N911DB

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 22, 2001, about 0103 eastern daylight time, a Bell OH-58A helicopter, N911DB (call sign Air 1), owned and operated by the Polk County Sheriff's Office (PCSO), as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 public-use flight, impacted in a swampy area about 1.2 miles northwest of the Bartow Municipal Airport, Bartow, Florida. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed. No flight plan was filed. The helicopter was destroyed. The commercial-rated pilot and flight observer received fatal injuries. The flight had originated from the Bartow Airport at 0030.

The pilot of N911DB received a call from the PCSO Communications Center (dispatcher) for aerial surveillance shortly after a burglary in the nearby city of Eaton Park, Florida, located about 7 miles northwest of the Bartow Airport. N911DB departed the airport and flew to a crime scene area where it provided aerial support. At 0058, the pilot of N911DB called PCSO dispatcher, and stated he was clear of the scene. About 0103, and while en route returning to the Bartow Airport, the pilot was contacted by the dispatcher, and told that a deputy at a power plant to the south-southwest of his current location required assistance. The last radio communication with the helicopter was a request from a deputy to have Air 1 do a fly-by "Florida Power," when Air 1 answered "10-4." An attempt to make contact with the helicopter by the PCSO dispatcher was made at 0105, with no response. At 0145, the chief pilot for the PCSO's air section was notified by the PCSO Communications Center that they could not raise Air 1 by radio. The Chief Pilot began a search for N911DB about 0250, and found the helicopter about 0400.

A review of radar data showed the helicopter initially flew eastbound, after departure from the crime scene area, for about 2 miles, and then headed southbound (150 degrees) for 3/4 mile, then 180 degrees for 1 mile before radar contact was lost at 0102:35. In addition, when the radar data was placed on a map of the area it showed that the helicopter flew to the north of Lake Hancock while heading eastbound, and then flew over the water along the eastern portion of the lake, after it had turned to a southerly heading (See the copies of the radar data, an attachment to this report).

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held an FAA commercial pilot certificate, with airplane single engine land, helicopter, airplane instrument, last issued on February 7, 2001, when he was issued his commercial rotor wing rating. He held an FAA class 2 medical certificate issued on August 17, 2000, with no limitations. He received a biennial flight review, as required by 14 CFR Part 61, on February 7, 2001. As per the entries in his PCSO flight records, he had accumulated a total of 1,031 total flight hours, 477 total single engine flight hours, and 554 hours rotorcraft. In addition, the records showed that he had a total of 232 night flight hours, 13 simulated instrument flight hours, and 49 actual instrument flight hours. In the last 90 days before the accident, the pilot flew a total 90 hours; all in this make and model aircraft. In the last 30 days before the accident, the pilot flew a total of 67 hours all in this make and model aircraft.

The pilot was hired by PCSO in 1994 and had been a flight officer since 1997. He had obtained his single engine private pilot's license on his own and had accumulated 250 flight hours before starting his rotary wing training with PCSO. He started his rotary wing training with the PCSO in a Robinson R22 on May 16, 2000, completed his training and received his FAA private rotary wing rating on November 6, 2000, with a total of 200 flight hours in the R22. He received his commercial rotary wing rating on February 7, 2001. The pilot started his transition in OH-58 helicopters on February 16, 2001. He logged 100 flight hours in OH-58 helicopters, and completed his transition training on June 9, 2001. At the time of the accident the pilot had logged about 226 total flight hours in this make and model helicopter. On the same day he completed 20 hours in the OH-58 on law enforcement tactics with the use of night vision goggles (NVG). At the time of the accident he had logged a total of 156.1 NVG flight hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was a Bell; model OH-58A, serial number 72-21189, manufactured in 1972. At the time of the accident the helicopter had accumulated 4,822.2 total flight hours. The helicopter received an annual inspection on June 30, 2001, 134.2 hours before the accident. The helicopter was equipped with one Allison (Rolls-Royce) T63-A720, 420-shaft horsepower engine. According to the maintenance logbooks, the engine at the time of the accident had a total time of 1,743.9 hours (See the copies of the engine and airframe logbooks, an attachment to this report).

