N41054

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 10, 2000, approximately 1215 mountain standard time, a privately owned Cessna 425, N41054, was substantially damaged in a collision with terrain approximately 2 miles north of Fanning Field, Idaho Falls, Idaho. The airline transport pilot-in-command and a second airline transport pilot aboard for the flight were fatally injured in the accident. The local flight, which was a maintenance test flight, departed from Fanning Field approximately 1208, and was conducted under the provisions of 14 CFR 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time of the accident, and no flight plan had been filed for the flight.

The accident aircraft had recently had maintenance work performed on its autofeather system pressure sensing switches, due to reports of the left engine not autofeathering properly in flight. The maintenance work was performed by Aerohawk Aviation, a maintenance firm based at Fanning Field. According to Aerohawk's owner, the purpose of the accident flight was to verify proper inflight operation of the autofeather system following the maintenance work on the autofeather pressure sensing switches and a successful ground check of the autofeather system. Air traffic control (ATC) communications recordings from the Idaho Falls air traffic control tower disclosed that the pilot called ready for takeoff approximately 1207, and requested to orbit above the airport at 8,000 feet (note: the airport elevation is 4,740 feet.) He was cleared for takeoff on runway 2 at 1208, and his departure was approved by ATC as requested. The pilot subsequently reported established in a hold at the Idaho Falls VOR (collocated with the airport) at 8,000 feet approximately 1213. The Idaho Falls tower controller instructed the pilot to report leaving the hold. Approximately 1215, an abbreviated radio transmission, "zero five four," was recorded. The Idaho Falls tower controller responded to this call but never got a response in return from the accident aircraft, despite repeated efforts to contact the aircraft. At 1227, the Idaho Falls tower controller informed the Boise, Idaho, Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) that she was receiving reports of an aircraft down about 2 miles north of the airport.

A witness to the accident reported that he first observed the aircraft flying south along Interstate Highway 15 (I-15) at an altitude of 200 to 300 feet above ground level. He stated that the aircraft then started banking left, and that part way throught the bank the aircraft then began a "skidding" or "sliding" motion. This witness reported that the aircraft entered a spiral about 1 second later and crashed. This witness reported he did not observe anything wrong with the aircraft at that time, but could not tell whether or not both of the aircraft's propellers were turning. The second witness reported that the airplane was banking west, and that it then "spiraled straight down and hit the ground." A third witness reported that the airplane was northbound, "banking to the west on its wingtip." This witness reported that the aircraft then went out of sight, and that he then saw a smoke cloud.

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at approximately 43 degrees 32.2 minutes North latitude and 112 degrees 3.8 minutes West longitude.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Both pilots were employed as corporate pilots for local companies in Idaho Falls at the time of the accident. The pilot-in-command, who according to the aircraft's owner was highly experienced in the Cessna 425, was retained by Aerohawk Aviation to conduct maintenance test flights on an ad-hoc basis. He held an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land, airplane multiengine land, and airplane single-engine sea ratings, and a Cessna 500 type rating (note: according to the provisions of 14 CFR 61.31(a), a type rating is not required for the Cessna 425). He also held a flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine, airplane multiengine, and instrument airplane ratings, with a date of issue of October 28, 2000. The pilot held an FAA second-class medical certificate dated November 23, 1999, with a limitation requiring the pilot to possess glasses that corrected for intermediate and near vision. No pilot logbooks for the pilot-in-command were located by, or provided to, the NTSB. However, NTSB investigators recovered documentation of the pilot-in-command's completion of a pilot-in-command proficiency check in the Cessna 500 at SimuFlite, Inc. on March 11, 2000. The pilot indicated on his last FAA medical certificate application that he had 8,000 hours total pilot time, with 250 hours in the last 6 months.

