N96WF

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 16, 2002, at 1424 eastern daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12/45, N96WF, was substantially damaged during a forced landing at Trenton Mercer Airport (TTN), Trenton, New Jersey. The two certificated airline transport pilots, and one passenger were not injured. One passenger received minor injuries. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the corporate flight, which departed from Trenton, and was destined for Dulles International Airport (IAD), Dulles, Virginia. The flight was conducted on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan under 14 CFR Part 91.

According to a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), transcript of air/ground communications from the Trenton control tower, the pilot made initial contact with Trenton ground control at 1407, and was cleared for takeoff on runway 6 at 1421.

At 1423:02, the pilot stated to the local controller, "...nine six whiskey fox declaring an emergency, we're engine out, we're coming back to the airport." The local controller enquired if they had the field in sight, and the pilot replied that they had the field in sight and were going to land on runway 16. The local controller cleared the flight to land on runway 16.

The last segment of the landing roll was captured by a security camera. The airplane departed the runway in a right yaw of approximately 45 to 60 degrees. The pilot-in-command (PIC) reported the yaw was intentional, and an attempt to avoid the chain link fence beyond the runway.

The PIC stated:

"...Engine startup was normal, checklists were completed and we were cleared to taxi to runway six...Then we were cleared for takeoff...Ignition was turned on because of anticipated turbulence, all engine parameters were normal on takeoff including engine and aircraft acceleration...Gear was retracted and then the flaps were retracted. Concurrent with the flaps being retracted there was a squeal...We had been given a clearance to turn to a heading of 290 and we commenced this turn about 700 feet msl [mean sea level] and were in the clouds at that time. About the time we started the turn there was a strong odor of something hot, but not an electrical smell...[the SIC] told the tower we were returning to land and I planned on a downwind to runway six...Before the turn was completed, there was a loud bang that sounded like a compressor stall, but much more violent and a long flame shot out of the engine exhaust. I reduced the PCL (power control lever-throttle) to mid-position, targeting 15 PSI torque. The first bang interrupted thrust and then the engine seemed to regain some power, the second bang followed almost immediately with the same exhaust flame and thrust was lost. The PCL was closed to idle, there was one more lesser bang...[the SIC] announced that he was feathering the engine and did so...A glide was established and the aircraft turned in the direction of where the approach end of runway 16 was believed to be...The runway became visible through ragged clouds and we were high. I extended the gear and lowered the flaps. By that time there were main gear green lights...[the SIC] said that he would pump the [nose] gear, which he did, and he announced the green-gear down...I maneuvered the aircraft to lose altitude and align with the runway, landed on the runway with an estimated 20 knots tailwind in rain, ran off the end and made a right turn to cause a long run-out and attempt to avoid the airport boundary fence, berm, and railroad....We evacuated using the overwing exit (which is on the right side)...."

The second pilot stated:

"...Touchdown happened at a higher than normal airspeed with a high tailwind about at the intersection of the two runways. Braking action was observed to be minimal. At this point I turned to the passengers and shouted brace. After the announcement, I cycled the electrical crash bar. I felt the right pedal advance to the floor and observed the aircraft yaw to the right and queried...[the PIC] about this. He said he was doing this intentionally to avoid the railroad tracks. I concurred...After impact, I departed the cockpit to evacuate the aircraft. A foreign metal bar blocked the main cabin door, so I continued to the cargo door. The cargo door would only budge an inch or two after the second shove, so I turned around and announced we would be exiting through the window exit. I assisted...[a passenger] in removing the exit window and tossing it out and then helped both him and ...[the other passenger]to evacuate the aircraft. I then stepped through the exit and turned around to assure...[the PIC] was behind me...."

When interviewed, the PIC reported that although he was aware of the engine shutdown, he had not called for it at the time it was initiated. He added that based upon his airline experience, the first thing you normally do with a compressor stall is reduce the power. The second pilot reported that he initiated the engine shutdown based upon feeling a reduction of power in the engine. He reported that the PIC had not requested the shutdown at the time that it was initiated.

