Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The crew's failure to execute a missed approach and the flying pilot's (captain) failure to maintain directional control upon touchdown with a seven degree left bank and a right quartering tailwind. Factor's were the snow covered runway/landing area and the night conditions.
Aircraft Information
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On December 17, 1998, at 1840 eastern standard time, an Aerospatiale ATR42-300, N47AE, operated by American Eagle Airlines, Incorporated, as flight 4047, received substantial damage during landing on runway 28 (6,501 feet by 150 feet, asphalt/snow) at Cherry Capital Airport (TVC), Traverse City, Michigan. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The 14 CFR Part 121 passenger carrying flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The 3 flight crew members and 40 passengers reported no injuries. The flight originated at Chicago O' Hare International Airport, Chicago, Illinois, at 1730, and was en route to its scheduled destination of TVC. Austin Straubel International Airport (GRB), Greenbay, Wisconsin was filed as an alternate airport.
During the flight, the captain was acting as the non flying pilot (NFP) and the first officer was the flying pilot.
At 1813:40, radar data indicates that the aircraft is approximately 65 nmi southwest of TVC at 15,000 feet msl. At 1813:40, the cockpit voice recorder indicates that the captain said, "information Lima, two two five six zulu. winds are three two zero at ten. two and a half, light snow, mist. ... one thousand scattered, three thousand broken, fifty five hundred broken, minus two, minus four, two niner niner four is already set left center. they're using the ILS to two eight. thin patchy, ice. sanding and chemicals are in progress. ... landing's gonna be, thirty five thousand pound landing with icing speeds... call it one twenty three, one twenty three squared.
In the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) Air Traffic Control report of the aircraft accident, Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) told flight 4047 they were number two following a Cessna 152. Flight 4047 was then issued instructions to fly heading 300 to join the localizer with discretion to descend to 2,700 feet msl. Approximately three minutes later, ARTCC instructed flight 4047 to join the localizer for runway 28 and proceed inbound and to expect approach clearance after the Cessna 152 was on the ground. At 1837:53, the CAPT said, "...there's GWENN right there...". At 1838:28 Minneapolis Center cleared Flight 4047 for the ILS 28 approach at TVC and was instructed to maintain two thousand seven hundred feet until on a published portion of the approach.
Radar data indicates that the aircraft maintained an altitude of 2,700 feet msl until it was 1.6 nmi inbound from the outer marker, on the ILS 28 approach. Thirty six seconds later, the aircraft was at 1,500 feet msl and 3.3 nmi inbound from the outer marker.
At 1839:00 the cockpit audio mike recorded, "sink rate, sink rate, sink rate" followed by, "whoop whoop, pull up, whoop whoop, pull up, whoop whoop, pull up" at 1839:04. Five seconds later, the first officer called for 30 degrees of flaps.
At 1839:30 the TVC tower controller transmitted, "Eagle flight forty seven Tranverse City runway two eight. cleared to land. wind zero seven zero at one seven. altimeter's two niner niner five. ... runway two eight Mu is eight two eight five eight one, with chemically treated thin loose snow over patchy ice." (See Test and Research section for tailwind and crosswind components)
At 1839:44 a transmission from the accident aircraft responded, "cleared to land, Eagle forty seven."
At 1840:24 the TCV tower controller transmitted, "wind zero six zero at two zero." (See Test and Research section for tailwind and crosswind components)
At 1840:26 the cockpit audio mike recorded a "sound similar to aircraft touching down on runway".
In a debrief taken by American Eagle, Incorporated, on December 18, 1998, the captain reported:
"On approach to Traverse City we received a notice of weather change. This was approximately at the outer marker and made by the tower. The tower advised us of the change in direction and velocity of the wind. At approximately three to five hundred feet the first officer positively transferred control of the aircraft to me. I confirmed positive transfer of controls. The approach was stable. At touchdown the aircraft veered to the left. I returned the aircraft to the centerline and then continued to the gate. The passengers deplaned by jetbridge. Upon postflight inspection damage to the aircraft was noted. I then contacted the company."
