Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
THE PILOT'S FAILURE TO EXTEND THE LANDING GEAR, AND THE CHECK PILOT'S INADEQUATE SUPERVISIION. A FACTOR IN THE ACCIDENT WAS THE PILOT'S INADEQUATE UPGRADE TRAINING BY THE COMPANY.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On July 27, 1993, at 1217 mountain daylight time, a Convair 240, N156PA, owned by Cool Air Inc., of Spannaway, WA, and operated by Renoun Aviation, a 14 CFR Part 121 supplemental air carrier of Santa Maria, CA, landed with all landing gear retracted, during a simulated single engine ILS approach Gowen Field, Boise Air Terminal, at Boise, ID. The flight was being operated under 14 CFR Part 91 during a Part 61 flight check for an initial airline pilot's rating and CV240 type rating. An FAA air carrier operations inspector was conducting the flight check and occupied the copilot's seat. The airplane had departed Boise at approximately 1106 on a local VFR flight plan in visual meteorological conditions. The pilot, check pilot and jumpseat observer were not injured. The airplane sustained substantial damage and the airport runway sustained damage.
FAA air traffic controllers reported the airplane to have been executing a VOR/DME approach to Boise Runway 10 R (right) and continued to touch down with the landing gear in the retracted position. Neither landing clearance nor contact with the Boise tower was established at the time of the accident.
The airplane's owner, Captain Bud Rude, identified himself as a chief pilot for Renoun Aviation and director of Cool Air, Inc. Captain Rude told FAA and NTSB investigators that he had recommended, to the FAA, the Renoun first officer for the check ride, and knew the FAA check pilot personally. The chief pilot stated that he and another qualified company pilot-in-command had been available to act as first officer, but that the FAA inspector "had acted as pilot in command and had (occupied) the copilot's seat without his authority." The jump seat observer identified herself as the daughter of the airplane's owner and was reportedly preparing for a commercial type rating in the CV240 the following day. The owner said that his relationship with Renoun Aviation was to operate a company to lease airplanes to Renoun and then to act as a chief pilot. The FAA-Approved Operations Specifications for Renoun Aviation lists Captain Rude as one of the chief pilots.
The Renoun company first officer receiving the check flight told investigators that he had received a total of 1.4 hours left seat training in the CV240 prior to the accident flight. His flight log book contained no entries of instructor endorsement in preparation for the type rating check flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 61.
An interview of the FAA check pilot, who had occupied the right seat was conducted by the NTSB with an FAA Northwest Mountain Region inspector as party member. During that interview, investigators were told that a simulated left engine failure was in progress at the time of gear up landing.
INJURIES TO PERSONS
The three persons aboard the Convair 240 were uninjured.
DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT
The aircraft sustained engine stoppage and propeller damage to both engines, lower cowl damage and gear door damage to both nacelles and damage to both main landing gear. The aircraft skidded on its center keel and there was grinding damage to fuselage doublers at the center wing section of the aircraft's hull bottom.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot in the left seat of the accident airplane was First Officer Romuald Eugene Eckols. FAA records indicated that the pilot possessed a Commercial Airplane, Single and Multiengine Land certificate and an Instrument Airplane rating. He held a current FAA First Class Medical certificate without restrictions.
Records showed Mr. Eckols to have approximately 2200 hours of flight time, and have been employed as a pilot for about three years with Renoun. Prior to that employment, he was a mechanic at Air Kentucky Airlines and other companies.
The FAA check pilot in the right seat of the accident airplane was Robert Lee Rountree. FAA records indicated that this pilot possessed an Airline Transport Pilot Rating for airplane single and multiengine land, (ATP) with ATP type-ratings in the Convair 240, 340 and 440 airplanes. He also held Commercial Pilot Certificates in Rotorcraft-Helicopter and Instrument-Helicopter. Records showed that Mr. Rountree had listed his pilot hours as 15000 hours on his most recent FAA Medical application. He held a current FAA Second Class Medical certificate (commercial pilot) with limitations (glasses for near vision required).
Mr. Rountree also held certificates as a hot-air balloon pilot and a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) in airplanes, single and multiengine, helicopters and instrument airplane.
He told investigators that until recently, he was the only Convair 240-rated FAA examiner in the United States.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The local observation by the National Weather Service (NWS) taken at 1253 PDT was: sky clear, visibility 40 miles, temperature 79 degrees (F); dewpoint 44; wind 200 degrees at 8 knots; altimeter 30.10 inches (hg); remarks, few cumulo-cirrus. An observation one hour later showed no appreciable changes.
