CGPTT

Destroyed
Fatal

Aerospatiale AS-350B S/N: 1317

Accident Details

Date
Thursday, May 4, 2000
NTSB Number
DEN00FA084
Location
BLANDING, UT
Event ID
20001212X20971
Coordinates
37.550178, -109.479652
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
3
Serious Injuries
3
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
6

Probable Cause and Findings

the pilot's loss of aircraft control due to abrupt flight maneuvering. Contributing factors were the high density altitude weather condition, the total loss of engine power due to the pilot manually introducing excessive fuel into the engine and over temping the turbine section, and the lack of suitable terrain for the ensuing autorotation.

Aircraft Information

Registration
CGPTT
Make
AEROSPATIALE
Serial Number
1317
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Model / ICAO
AS-350B AS50
Aircraft Type
Rotorcraft
No. of Engines
1

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On May 4, 2000, approximately 1555 mountain daylight time, an Aerospatiale AS-350B helicopter, Canadian registration CGPTT, was destroyed during impact with terrain while maneuvering near Blanding, Utah. The commercial pilot and two passengers were fatally injured, and the other three passengers were seriously injured. The helicopter was being operated by Peace Helicopters Ltd., Edmonton, Alberta, under Title 14 CFR Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight that originated from landing zone 1 (LZ1) 10 minutes earlier. No flight plan had been filed.

The pilot arrived in Blanding, Utah, on May 1, 2000, to relieve the project pilot working for a geophysical seismic team. On May 2, 2000, he flew a familiarization flight with the previous project pilot, and was briefed on operational procedures and environmental concerns. The previous project pilot stated that "when you live with, and fly for a geophysical seismic crew for 3 or 4 weeks, they get used to you; a new guy has to prove himself." The operator stated that this was the first time that the pilot had been on assignment in the United States.

On May 3, 2000, the pilot flew his first day as the project pilot. In the afternoon, the Safety Officer of the geophysical project said that the pilot told him that this was "his first time to fly in the desert, and the [desert's unpredictable] winds." He also said that the pilot seemed "very brash."

On May 4, 2000, the helicopter mechanic said that the helicopter was fueled at the LZ1 staging area (landing zone 1; N37 degrees 22.77', W109 degrees 28.40'; elevation 4,702 feet) to its project maximum 40 percent of the 143 gallon tank, or 57 gallons. A geophysical team member, who operated the Kodiak system [a computerized ground based resource management system that displays and records the real-time helicopter location utilizing GPS technology] at the staging area, said that he briefed the pilot for the flight. He said that the briefing included a request that the pilot "fly a little easier; less aggressive." The Kodiak operator told the pilot that two other team members had spoken to him and requested that he talk to him about his "rough handling of the helicopter."

The helicopter departed at 1545 and flew 5.35 nautical miles (nm) direct to LZ4 (N37 degrees 20.56', W109 degrees 23.01'; elevation 4,586 feet) to pick up five geophysical team members. The helicopter's flight data stopped recording on the Kodiak, at 1547, due to the terrain masking characteristic of the line-of-sight system.

The passenger sitting in the left front seat said that when he boarded the helicopter at LZ4, the pilot was wearing a flight helmet and shoulder harness. Because of the anticipated short ride, the passenger secured himself with only the seat belt; he also put on a headset. At 1552, the Kodiak system once again started recording; the helicopter was recorded flying westbound. The estimated weight of the helicopter, with five passengers and equipment, was 4,076 pounds.

At this point, the Kodiak operator said that he was scheduled to transmit the team's multiple drop off points to the pilot. But instead, he transmitted a radio request for the pilot to land the helicopter so that a seismic shot could be fired [the helicopter's noise/vibration is picked up by the geophones, and recorded if the helicopter is airborne at the time of the shot]. According to the Kodiak operator, the pilot radioed back that he would set down "on top, up here" [on top of the mesa]. The helicopter was last recorded (2.6 nm of flight from LZ4) on the Kodiak as flying 065 degrees at 68 knots, at an altitude of 1,696 meters, or 5,565 feet. This would have placed him 199 feet above the mesa (elevation 5,366 feet).

The Safety Officer, located .74 nm east of the crash site, observed the helicopter flying eastbound towards him (this portion of the flight was not recorded on the Kodiak due to terrain blocking). He said that as it approached the eastern edge of the mesa, it made a "very hard left hand turn [180 degrees] back to the west." He later estimated that the helicopter's bank was 45 to 60 degrees. He then saw the helicopter turn southbound, lower its nose almost vertically down, and then reduce its nose low pitch to approximately 45 degrees as it disappeared from sight. Immediately he observed a cloud of dirt and dust. He got on the radio and reported that the helicopter was down; approximately 1 minute from the helicopter's disappearance, he observed smoke rising from the mesa top.

