Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's inadequate remedial action to recover from an inverted spin, while performing aerobatics. Contributing factors were the lower than recommended entry altitude for a spin and the pilot's lack of familiarity with the accident airplane.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 26, 1998, about 1109 Alaska daylight time, a Russian built, unlimited class aerobatic Yakovlev Yak-54 airplane, N354AM, was destroyed after colliding with trees and terrain on the Fort Richardson Army Base, about 14 miles north of Anchorage, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) local area personal flight under Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. The airplane was registered to Red Eagle Flying LLC, Anchorage, and operated by the pilot/owner. The airplane was operated in the United States under a special airworthiness certificate in the experimental/exhibition category. The certificated commercial pilot, and the pilot-rated passenger, received fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. The flight originated at the Elmendorf Air Force Base, Anchorage, about 1030.
The pilot, a U.S. Air Force Lt. General at Elmendorf AFB, and the passenger, departed Elmendorf AFB and joined a second airplane in restricted airspace R-2203 to photograph each airplane. No airspace restrictions were in effect during the flight. The airspace overlies military reservation land on the Fort Richardson Army Base. The second airplane, a Sukhoi SU-29, N329SU, occupied by the pilot and a passenger, departed from Merrill Field, Anchorage.
The pilots and passengers of both airplanes met at Merrill Field about 0930, and conducted a briefing about the photo flight. The briefing included primary and secondary communications frequencies, key landmarks, weather, and emergency landing areas. After the briefing, each pilot departed their respective airports about 1030. After takeoff from Elmendorf AFB, the accident airplane was assigned a transponder code of 0154 by an Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) controller. After departure from Merrill Field, the SU-29 was assigned a transponder code of 0151. The two airplanes rendezvoused in R-2203. Upon reaching the area, the pilot of the SU-29 was told by ARTCC to place his transponder on "standby." The two airplanes then flew alongside each other while the passengers of each airplane took photographs. The pilots of each airplane were seated in the rear seat of their respective airplanes which is the pilot-in-command position. Both seats of each airplane were equipped with full functioning dual flight controls.
The pilot of the SU-29 reported that after the photography session was completed, he planned to return to Merrill Field. He began to fly northward about 3,000 feet msl, diverging away from the accident airplane that was flying southbound. During a radio conversation, the pilot of the accident airplane stated he was going to demonstrate some aerobatic maneuvers to his passenger. The pilot and passenger of the SU-29 saw a hammerhead turn to the right, followed by a 4-point roll. The roll was conducted at an altitude lower than the SU-29. While he was making a turn toward the south, the pilot of the SU-29 momentarily lost sight of the Yak-54 airplane. After completing his turn, the pilot of the SU-29 reported he regained sight off the YAK-54. He estimated he was about 3 miles north of the accident airplane.
When visual contact was regained with the YAK-54, it was facing north at an altitude higher than what was used for the previous 4-point roll, and the airplane had just entered a spin. The SU-29 pilot said he estimated the altitude of the YAK-54 between 2,700 and 3,000 feet msl, and descending. He said the position of the airplane seemed to indicate the YAK-54 had performed a course reversal, and a gain in altitude, prior to the spin. The spin appeared to be upright, and to the right. The SU-29 pilot estimated the spin rotation around 300 degrees per second, with the nose of the airplane about 70 to 80 degrees below the horizon. The SU-29 pilot described the spin as "normal," but at an altitude lower than he expected. The accident airplane continued to descend in the spin without noticeable variation, for between 5 to 7 turns, until it collided with trees. Both the pilot and passenger of the SU-29 looked for parachutes, but saw none. The SU-29 pilot then made radio contact with the Anchorage ARTCC, and reported the accident.
Following the accident, the pilot and passenger of the SU-29 both submitted written descriptions of the accident events. They also provided an addendum to their written statements. Each addendum included a revision of their observations of the accident airplane. After review of photographs of the accident airplane, and comparison between the color of the airplane and their observation of the spin, both occupants of the SU-29 reported the accident airplane appeared to be in an inverted spin.
The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at latitude 61 degrees, 20.712 minutes north, and longitude 149 degrees, 39.931 minutes west.
