N554CL

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 17, 1998, at 0856 Pacific standard time, a Learjet 55B twin-turbojet airplane, N554CL, made a gear-up landing at Los Angeles, California, after experiencing progressive loss of all electrical systems while en route. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; however, neither the captain, first officer, nor the five passengers onboard were injured. The aircraft was registered to IMP Inc., Van Nuys, California, and was being operated as an on-demand air taxi under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 by Clay Lacy Aviation, Van Nuys, when the accident occurred. The flight originated from San Diego, California, about 0830, and was destined for Los Angeles, California. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident and no flight plan was filed.

According to the captain's written statement, the flight crew was told by clearance delivery to expect a takeoff time of 0835, so the captain "decided to start the right engine and taxi out while waiting for departure clearance." The flight crew was then given a takeoff clearance prior to their expected time, and "started the left engine while taxiing to the runway and did the take-off checklist." The flight crew was told to change to the southern California (SoCal) departure controller. After the flight crew changed frequencies, the departure controllers experienced difficulty hearing the accident flight's radio transmissions. The flight crew could hear the controller; however, the controller could not hear them. The SoCal controller told the flight crew to contact Los Angeles (LAX) approach control.

The captain stated that once they crossed Long Beach Airport (approximately 15 nautical miles from LAX), "my instruments failed and we could not communicate with approach." He added that since the sky was clear and visibility unrestricted, he elected to extend the flaps and lower the landing gear. The captain remembered selecting 20 degrees of flaps and attempting to lower the landing gear; however, he could not determine whether the landing gear were extended. The captain elected "to make a low pass with the intent to land if [the landing gear] were down. Since it was obvious that [the landing gear] were not down, [he] made a go-around." The captain then "pushed the blow down lever thinking that this would extend [the landing gear]."

The captain stated that he entered final approach with the expectation of landing with the landing gear extended; however, he was prepared for a gear retracted landing if they were not. The pilot landed the airplane "as smoothly as [he] could." He added that the airplane continued straight down the runway until he lost rudder control, at which time the airplane turned sideways and slid onto the high speed turnoff.

The captain stated that he had pulled the firewall shutoff handles just prior to landing; however, "they were inoperative because of the electrical failure." He added that the first officer opened the door and evacuated the passengers. The captain attempted to shutdown the engines "using the normal shut down procedure; however, he was unable to do so because the linkage had been damaged due to the landing." The crash/fire and rescue personnel stopped the engines by spraying fire retardant foam into the engine intakes. The captain added in his statement that they did not utilize the emergency landing gear free fall system to extend the landing gear.

The airplane's cockpit voice recorder was sent to and transcribed by the NTSB recorder laboratory in Washington, D.C. According to the recorder transcripts the flight crew was taxiing out to the runway and running through the takeoff checklist, when the co-pilot called for the engine instrument check. The captain indicated that they could not "do that yet until we...start the other engine." The first officer replied "we'll stand by engine and electrical," and the captain stated at 0826:26, to "just standby everything," to which the first officer responded in the affirmative. At 0826:43, the first officer contacted the departure airport tower and indicated that they were "ready to go, uh upon our clearance time." At 0826:50, the tower cleared N554CL to taxi into position and hold for a 30-second to 1-minute delay on the runway. At 0827:11, the captain called for the runway items on the takeoff checklist. At 0827:19, a sound similar to an engine ignition could be heard on the recording. At 0827:30, the first officer responded, "okay before takeoff checklist complete." At 0828:09, N554CL was cleared for takeoff.

At 0832:58, the captain asked if they had the navigation lights on, to which the first officer responded in the negative. The captain then replied, "I can't see any of these things. I think they must be." The first officer replied that the beacon and the navigation lights were not on. At 0833:25, the captain again stated that, "there's some lights on because this is dim. I can't see any of those." At 0833:38, the captain stated, "something isn't set right," to which the first officer responded, "I've got all my lights off on my side." At this point in the recording, the captain alerted the first officer that the altitude was increasing and that they were beginning to join their cleared course. At 0834:45, the first officer reported "I'll do the after takeoff checklist if that's okay," to which the captain responds in the affirmative. At 0834:51, the captain stated, "there's still something wrong with that light system." At 0835:03, the first officer reported that the after takeoff checklist was complete. Three seconds later, he reported that the climb checklist was complete. Four seconds after that, he reported that the descent checklist was complete.

At 0835:13, the recorder picked up a sound similar to an autopilot/yaw damper disengage tone. Two seconds later, the captain reported that the "autopilot isn't working." At 0835:55, the first officer attempted to get weather information for the destination airport. During this attempt, the recorded weather message became faint and unintelligible. During the first officer's attempt to retrieve weather information, the air traffic controller instructed N554CL to contact approach control on a different frequency. Review of the recording revealed that the flight crew attempted to contact approach control four times. After the fourth attempt, SoCal approach indicated that "whoever just called was broken and unreadable," and requested that whoever called to IDENT. The flight crew continued to try and contact the approach controller and at 0838:54, the controller indicated that N554CL's "radio is completely unreadable. I'm getting nothing but scratches and noise." The controller also informed the flight crew that he was not receiving any transponder signal from N554CL. Between 0839:01 and 0844:57, the flight crew attempted to contact approach control using different radios and different frequencies to no avail. At 0846:41, the captain told the first officer to check his circuit breakers. The first officer responded that all the circuit breakers were in. At 0847:24, the captain instructed the first officer to "see about the emergency and all that kind of stuff." At 0847:39, the captain again stated that he thought that the navigation lights were on "because it's too...these...are very dim." However, the first officer replied that they were "definitely off."

At 0848:38, N554CL was cleared for the instrument landing system (ILS) approach for runway 25L at the Los Angeles International Airport, and was told to switch to the tower frequency. After this point on the recorder, the flight crew could not hear any radio calls from air traffic control; however, they attempted switching radios and attempted contacting controllers until 43 seconds prior to landing gear up on the runway. It was apparent that the flight crew attempted to lower the landing gear; however, they were uncertain whether they were down and locked. Review of the recorder transcripts did not reveal which, if any, gear extension checklist was used. It also could not be determined if the flight crew ever completed the engine start checklist (which would include the online activation of the generators). Further review of the cockpit voice recorder transcripts revealed that the flight crew did not examine the electrical system switch positions nor did they perform the Dual Generator Failure checklist. The flight crew did not discuss any common denominator for the radio, autopilot, annunciator and indicator lights, and transponder malfunctions.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate for multiengine land airplanes, and commercial certificates for single engine land and multiengine sea airplanes. The captain was also type rated in the Learjet, along with the Boeing 727 and 747; DC-3, -6, -7, -8, and -10; and CV-240, -340, and -440 airplanes. The pilot was issued a flight instructor certificate; however, it had expired in 1973, and according to FAA records, it had not been renewed since. The captain was issued a first-class medical certificate on August 10, 1998, with a limitation that he "must wear corrective lenses." He was also issued a airframe and powerplant mechanic certificates in 1977. According to the captain's last medical application, he reported having had accumulated a total of 23,000 civilian flight hours. According to the Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident Report that the captain submitted, he reported having had accumulated 25,000 total flight hours, of which 500 hours were in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The captain reported having flown a total of 70 hours within the preceding 90 days, of which 10 hours were flown in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

The co-pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate for multiengine land airplanes, and a commercial pi...