A person employed by Trenton Airport reported:

"While doing the mid-day field check, I had just exited off of R/W 16/34. The tower had notified me that a plane coming in with a dead engine onto R/W 16/34. At that time, I turned to look out the window to see the plane passing me. I noticed that the engine was off, and the prop was not spinning...I watched the craft leave the R/W. I saw mud flying all over, the plane hit the fence...I saw 4 people exiting the aircraft...One of the passengers was complaining of side pain, I walked him to the ambulance. I notice the left wing was off and landed on the train tracks...."

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at north 40 degrees, 16 minutes, 18 seconds, and west 74 degrees, 48 minutes, 24 seconds.

OTHER DAMAGE

Approximately 100 feet of airport chain link security fence was destroyed.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot-In-Command

The PIC held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for multi-engine land airplanes. He held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single engine land and single engine sea airplanes. He also held a flight instructor rating for single and multi-engine airplanes and instrument airplane. He was last issued a second-class FAA Airman medical certificate, with no limitations, on May 23, 2002. He reported his total flight experience as 26,274 hours, which included 3,942 hours in single engine airplane. He reported that he had accumulated 563 hours in make and model, including 45 hours in the preceding 90 days.

The PIC had completed Pilatus PC-12 initial ground and flight training on April 19, 2000, and completed his last recurrent Pilatus PC-12 ground and flight training on April 6, 2002.

Second Pilot

The second pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for multi-engine land airplanes. He held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single engine land airplanes. He also held a flight instructor rating for single and multi-engine airplanes and instrument airplane. He was last issued a first-class FAA Airman medical certificate, with no limitations, on March 26, 2002. He reported his total flight experience as 12,000 hours, which included 10,500 hours in single engine airplanes. He reported that he had accumulated 1,500 hours in make and model, including 50 hours in the preceding 90 days.

The second pilot had completed Pilatus PC-12 initial ground and flight training on June 19, 1999. His last recurrent ground and flight training in the Pilatus PC-12 occurred June 6, 2001. He had completed LearJet 31A, initial ground and flight training on June 14, 2002.

Interviews disclosed the airplane was flown both in the single pilot configuration, and with two pilots.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The wing flaps were electrically operated, and the landing gear was hydraulically operated.

The airplane was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney of Canada (PWC) PT6A-67B engine, and certificated for single pilot operations.

The engine installation was designed so that feathering the propeller also cut off the fuel, and induced engine shutdown. In addition, a loss of oil pressure on the engine would also cause the propeller to go into feather. A check of the emergency procedures contained in the airplane flight manual revealed that movement of the condition lever to cut-off/feather is part of the ENGINE FAILURE IN FLIGHT checklist.

The engine's oil system was equipped with a magnetic chip detector (MCD) that was installed in the reduction gearbox (RGB). The MCD used a dipole magnet, which attracted magnetic materials that may be in the engine's oil. When enough magnetic (or other conductive) material had collected to bridge the two poles, the material completed an electrical circuit that illuminated an amber caution light CHIP on the central advisory and warning system (CAWS) in the cockpit. There was no MCD installed in the accessory gear box (AGB).

The CAWS on early serial-numbered PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes, including the accident airplane, was designed so that such engine MCD warnings would be enabled only when the airplane was on the ground. The CAWS received a signal from the weight-on-wheels (WOW) switch on the left main landing gear. As soon as the airplane took off and the WOW switch was opened, MCD warnings were disabled.

When PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes were registered for use in Canada, Transport Canada required that they be modified so that the installed CAWS would display any engine MCD cautions throughout all phases of flight. Pilatus issued Service Bulletin (SB) No. 04-002, "Canadian Registration of PC-12 and PC-12/45 Aircraft," which called for the replacement of the CAWS in these airplanes with a system that would not inhibit any engine MCD cautions when the airplane was in flight.

When PC-12 and PC-12/45 airplanes were register...