AIDS TO NAVIGATION
Boise Air Terminal area is served by VOR/DME, ILS and a Non- Directional Beacon (NDB) at the Locator-Outer-Marker (LOM), as well as a radar approach control facility. During the period of the check flight flown by the accident aircraft all components were operational and no outages or anomalies were reported.
COMMUNICATIONS
Review of original tower and radar facility frequencies in use during the two-hour period prior to and during the accident indicated that all local, ground, radar and ATIS (Automated Terminal Information Service) frequencies were operational and all other aircraft communications were normal.
The FAA check pilot was heard throughout the transmissions to be the communicating pilot. During the flight of the accident aircraft, N156PA, which lasted from 1103 to 1217 Pacific daylight time, communications between the accident airplane and Boise ATC facilities were marked with the following abnormalities in transmission.
At 1106 PDT N156PA changed the use of (2) transceivers before finding one that could be understood by the Boise radar approach control facility. At 1107 a clear transmitter was in use from N156PA, and continued to be so, throughout the flight.
At 12:06:50 the approach controller directed N156PA to contact Boise tower, local controller. At that time, the airplane was approaching the airport on the ILS Backcourse 28 Left, with a clearance for "the option" (low approach or touch and go). The airplane made a missed approach without contacting the tower. At 12:07:38, the local controller asked the radar operator (via interphone) to have N156PA contact him. Repeating the directions to the aircraft to contact the tower, the radar facility, at 12:07:40, directed N156PA, saying, "Convair Six Papa Alpha, tower one one eight point one. [frequency of the tower 118.1 Mhz]
At 12:07:43, N156PA announced, still on approach control's frequency, that he had commenced a missed approach, saying, "cause we're way too high." He then was given vectors for VOR approach to runway 10, and indicated that he would terminate the approach with a full stop [transmitted at 12:09:05].
At 12:13:16, N156PA read back a VOR approach clearance to approach control, and acknowledged that the approach would terminate with a full stop.
Approximately one minute later at 12:14:29, approach control directed N156PA to contact the tower on 118.1 Mhz. The FAA check pilot in N156PA acknowledged. That was the last transmission prior to ground collision.
At 12:15:51 the tower local controller attempted contact with N156PA without success. This prompted intercom calls to the IFR room (approach controller) and until the time of impact, there were seven additional transmissions to alert N156PA (including a United Airlines pilot) on local control frequency, three additional transmissions on approach control's frequency, two transmissions on ground control frequency and unrecorded transmissions on guard frequencies (121.5/243 Mhz).
AERODROME INFORMATION
Boise Air Terminal runway 10 Right is 190 feet wide and 9763 feet long. N156PA landed, on the approximate center of the runway, 30 feet past the entrance to Taxiway G and slid approximately 1000 feet to a position on the runway abeam the opening throat to Taxiways D and A. The control tower's view of the traffic pattern, runways and field boundaries is unrestricted.
The field elevation is 2858 feet (msl). The density altitude for a 79 degree (F) day (26.5 C) is approximately 5000 feet (msl).
FLIGHT RECORDERS
N156PA was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped with flight or data recorders.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Refer to photographs attached as a supplement to this report.
ADDITIONAL DATA
Investigators conducted recorded interviews with both pilots of N156PA, as well as the company chief pilot, at the Boise Flight Standards District Office. The interviewer was the NTSB IIC and was assisted by Ms. Mary Hoy, FAA Inspector (Ops) from the NW Mountain Region, Seattle.
Interview of Pilot
The interview of First Officer Eckols reviewed his flight experience, the accident flight and his recollection of the events leading to the gear-up landing.
Mr. Eckols said that he had received a "pre-check ride" with Chuck Troutman in the Convair on the previous Thursday in Kansas, and it had lasted one hour and forty minutes. Asked if he had been in the left seat of the Convair before that time, he answered that he had, a total of 5 to 10 hours, "on empty legs." He said also that he had not had simulator instruction. Mr. Eckols was asked if he had any other dedicated training flights in the Convair, and he replied, "I don't recall any dedicated training, . . . if any, it wasn't recent."
He said that he did not have a written recommendation in his log book to take the check flight, but that "Bud Rude recommended me to Bob Rountree." Mr. Eckols said that the check pilot did not ask to see hi...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ANC93FA128