In a debrief taken by American Eagle Airlines, Incorporated, on December 18, 1998, the first officer reported:
"I was flying an ILS 28 to TVC. At approximately the outer marker there was a reported wind change. I flew the approach normally. At approximately 400-500 feet agl, control of the aircraft was transferred to the captain. We continued visually upon touchdown the aircraft veered left. The captain brought the aircraft back to the centerline and a normal taxi to the gate was accomplished. Upon postflight of aircraft, aircraft damage was discovered. To my knowledge the captain contacted the company."
During a postaccident interview, the captain stated that he was inbound from Ft. Wayne on another flight, swapped aircraft in Chicago, obtained weather and greeted the first officer at the gate. He reported that he reviewed the weather packet and maintenance logs, which did not have any open write ups. He described the takeoff, flight and approach as normal into Traverse City, Michigan. He obtained information Lima and was vectored and subsequently cleared for the ILS 28 approach. He stated that the winds were reported as 030 at 17 knots, the crosswind component chart was pulled out on approach. He stated he was visual at 800 feet, and at approximately 500 feet, the first officer indicated to him that he [first officer] wanted to transfer control. He also stated that there was a positive transfer of control. He stated that shortly after touchdown, the aircraft veered to the left and that he could not see the centerline. He stated that there were "windrows" of snow 10-15 feet from the edge of the runway. The captain added that he believed that he applied toe brakes shortly after touchdown and applied some reverse. He also added that he could not remember if the aircraft began to veer before or after braking. He added that shortly after all three gear on the aircraft touched down, the aircraft veered to the left. The captain stated that he had applied aileron control into the wind with slightly forward pressure. He reported that he did not notice an anti skid fault.
During a postaccident interview, the first officer stated that it felt like a normal touchdown but that the nose went left. There was a "windrow" of snow 10 feet from the edge of the runway. He stated that the captain hit the windrow and taxied back out. The first officer stated that he was not touching any of the flight controls during the landing. He stated that the approach speed was 125-130 knots and bugged for icing speeds. He stated that the captain had given the ATIS information. The first officer stated that prior to the outer marker the winds were reported as 030 at 17 knots and visibility went to 1/2 mile. He stated that they discussed that it would be a crosswind and calculated the crosswind component with the tailwind component. The first officer stated that he transferred control since he did not feel comfortable landing the aircraft after seeing the snow covered runway.
OTHER DAMAGE
The TVC Airport Operations Manager reported that runway lights 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16, located on the south side of runway 28, were "knocked down". The "knocked down" lights were between taxiway H and the approach end of runway 23. The location of light 12 was reported to be 2,574 feet from the threshold of runway 28. The distances between lights 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 were reported to be 184 feet, 185 feet, 184 feet and 184 feet respectively.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The captain, age 41, was hired by American Eagle, Incorporated on June 25, 1990. He held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine rating, and type ratings in the ATR42 and ATR72. He was upgraded to captain on March 27, 1998, and received a recurrent training check on September 26, 1998. The captain had accumulated 8,000 total flying hours, 365 hours of which were as pilot-in-command in the ATR42. He had accumulated 90 hours in the ATR42 in the preceding 90 days of the accident. The captain was issued a first class medical certificate on October 20, 1998. Duty time records showed that he was off duty on December 15, 1998. On December 16, 1998, the captain reported, at 0830 CST, for a flight in the ATR72. The captain completed his duty period at 1020. On December 17, 1998 the captain reported for duty at 1500 CST and had flown two flights in the ATR72 prior to the accident flight.
The first officer, age 41, was hired by American Eagle, Incorporated on July 20, 1998. He held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and multiengine ratings. He was line qualified on September 17, 1998. The first officer had accumulated 3,520 total flying hours, 130 hours of which were in the ATR42. He had accumulated 100 hours in the ATR42 in the preceding 90 days of the accident. The first officer was issued a first class medical certificate on September 9, 1998. Duty time records showed that he was off duty for a 48-hour period preceding the day of the accident. On December 17, 1998, the first officer reported for duty 1054 CST and had flown two flights in the ATR42 prior to the accident flight.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
N47AE, an ATR42-300, serial number 0047, was manufactured by Aerospatiale in 1987 and had accumulated a total airframe time of 24,339 hours and 30,354 cycles. The aircraft was maintained on an approved inspection program and had last been inspected on October 16, 1998, at an airframe time of 23,993 hours and 29,904 cycles. The aircraft was fitted with two Pratt and Whitn...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CHI99LA055