N94WB

Substantial
Fatal

Wood SEAWIND 3000 S/N: 45

Accident Details

Date
Friday, February 11, 2000
NTSB Number
IAD00LA021
Location
CUMBERLAND GAP, VA
Event ID
20001212X20498
Coordinates
36.609317, -83.719863
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
2
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot's continued flight from visual flight rules into instrument meteorological conditions.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N94WB
Make
WOOD
Serial Number
45
Year Built
1999
Model / ICAO
SEAWIND 3000

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
AMERICAN INSPECTION INC
Address
6358 BRANDEIS CIRCLE
Status
Deregistered
City
CLARKSTON
State / Zip Code
MI 48346
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On February 11, 2000, about 1435 Eastern Standard Time, a homebuilt Seawind 3000 amphibian airplane, N94WB, was substantially damaged after colliding with trees and mountainous terrain while maneuvering over Cumberland Gap National Historic Park, Cumberland, Virginia. The certificated private pilot/owner/builder and passenger were fatally injured. The flight originated in Dunellon, Florida, at 0844 destined for Pontiac, Michigan, with an intermediary stop in Douglas, Georgia. No flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed.

A witness who lived near the park was in his house when he heard the airplane. He was interviewed via telephone by a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector. According to the record of conversation, the witness said:

"Approximately 3:00 pm - no sight - only heard airplane from indoors. The engine was sputtering, and was coming on and off. He ran outside to the back deck and looked up. There was a lot of fog but he did not see the airplane. He still heard sputtering for about five seconds, then heard the sound of the airplane hitting trees, then silence."

A second witness, an engineer, also lived near the park and heard the airplane. In a written statement, he said:

"I heard a small plane with the engine at full throttle, about 7 to 10 seconds with no missing sound, but full rev. Also, what sounded like a crash and the cracking of timber and then the engine went silent. I noticed the possible strong wind gusts at 1,300 feet and the accident site was approximately 2,400 feet."

A third witness, an auto mechanic, lived near the park and was in his yard working when he observed the airplane flying over his home. He was interviewed via the telephone by an FAA inspector. According to the record of conversation, the witness said:

"It was approximately 1430 when he first saw and heard the airplane heading towards the Middleboro airport, Middleboro, Kentucky. The airplane was white in color. The airplane went directly over his home and made a right turn toward the Pinnacle, which is the highest peak in the park. When the airplane turned right, he heard the airplane go full power towards the Pinnacle, which was fogged in. The airplane disappeared over the ridge into the cloud cover and then heard a cracking noise of trees then silence. He stated the weather was very cloudy and the Pinnacle area was socked in with heavy fog. He was confused as to why the airplane turned off his original heading toward the airport."

The airplane collided with terrain inside the Cumberland Gap National Historic Park, approximately 5 nautical miles southeast of Middleboro Airport (1A6), Middleboro, Kentucky.

Two FAA inspectors examined the airplane on-site. An inspector reported that the wreckage path was approximately 250 yards long, at an approximate elevation of 2,200 feet mean sea level (msl). Both wings were sheered from the airplane at the wing root. The fuselage came to rest on the right side, and the engine separated from the pylon.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate for airplane single engine land (ASEL). Examination of his logbooks revealed that he had received airplane single-engine sea (ASES) instruction and a certified flight instructor had endorsed his logbook for an ASES rating on December 16, 1999. However, there were no records that the pilot completed the ASES practical test.

Between March 16 and August 31, 1996, the pilot received instruction for an instrument rating. There were no records that the pilot completed the instrument rating practical test. He had logged about 3.6 hours of actual instrument, 27.7 hours of simulated instrument, and 3.5 hours in a flight simulator.

Examination of the pilot's logbooks also revealed that he had about 321 total flight hours. He had logged about 34.1 hours in single-engine sea airplanes, of which 18 hours were in the Seawind 3000.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Examination of the airplane's logbooks revealed the FAA issued a special airworthiness certificate on May 11, 1999, with the next inspection due on May 11, 2000. The pilot had completed Phase I of the experimental operating limitations established by the FAA for amateur-built aircraft. The airplane had accumulated about 55 total flight hours at the time of the accident.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The pilot called via telephone and received two separate weather briefings from an automated flight service station (AFSS). The first call was made to the Gainesville, Florida, AFSS between 0744 and 0755, on February 11, 2000. The pilot told the briefer he would be departing the Ocala, Florida, area headed for Pontiac, Michigan. The AFSS briefer provided a synopsis of the weather conditions and flight precautions that covered Tennessee and Ohio with instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. The AFSS briefer stated he could probably only get the pilot to Tennessee in visual flight rules conditions before the weather would become marginal visual flight rules (MVFR) to IFR conditions. The main IFR weather was expected over Central Ohio throughout that period, which impacted the route further north. The pilot stated to the briefer, "if we hit some bad stuff, we'll just put it on the ground."

