N179GA

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 8, 2003, at 1850 central daylight time (CDT), a Dassault DA-20C, Fan Jet Falcon, N179GA, operated by Grand Aire Express, Inc. as flight GAX179, was destroyed when it was ditched into the Mississippi River near St. Louis, Missouri. The airplane was approaching to land on runway 30R (9,003 feet by 150 feet), at the Lambert-St. Louis International Airport (STL), when it lost power to both engines. The 14 CFR Part 135 non-scheduled domestic cargo flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan in instrument meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. The pilot and first officer received serious injuries. The airplane departed from the Del Rio International Airport, Del Rio, Texas, about 1630.

The airplane received vectors from air traffic control (ATC) for the instrument landing system (ILS) 30R approach to STL. During the first approach, the STL tower controller initially cleared the airplane to land on runway 30R. Later, the airplane was instructed to climb to 3,000 feet and to contact departure control. The airplane was then vectored for a second approach to runway 30R. While being vectored for the second approach, the flight crew asked controllers several times how far they were to be vectored away from the airport. When the airplane was on a base leg for landing, the flight crew reported that they had a "fuel limitation." They were then immediately issued vectors and cleared for the ILS 30R approach. After being switched to the tower frequency, the flight crew declared an emergency. The crew reported to the tower controller that they lost power to both engines. The airplane was subsequently ditched into the Mississippi River.

In an interview after the accident, the pilot-in-command (PIC) stated that during the first approach to land, when they were inside the outer marker of the approach, ATC instructed them to climb to 5,000 feet and "fly the heading." He stated that they were then vectored for another approach. The PIC stated that during the second approach they asked ATC how far out they were going to be taken and ATC responded 20 miles. He said that they were again cleared for the approach, intercepted, and broke out of the overcast. He stated that they went about 1 1/2 miles after that when the engines failed. He stated that during the second approach they questioned ATC several times as to how far away from the airport they were going to be taken on the approach. The PIC stated that they informed ATC of their fuel situation. He stated that they also asked ATC why they had been instructed to go-around on the first approach and that ATC did not give them an answer. The PIC stated that he had been assigned to the airplane since April 5, 2003, and that there were no problems with the airplane. In a later telephone interview, the pilot stated that the airplane had departed DRT with 6,200 pounds of fuel on board. The pilot subsequently provided a load manifest that indicated that the airplane was limited to 25,000 pounds takeoff weight due to runway and climb limitations. The manifest showed that the actual takeoff weight was 24,646 pounds.

In an interview after the accident, the second-in-command (SIC) stated that they had received vectors for the ILS 30R approach and that everything went "fine" until they were less than 7 miles from the airport. At that point, ATC instructed them to climb to 5,000 feet. He said that they were then vectored for another approach, during which time, they were sent 23 miles west of the airport, and then 17 miles east of the airport prior to being vectored back to the final approach for runway 30R. He stated that their fuel was critical and that the right engine stopped producing power about 15 miles from the airport. He said that the left engine stopped producing power about 30 seconds after the right engine stopped producing power. When questioned as to why he thought the engines stopped producing power, he said that they "ran out of fuel." He stated that when the right engine failed the fuel quantity indicator read zero, and when the left engine failed the fuel quantity indicator read 100 pounds. When asked if there were any problems with the airplane the SIC responded "No, the airplane was good." He also stated that after being instructed to climb to 5,000 feet after their first approach, he questioned the PIC about landing at the Spirit of St. Louis airport. The SIC said that the PIC elected to continue with the second approach to STL. The Spirit of St. Louis Airport is located about 14 nautical miles west-southwest of STL.

According to personnel statements made by FAA Air Traffic Control Specialists, the accident airplane was given missed approach instructions during its first instrument approach when adequate separation from another arriving aircraft could not be maintained.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The PIC held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on April 13, 2001. The ATP certificate listed ratings for multi-engine and single-engine airplanes. Single engine operations were limited to commercial privileges. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate with single-engine airplane, multi-engine airplane, and instrument airplane ratings. His first class medical certificate issued October 21, 2002 listed no limitations.