According to the owner of Aerohawk, the pilot-in-command had invited the second pilot to fly on the accident flight because the company that employed the second pilot was purchasing a Cessna 425. The second pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane single-engine land rating, with commercial privileges for airplane multiengine land. He held an FAA first-class medical certificate dated July 27, 2000, with no limitations. No pilot logbooks for the second pilot were located by, or provided to, the NTSB. The second pilot indicated on his last FAA medical certificate application that he had 2,500 hours total pilot time, with 200 hours in the last 6 months.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The aircraft, a Cessna 425, serial number 425-0172, was manufactured in 1982, and was registered to the then-current owner (who was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the accident) on May 28, 1997. The Hobbs meter reading noted at the accident site was 4,027.1 hours, which according to the aircraft logs also corresponded to the airframe total time. The aircraft was on a manufacturer's approved aircraft inspection program. The last documented inspections were phase 2 and 3 inspections signed off by the owner of Aerohawk Aviation on February 10, 2000, at 3,963.5 airframe hours.

The aircraft was equipped with two McCauley 4HFR34C762-H four-bladed propellers, which according to the propeller logs were installed new on the aircraft on March 15, 1996, at 3,216.5 airframe hours. At the time of this new propeller installation, the aircraft was equipped with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-112 turboprop engines. The aircraft records indicated that the propellers were installed per FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA1491GL (held by McCauley Propeller Systems), which authorizes installation of the McCauley 4-bladed propellers on PT6A-112 engines. Two new Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-135A engines, serial numbers PCE-PZ0025 (left) and PCE-PZ0026 (right), were subsequently installed on the accident aircraft by Aerohawk Aviation on September 24, 1999, at 3,937.7 airframe hours. The PT6A-135A installation was accomplished per STC SA622CH, held by Duncan Aviation (formerly Kal-Aero) of Battle Creek, Michigan. The McCauley 4-bladed propellers were removed from the aircraft and reinstalled on the new engines at the time of this engine change. A March 1996 amendment to STC SA1491GL added PT6A-135A engines to the eligibility for installation of the McCauley 4-bladed propellers (the original STC, issued in 1990, listed only PT6A-112 engines as eligible for installation of these propellers.)

The aircraft was equipped with a propeller autofeathering system that provided for automatic feathering of a propeller in the event of loss of the engine. This system was controlled by an arming switch in the cockpit with ARM, OFF, and TEST positions. In the OFF position, the system was deactivated. During nominal system operation with the switch in ARM, the propeller would automatically feather if engine torque dropped below approximately 185 foot-pounds (ft-lb) at power lever positions of 80% gas generator RPM (Ng) or greater. In nominal system operation, autofeathering of one propeller would disarm the system on the other propeller. L and R AUTO-FTHER ARM annunciator lights, located on the instrument panel, would nominally illuminate when the system was armed. TEST was a momentary switch position used to check out system operation with power below 80% Ng. According to the Cessna 425 Information Manual, the autofeather system on the aircraft is primarily intended for use during takeoff and climb. The Normal Procedures checklists in the Information Manual specify setting the autofeather switch to ARM in the "Before Takeoff" check, to OFF in the "Cruise" check, and back to ARM in the "Descent" check.

According to the Cessna 425 maintenance manual, with the autofeather switch in ARM and power levers advanced above 84% Ng, circuits are completed to two oil pressure-sensing switches (a high-pressure switch and a low-pressure switch) on each engine. These switches monitor engine torquemeter oil pressure. The high-pressure switch is designed to actuate under pressures exceeding 9.00 psig, and to deactuate when pressure decreases below 7.75 psig. The maintenance manual states that for serial numbers -0002 through -0186, the low-pressure switch opens with increasing pressure of 4.75 psig, and closes with decreasing pressure of 3.50 psig. For airplanes -0187 and on, the low-pressure switch is specified to open with increasing pressure of 6.00, +0.25, -0.25 psig, and to close with decreasing pressure of 3.00, +0.5, -0.5 psig. During nominal system operation, if an engine fails while the system is armed, engine torque begins to drop off until below the actuating pressure of the high-pressure switch (corresponding to a nominal engine torque of 300, +40, -40 ft-lb). Deactuation of the high-pressure switch on the failed engine closes the circuit to the coil of its respective control relay, which will remain deenergized as long as torquemeter oil pressure exceeds 4.25 psi (because of the open circuit at the low-pressure switch). When the torque of the failed engine falls b...