The NTSB IIC examined the wreckage of the airplane at the accident site initially on May 30, 1998. The helicopter was first examined on May 31, 1998.

The airplane came to rest in a tidal area of Gastineau Channel, three miles southeast of the Juneau Harbor Seaplane Base.

The flap actuator was found in a flaps retracted position. The landing and taxi light switches in the cockpit were both destroyed. The navigation light switch was destroyed. The tail position light was recovered from the wreckage in an intact condition. This light bulb filament yielded no indication of ductile or 'hot' stretching. The airplane's anti-collision beacon switch was "ON", and the strobe light switch was in the "OFF" position.

The right aileron of the Cessna terminated 164 inches outboard of the wing root. The right wing leading edge was deformed aft 140 inches outboard of the wing root. The right wing fuselage attachment fittings were deformed aft, and the right wing was oriented parallel to the fuselage. The right wing leading edges did not exhibit crushing.

The left wing leading edges displayed accordion-type crushing of the leading edge D-tubes. The left wing of the Cessna had the entire aileron attached.

The outboard 18 inches of the right aileron were not located.

The outboard 25 inches of the right wing were not located at the airplane impact site. The right wing outboard tip rib, right strobe light assembly, fiberglass tip cap, and green glass were found on the aft cabin floor of the helicopter. An 18-inch section of upper and lower wing skin, and wing outer spar, corresponding to wing stations 190.0 to 208.0, was removed from the aft, right, skid cross-tube assembly of the helicopter where the cross-tube joins the fuselage.

The right-rear seat frame in the helicopter had a one inch deep indentation located two inches inboard of the right side door frame.

Metallic scratches were observed on the right side of the helicopter fuselage extending from a point on the door adjacent to the right-rear seat frame, slightly down and aft to the point where the fuselage joins the right-rear skid cross-tube. The antennas beneath the tail boom were broken off. Paint transfer marks and scratches were evident on the right side of the lower vertical stabilizer, which aligned with scratches on both the inboard and outboard sides of both tail rotor blades, seven inches inboard from the blade tips.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Postmortem examinations were performed on both occupants of the airplane by the Alaska State Medical Examiner, 5700 East Tudor Ave, Anchorage, Alaska, on June 1, 1998. Test results of toxicological samples from both occupants of the airplane were inconclusive due to extended exposure to salt water.

The company ordered a urinalysis test of the helicopter pilot, which was collected at 1920 on May 30, 1998. Test results (appended) were negative.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The airplane's tail position light was examined at the NTSB metallurgy laboratory for evidence of ductile stretching of the filament. None was found. The three position lights are controlled by a common switch in the cockpit.

Examination of the right wingtip strobe light by the NTSB laboratory was unable to determine whether the strobe was activated or illuminated.

A company AS-350 was flown over the tour route at a gross weight of 4,500 pounds on June 1, 1998, with party representatives on board. Cruise power of 85% torque resulted in 115 knots indicated airspeed, and a nose attitude of 3 degrees nose down relative to the horizon.

A Cessna 172RG was flown by the IIC and Cessna party representative with a cruise power setting of 23 inches of manifold pressure, and 2,300 rpm. This resulted in a level speed between 122-130 knots. The same power setting combined with a 500 feet per minute descent resulted in an airspeed between 130-135 knots. The Cessna 172RG Cruise Performance chart for 2,000 feet pressure altitude, indicates that 2,300 rpm and 23 inches of manifold pressure yields 65% brake horsepower (BHP), and an expected true airspeed in cruise of 123 knots.

The pilot of the airplane transmitted that N4948V was departing Petersburg at 1525, and the collision occurred at 1611. The elapsed time between takeoff and collision was 46 minutes. The distance between Petersburg and the collision point was 98 nautical miles, which equates to an average groundspeed for this leg of 128 knots.

Polar plots of the fields of view from each pilot seat were determined by the NTSB IIC placing his eyes at the same sitting height as those of both pilots, and the pilot-rated passenger. These plots were made from a fixed eye position, and did not involve any movement of the head to look around obstructions.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) - Basic Flight information and ATC Procedures, states in part:

"...1. It is a pilot's inherent responsibility to be alert at all times for and in anticipation of all circumstances, situations, and conditions affecting the safe operation of the aircraft. For example, a pilot should expect to find air traffic at any time and place. At or near both civil and military airports and in the vicinity of known training areas, a pilot should expect concentrated traffic and realize concentrations of air traffic are not limited to these places..."

The airplane was transiting through the area of the Juneau Downtown Seaplane Base en route to the Juneau International Airport. This seaplane base is an uncontrolled seadrome which utilizes a common traffic advisory frequency for pilots to self announce positions and intentions. This frequency is published in the Alaska Supplement, and on the Juneau VFR sectional aeronautical chart.

The AIM, Section 4-1-9. Traffic Advisory Practices at Airports Without Operating Control Towers, states in part:

"a. Airport Operations Without Operating Control Tower-

1. There is no substitute for alertness while in the vicinity of an airport. It is essential that pilots be alert and look for other traffic and exchange traffic information when approaching or departing an airport without an operating control tower. This is of particular importance since other aircraft may not have communication capability or, in some cases, pilots may not communicate their presence or intentions when operating into or out of such airports. To achieve the greatest degree of safety, it is essential that all radio equipped aircraft transmit/receive on a common frequency identified for the purposes of airport advisories.

2. An airport may have a full or part-time tower or Flight Service Station (FSS) located on the airport, a full or part-time UNICOM station, or no aeronautical station at all. There are three ways for pilots to communicate their intentions and obtain airport/traffic information... : by communicating with an FSS, a UNICOM operator, or by making a self-announce broadcast.

b. Communicating on a Common Frequency-

1. The key to communicating at an airport without an operating control tower is selection of the correct common frequency. The acronym CTAF, which stands for Common Traffic Advisory Frequency, is synonymous with this program. A CTAF is a frequency designated for the purpose of carrying out airport advisory practices while operating to or from an airport without an operating control tower. The CTAF ... is identified in appropriate aeronautical publications.

2. The CTAF frequency for a particular airport is contained in the Airport/Facility Directory (A/FD), Alaska Supplement... Also, the CTAF can be obtained by contacting any FSS. Use of the appropriate CTAF, combined with visual alertness and application of the following good operating practices, will enhance safety of flight into and out of all uncontrolled airports.

c. Recommended Traffic Advisory Practices-

1. Pilots of inbound traffic should monitor and communicate as appropriate on the designated CTAF from 10 miles to landing. Pilots of departing aircraft should monitor/communicate on the appropriate frequency from start up, during taxi, and until 10 miles from the airport unless the FARs or local procedures require otherwise.

2. Pilots of aircraft conducting other than arriving or departing operations at altitudes normally used by arriving and departing aircraft should monitor/communicate on the appropriate frequency while within 10 miles of the airport unless required to do otherwise by the FARs or local procedures."

The AIM, Section 5. Pilot/Controller Roles and Responsibilities, 5-5-8. See and Avoid, states in part:

"a. Pilot - When meteorological conditions permit, regardless of the type of flight plan or whether or not under control of a radar facility, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic... ."

Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 14 CFR Part 91.113, states, in part: "...vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft."

Wreckage Release

The airplane wreckage, with the exception of the airplane right wing parts removed from the helicopter, and the airplane navigation-communication radios, was released to the owner's insurance company on June 1, 1998. The remaining parts were returned to the owner's insurance company on June 23, 1998.

The helicopter was released to the operator on May 31, 1998.