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The automated weather for the Bartow Airport for 0100 was: 400 broken, visibility 10 sm, fog and drizzle, wind 060 at 6 knots, temperature 23 degrees C, dew point 23 degrees C, and the altimeter was 30.05 in Hg.

According to the PCSO dispatcher's transcript of radio communications, between the crew of Air 1, and the dispatcher, the crew of Air 1 made the following transmissions references to fog, while assisting in the burglary in progress; Air 1 said (On Page 20), "...we're in an awful lot fog...we'll stay ah...as long as we can. We're in an awful lot of fog here." Air 1 said (On Page 22), "...We're trying to locate you through the fog, give me a light." Air 1 said (On Page 23), "...we're having to look through the fog so it's ah...limiting our clear ability so bare with us…." (See the copy of the PCSO dispatcher transcript of radio communications, an attachment to this report).

In addition, the chief pilot reported that there was fog at the airport and in the vicinity when he arrived at the airport, to start the search for N911DB.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The accident site was located about 1.2 miles northwest of the Bartow Airport. The site was in an area of a saw grass swamp, and a reclaimed phosphate pit. The accident occurred during the hours of darkness about 27 degrees, 57.10 minutes north, and 081 degrees, 48.8 minutes west. The terrain was flat with low vegetation and no obstacles in the immediate area. The helicopter was observed to be lying mostly submerged and inverted in about 4 feet of water with a portion of the belly, landing gear and vertical fin protruding above the surface. The fuselage was found with the tailboom and vertical fin aligned to a southerly heading. The dive team that helped in the recovery of the helicopter reported that an impact crater measuring about 4 feet deep, was located below the wreckage. The elevation at the crash site was reported to be about 200 feet MSL.

The on-site examination of the airframe and engine took place after the recovery of the helicopter and aircraft components were taken to a "T" hangar at the Bartow Regional Airport. The fuselage including the engine and main transmission were laid out at the hangar. The tailboom was broken off but remained secured to the fuselage by the tail rotor control cable. The cabin structure was compromised, with rearward crushing of the cabin extending from the nose aft. The entire fuselage forward of the engine was crushed and fractured. All instrument and circuit breaker panels were destroyed. The interior volume of the fuselage was totally compromised. The left horizontal stabilizer was torn off from front to rear. The landing (skid) gear remained in place and partially attached to the undercarriage. The forward cross tube was still attached to a section measuring about 2 feet by 4 feet.

Removal and layout of the flight controls showed all controls were accounted for with several fractures being noted. The pilot's collective and cyclic controls contained fractures at the base of the control tubes. The anti-torque pedals were torn from their mounts and the crossover tube. The actuating linkage was broken. All flight controls, and control linkages within the main fuselage were destroyed and/or damaged. An examination of these components revealed no breaks and continuity was established. All observed fracture surfaces appeared to be overload in nature.

Examination of the main transmission and main rotor revealed that the mast was bent, and then separated below the thickened area that is beneath the upper trunnion splines. The fracture surface appeared overload in nature. Main rotor and rotating controls exhibited no evidence of discrepancies. Bending, and twisting was observed to the main rotor blades. Both main rotor blades exhibited substantial damage. Both pitch links were broken. All observed damage was consistent with rotation. All fractures appeared to be overload. After removal of the mast, the transmission turned freely. The installed K-Flex coupling showed compression and evidence of rotational contact with the adjacent airframe during the impact sequence. The transmission had pressed down into the transmission deck as a result of impact forces. The mast was fractured in a plane roughly parallel to the static stops. The mast-retaining nut was secured to the mast. The aft portion of the engine-to-transmission coupling was engaged to the overrunning clutch assembly. The shaft was fractured at the base, engine end. The material damage revealed evidence of torsion in the drive direction. The flexors were also fractured.

The tailboom was still partially attached to the aft section of main fuselage by the tail rotor control cable. The left-hand horizontal stabilizer was torn from its mounting flange. The tail rotor drive train and Freewheeling Unit revealed that the freewheeling unit, installed in the engine gearbox functioned without any discrepancies. A 4-inch section of the tail rotor driveshaft remained engaged to the power takeoff gear. The tail rotor dr...