CREW INFORMATION
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, instrument airplane, and glider ratings. In addition, he held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine, and instrument airplane ratings. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on February 26, 1998, and contained the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses.
The pilot's military career included flying about 40 different models of aircraft, and he had accumulated about 4,400 hours of military flight time. He routinely operated high performance military fighter aircraft. He received "G" awareness training, including centrifuge training, on October 30, 1990.
The pilot received a Statement of Aerobatic Competency (FAA Form 8710-7) from the FAA in November, 1996. The pilot's statement of aerobatic competency was issued for solo and formation aerobatics at Level 4 (minimum altitude of 800 feet above the ground), in a L-39/Yak-52 airplane. The pilot applied for the form on November 3, 1996, by undergoing an evaluation from an Airshow Certification Evaluator (ACE). In partnership with the FAA, the ACE program is administered by the International Council of Air Shows, Inc. After evaluation, a pilot's application for an 8710-7 card is reviewed by an FAA inspector who then may issue a card. The card is valid for 12 months.
Examination of the pilot's logbook, and review of a recent application for aviation insurance, revealed that his total civil aeronautical experience consisted of about 1,600 hours. In the preceding 90 and 30 days prior to the accident, the logbook listed a total of 42.7 and 22.8 hours respectively. His total Yak-54 flight time was 16.6 hours. His last flight in the Yak-54, prior to the accident flight, was on July 22, 1998, when .8 hours were logged.
The pilot received a check-out in a Yak-54 airplane on April 14, 1998. He accrued 2.6 hours of training in the airplane from an aerobatic demonstration pilot employed by the importer of the airplane. During the check-out, the demonstration pilot reported the pilot tended to pull hard on the flight controls during aerobatic maneuvers.
After delivering the accident airplane to Anchorage, the demonstration pilot indicated that marginal weather conditions contributed to delays in scheduling additional training time in the airplane. Therefore, the accident pilot received no additional instruction in the airplane.
The pilot began flying in the accident airplane on June 21, 1998. He accrued an additional 14.0 hours in the Yak-54 before the accident. The pilot noted the type of aerobatic maneuvers he practiced in the accident airplane in his logbook. These included hammerhead stalls, 4 point rolls, inside and outside loops, upright and inverted stalls, immelmans, torque rolls, snap rolls, vertical rolls, normal spins, incipient inverted spins, and inverted and upright flat spins. The pilot noted having experienced up to +8 Gs and -4 Gs in the accident airplane.
The passenger held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, limited to carrying passengers for hire only during daylight, and not more than 50 nautical miles from the point of departure. The most recent second-class medical certificate was issued to the pilot on July 23, 1996, and contained the limitation that the pilot must wear corrective lenses. In addition, the passenger held a private pilot certificate with a glider rating, issued on the basis of, and valid only when accompanied by, South Africa Pilot Certificate 1100.
The passenger's pilot logbook revealed no flight time entries after December 31, 1997. The passenger's wife indicated he was still actively flying. The passenger's logbook indicated a total time of 940 hours. He had previously competed in aerobatic competitions, and he had not logged any flight time in a Yak-54.
The pilot and the passenger had previously flown together in several airplanes, and had joint ownership in a Yakovlev Yak-52 airplane. The pilot accrued about 195 hours in a Yak-52. The passenger accrued about 67 hours in a Yak-52.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane was designed by the Yakovlev Design Bureau, Moscow, Russia. It was manufactured by the Saratov Aviation Plant, Saratov, Russia, on August 26, 1997. It is a mid-wing, tailwheel equipped monoplane with tandem seating, and a jettisonable canopy. The airplane is designed for aerobatic training, and unlimited class aerobatic competition. The U.S. importer of the airplane was the Northwest Aerobatic Center, Ephrata, Washington.
Personnel from the Yakovlev Design Bureau provided the following information: The airplane is rated for nine positive Gs, and seven negative Gs. It has a roll rate of 340 degrees per second. Yakovlev Design Bureau personnel reported that according to their flight test data, at an aft center of gravity (CG) of 37 percent mean aerodynamic chord (MAC), the airplane exhibited neutral stability, but was easily controlled. At a forward CG of 30 percent MAC, the st...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ANC98FA110