The second call to AFSS was made between 1125 and 1129, to the Macon, Georgia AFSS at the en route stop. The pilot told the briefer that he would be visual flight rules from Douglas, Georgia, to Pontiac, Michigan, and asked for the "weather enroute." The briefer provided two flight precautions. The first flight precaution was along the Michigan portion of the route for occasional moderate rime and mixed ice in clouds and in precipitation nine thousand feet and below with the freezing level starting at the surface. The second flight precaution was for Georgia and Tennessee for occasional moderate turbulence eight thousand feet and below.

The pilot then queried the briefer and said, "okay, we're pretty much passed the storm aren't we-we're coming out of Florida?" The briefer responded, "uh huh." The pilot then asked the briefer if he had "got through most of what was the bad weather was going across?" and the briefer responded, "right now as far as on a direct route from Georgia straight up to Michigan, you wouldn't have anything as far as thunderstorms or anything like that. There's some light precip[itation] enroute, but there's nothing significant."

The pilot requested information on cloud tops and the briefer advised, "I don't have any tops reports." The pilot also requested winds aloft and pilot report information.

The briefing terminated without the synopsis, expected terminal conditions, visual flight rules restrictions, and AIRMET Sierra series for IFR conditions and mountain obscuration being provided.

Weather conditions reported at Middleboro Airport (elevation 1,554 feet MSL), Middleboro, Kentucky, at 1501, were wind from 330 degrees at 7 knots, ceiling 1,300 feet overcast, visibility 10 statute miles, temperature 49 degrees F, and dewpoint 46 degrees F.

Weather conditions reported at London-Corbin Airport Magee Field (elevation 1,212 feet msl), London, Kentucky, about 34 miles northwest of the accident site, at 1453, were wind from 020 degrees at 9 knots, visibility 2 miles in mist, ceiling overcast 900 feet, temperature 41 degrees F, dewpoint 38 degrees F, altimeter setting 30.03 inHG, with remarks of ceilings 600 feet overcast variable to 1,200 feet.

A weather study was conducted by a Safety Board meteorologist. According to the meteorology factual report, a review of the area forecasts issued at 0545, on February 11, 2000, was conducted. The area forecasts were available at the time of the pilot's weather briefings and were valid until 2300. Northern Georgia was forecasted to maintain VFR conditions, Kentucky was forecasted for marginal VFR conditions and widely scattered thunderstorms, and Indiana and lower Michigan were forecasted for marginal VFR conditions. Satellite imagery revealed that the top of the overcast at the accident site was approximately 6,000 feet.

According to the Airman's Information Manual (AIM), Meteorology section 7-1-3, titled Preflight Briefing, stated, "Flight Service Stations are the primary source for obtaining preflight briefings and in-flight weather information."

There are three types of weather briefings: standard, abbreviated, and outlook. The pilot should specify which briefing they want when they contact a FSS.

When a pilot requests a standard briefing, the briefer will automatically provide the following information in sequence: adverse weather conditions, VFR not recommended, synopsis, current conditions, en route forecast, destination forecast, winds aloft, notices to airmen, and any known ATC delays.

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL

A survey of the air traffic facilities along the intended route of flight revealed there were no recorded communications between air traffic control and the accident airplane. No radar data was available either.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The airplane was recovered from the side of the mountain and taken to a salvage facility in Griffin, Georgia. Several components were retained for examination.

The engine was examined on May 23 and 24, 2000, at the Textron Lycoming engine facility in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, under the supervision of the Safety Board. Engine and valve train continuity was established by manual rotation of the propeller flange. Compression was produced for all but the #2 and #4 cylinder, due to bent push rods. The spark plugs were removed and appeared dark gray and oily.

During the engine examination, evidence of oil blow by was noted on all the cylinders with the heaviest concentration being exhibited on cylinders #4, #5, and #6. All of the piston rings were worn and the piston skirts were scratched and discolored.

Examination of t...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# IAD00LA021