According to the operators records, the PIC had accumulated 3,221 total flight hours including 1,270 in the same make and model airplane as the accident airplane. Operator records show that the PIC was hired on April 11, 2000, and that he had satisfactorily completed upgrade training for the DA-20 on April 13, 2001. Training records indicate that the PIC's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, as required by 14 CFR Part 135.293, was satisfactorily completed on October 24, 2002.

The SIC held an ATP certificate issued by the FAA on April 24, 2001. The ATP certificate listed ratings for multi-engine and single-engine airplanes. His first class medical certificate issued October 21, 2002 listed the limitation that the pilot wear corrective lenses.

According to the operators records, the SIC had accumulated 5,758 total flight hours including 1,532 in the same make and model airplane as the accident airplane. Operator records show that the SIC was hired on October 26, 1999, and that he had satisfactorily completed upgrade training for the DA-20 on April 24, 2001. Training records indicate that the SIC's most recent Airman Competency/Proficiency Check, as required by 14 CFR Part 135.293, was satisfactorily completed on May 8, 2002.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was Dassault DA-20, Serial number 100. The airplane was a two-engine turbofan powered low-wing airplane with an aluminum primary structure. Each engine was mounted in a pod attached to the fuselage side near the rear of the airplane. The accident airplane had been configured for cargo operations. According to maintenance records, the airplane had accumulated 15,899.3 hours total time in service as of the date of the accident. The airplane was part of an Approved Aircraft Inspection Program and was last inspected on March 17, 2003 at 15,866.1 total hours.

Two General Electric CF700-2D2 engines rated at 4,500 pounds of thrust each powered the airplane. The left engine, serial number 222J077, had accumulated 4,136.8 hours total time in service, 2,020.4 hours since overhaul, and 600.9 hours since inspection as of the date of the accident. The right engine, serial number 304-571, had accumulated 7,798.9 hours total time in service, 7,798.9 hours since overhaul, and 806.1 hours since inspection as of the date of the accident.

The airplane fuel system consisted of a wing and center wing fuel tank and a rear fuselage compartment tank per side. Fuel is transferred from the respective wing fuel tanks to the corresponding rear fuselage tank, and then to the respective engine. A crossfeed system is also provided. A magnetic ground fuel gauging system is contained in each inboard wing fuel tank for ground check of fuel quantity. Each wing and center wing tank combination has an electronic fuel gauging system consisting of 4 capacitance type sending units which are connected to a two-pointer gauge in the pilot compartment. One of the gauge pointers indicates the mass-quantity of fuel contained in the left wing/center wing fuel tank combination. Likewise, the other pointer indicates the mass-quantity of fuel contained in the right wing/center wing fuel tank combination. The rear fuselage mounted fuel tanks each contain a float type electronic fuel quantity sending unit. These sending units are connected to a two-pointer gauge to indicate the mass-quantity of fuel in the respective rear fuel tank. Right and left side low pressure transfer failure warning systems are installed to indicate the end of fuel transfer, transfer pump stoppage, or transfer pump failure. Each wing/center wing tank has a capacity of 571.3 gallons or 3,817.2 pounds of fuel, and each rear fuselage mounted tank can hold 108.5 gallons or 732.2 pounds of fuel.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The recorded weather for STL at 1853 was: Wind- 020 degrees at 8 knots; Visibility- 2 statute miles; Weather condition- light rain and mist; Ceilings- 500 feet broken, 1200 feet overcast; Temperature- 4 degrees Celsius; Dewpoint- 4 degrees Celsius; Altimeter setting- 30.25 inches of mercury; Remarks- Surface visibility 2 1/2 statute miles, ceiling variable from 500 to 1000 feet, sea-level pressure 1024.7 millibars.

The Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts (TAF), for STL encompassing the accident time were obtained. At the time that the accident airplane's flight plan was filed, the TAF was:

Station Identifier: KSTL

Date and time of origin: April 8, 2003 at 1220 CDT

Valid period: Valid from 1300 CDT on April 8, 2003 until 1300 CDT on April 9, 2003

Forecast wind: 3...