One of the surviving back seat passengers [who was on his first flight with the pilot] said that he remembered a hard left turn, followed by a loud pop, then a screaming whir," followed by a red light on the pilot's instrument panel. Another surviving passenger said that he heard a loud noise (sounded like something breaking), and then a loud Beep, Beep, Beep.... The third surviving back seat passenger said that he saw the pilot move his left hand quickly towards something near his left knee. He said that the pilot looked "upset," and then he heard a loud high pitch screaming sound. The passenger further reported that moments later the pilot pulled up (on the collective) with both hands, but nothing happened.

PERSONAL INFORMATION

The pilot was a Canadian citizen. According to the operator's records, the pilot had a commercial pilot certificate (helicopter) and private pilot certificate (single engine airplane). He was not instrument rated. The records further indicated that at the time of the accident, the pilot had approximately 2,900 hours total time in helicopters, with approximately 1,500 hours in this make and model. The records also indicated that the pilot had flown in a variety of environmental conditions, including desert conditions in Canada.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was a single engine, six seat aircraft, which was manufactured by Aerospatiale (now Eurocopter) in 1980. It was powered by an Turbomeca Arriel-1B turbo shaft engine rated at 641 horsepower at sea level. The engine (S/N 303) was installed in the aircraft on March 14, 2000, with a total time on it of 9,274 hours.

On March 21, 2000, the engine air-intake particle separator was removed, which reduced the helicopter's weight by 14.6 pounds. The last weight and balance measurement was performed on March 29, 2000; the helicopter's empty weight was determined to be 2,624.01 pounds. The aircraft's certificated maximum gross weight was 4,300 pounds, its in-ground-effect (IGE) maximum gross weight for the weather conditions at the accident site was 4,025 pounds, and its out-ground-effect (OGE) maximum gross weight for the weather conditions at the accident site was 3,725 pounds. Transitional lift speed was 15 knots.

The previous pilot assigned to the helicopter, departed Edmonton, Alberta, on March 31, 2000, in the helicopter and flew it to the project site. He arrived in Blanding on April 1, 2000; the total trip flight time was approximately 10 hours. He flew for the geophysical project until being relieved by the accident pilot on May 3, 2000. The previous pilot stated that he "felt very good about the aircraft," and he had very few problems with it. Maintenance performed on the aircraft during his tour of duty was confined to a tail-rotor change and an engine bleed value change. He said that he thought it was one of the operator's "better aircraft."

The maintenance person assigned to the helicopter said that he performed an annual inspection on April 22, 2000. The aircraft records indicated that the last daily inspection was performed on May 3, 2000; the maintenance person said an inspection was performed on May 4, but was never recorded in the aircraft logbooks. At the time of the accident, the helicopter had 11,221 hours of flight time and the engine had 9,427 hours since new.

The helicopter's fuel tank held 143 gallons, and was calibrated in percent of capacity. The operator said that the Utah operation was using a 40 percent of tank capacity rule, or 57 gallons maximum fuel (6.7 pounds per gallon). A representative of the engine manufacturer said that the aircraft burned an average 37 gallons per hour. A manual fuel flow control lever (FCL) was located by the pilot's left knee. This was used for starting the engine, and would permit the pilot to manually control fuel flow if the engine's fuel controller malfunctioned. To manually operate the FCL, the pilot would have to disengage the lever and slowly manipulate it in the emergency side of the quadrant. According to the manufacturer's representative, the "manual FCL has a small range for movement, and is very sensitive to operate."

The helicopter's normal main rotor speed in flight was 386 RPM. The helicopter was equipped with a low rotor horn, which would have sounded steadily if the main rotor speed decreased below 360 rpm. The horn would also sound anytime the hydraulic system pressure fell below 30 BAR (1 BAR is equal to 14.5 pounds per square inch [psi]). The helicopter was also equipped with a master caution panel that included six red warning lights. They would illuminate for the following reasons: 1. low hydraulic pressure (when main rotor blade rpm decreased below 250); 2. low engine oil pressure (when the power turbine speed decreased below 70%); 3. low main rotor gearbox oil pressure (when main rotor blade rpm decreased below 200); 4. high main rotor gearbox oil temperature; 5. engine fire warning light; and 6. high battery temperature warning light.

The helicopter's landing skids had black hard rubber "Bear Paws" attached to the aft end of the skids, which facilitated landing in snow or on soft terrain surfaces. They measured approximately 18 inches by 12 inches.

The aircraft was equipped with an NS500 Kodiak navigation system that provided real-time information about the helicopter's location (u...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DEN00FA084