Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's misjudged distance and speed during the approach to landing, and his failure to obtain the proper touchdown point resulting in an overrun. A contributing factor was the pilot's failure to abort the landing.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 19, 2003, at 1710 central daylight time, a Learjet 25B, twin-turbo jet airplane, N666TW, operating as Ameristar Jet Charter Flight 982 was destroyed upon collision with trees and terrain when it overran the departure end of runway 13 while landing at the Del Rio International Airport (DRT), near Del Rio, Texas. The airline transport rated captain was fatally injured, and the airline transport rated pilot acting as first officer was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 repositioning flight. The airplane was owned by Sierra American Corporation of Wilmington, Delaware, and was being operated by Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc., of Dallas, Texas, a 14 CFR Part 135 on-demand air taxi cargo operator. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight which originated from the El Paso International Airport (ELP) at approximately 1625, destined for DRT.
The operator reported that on the day of the accident the flight originated from Jackson Hole, Wyoming, early in the morning, making intermediate stops at Los Angeles, California, and El Paso, Texas. The flight was scheduled to arrive at DRT at 1730.
According to personnel at the airport, a transmission in the blind was heard on the Unicom, reported "Five miles north, landing 13." The airplane had been cleared by approach control for a visual approach to runway 13.
A witness who was standing outside the Fixed Base Operator (FBO) facilities at the airport stated that the airplane was "high and fast" and he was expecting the airplane to execute a go-around. A second witness, also on the airport ramp stated that the airplane was going so fast that he "thought the airplane was taking off instead of landing."
A third witness, who was doing some outdoor painting and was concerned with over-spraying aircraft on the ramp stated that he observed the wind sock at the time of the landing and he added that the airplane landed with a slight downwind. Another witness observed "that the airplane was going very fast" and noted that the airplane landed past Taxiway Charlie. Taxiway Charlie is located about 1,875-feet short of the departure end of Runway 13.
The pilot of a King Air on the ramp reported that he observed the airplane landing and that the flaps appeared to be fully extended. This witness reported that he did not hear the engines spool-up in an attempt to abort the landing.
The airplane overran the departure end of runway 13, impacted the airport perimeter fence, proceeded across a roadway, impacted another fence, struck two trees and displaced multiple headstones.
A person at the FBO that was monitoring the Unicom transmissions reported that a female voice was making all of the radio transmissions. The operator stated that the company policy is for the non-flying pilot (NFP) to make all of the radio calls, thus the captain was expected to be functioning as the flying pilot (FP).
No reported distress calls were received from the crew of the airplane prior to the accident.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The Captain
The 29-year old captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with the ratings of airplane multiengine land, commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land, and type ratings for DA-20 and LR-25. The captain's most recent first class medical certificate was issued on March 4, 2003, with a restriction "must wear corrective lenses" Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical records indicate that the pilot had waiver for a color vision deficiency.
The captain had been employed by the operator since August 31, 2000. According to the operator the pilot had accumulated a total of 4,689 hours, of which 2,889 hours were in multi-engine airplanes, with a total of 2,300 hours in jets. Company records revealed that the captain had accumulated a total of 1,348 hours in the make and model of the accident airplane, with 343 hours as pilot-in -command (PIC), and approximately 1,005 hours as second-in-command (SIC) in the same airplane. The captain had flown a total of 231.7 hours in the preceding 90 days, with 85 within the last 30 days, and 4.5 hours in the last 24-hours.
The captain's initial new hire training was completed on September 9, 2000. His transition training to the Learjet was also completed on September 9, 2000. His upgrade training to captain was completed on August 3, 2002. Last recurrent training was completed on March 21, 2003. The captain's last proficiency check indicated satisfactory performance in all areas.
The First Officer
The 38-year old first officer held an airline transport pilot certificate with the ratings of airplane multiengine land, commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. The first officer's most recent first class medical was issued on June 9, 2003, without waivers or limitations.
According to the operator, the first officer had accumulated a total of 2,873-hours, of which 1,500 hours were in multi-engine airplanes, with 234 hours in the Learjet 25. The first officer had flown a total of 205 hours in the last 90 days, with 65 within the last 30 days and 4.5 hours in the last 24 hours.
Company records revealed that the captain had previously flown into DRT 83 times and the first officer had flown into DRT 25 times. The records also showed that this was the first time they had both flown into DRT as a crew.
Following the recovery from injuries sustained during the accident, the first officer was interviewed by the members of the accident investigation team; however, she stated that she did not have any recollection of the approach or landing during the accident sequence.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane, a 1973 model Learjet 25B, serial number 25B116, transport category airplane was powered by two General Electric CJ610-6 turbojet engines, which were rated at 2,950 pounds of thrust each. The airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers.
The airplane was being maintained in accordance with an FAA approved airworthiness inspection program (AAIP) under 14 CFR Part 135.419.
The airplane had accumulated a total of 15,363.8 hours and 12,706 cycles. The most recent 300-hour inspection was completed on May 20, 2003, at 15,108.2 aircraft hours. The next inspection was another 300 hour inspection, which was due in 20.2 hours. The inspection was targeted to be accomplished on September 30, 2003.
According to records maintained by the operator, the right engine was installed on the aircraft on July 17, 2002, and the left engine was installed on September 05, 2003. The right engine, serial number 241-008A had accumulated a total of 13,182.8 hours and 12,087 cycles since new, and 7,797 hours and 7,080 cycles since last overhaul. The time since the last hot section inspection was 284.1 hours and 223 cycles.
The left engine, serial number 251-460A, had accumulated a total of 13,337.8 hours and 14,618 cycles since new. The engine had accumulated a total of 10,499.3 hours and 10,108 cycles since its last overhaul. The time since the last hot section inspection was 1,086.5 hours and 1,746 cycles.
The operator reported that there were no open maintenance discrepancies at the time of the accident; however, one appropriately deferred Category D Minimum Equipment List (MEL) item, 34-8 (an inoperative transponder) was being carried.
The airplane was configured with seats for the two crewmembers. The pilot and the copilot seats were equipped with shoulder harnesses. The maximum takeoff weight for the airplane was reported at 15,000 pounds. The basic weight for the airplane was 8,097 pounds. The airplane fuel system was capable of carrying a maximum of 6,025 pounds of fuel. The takeoff weight at the time of departure from ELP was estimated to be 12,897 pounds. The estimated landing weight at the time of the accident at Del Rio was 11,838 pounds, which included approximately 3,800 pounds of fuel.
AERODROME INFORMATION
The Del Rio International Airport (DRT) is an uncontrolled airport featuring a single asphalt runway (13/31) which is 5,000-feet long and 100-feet wide. The elevation of Runway 13 at the approach end is 998 feet, while the elevation at the departure end is 995 feet. Runway 13 has a slight downslope until reaching Taxiway Charlie, and at that point, the elevation rises back to 995 feet at the end of the runway. The overrun area of the runway also features a slight upslope gradient (uphill). There was no evidence of rubber deposit contamination on the runway.
The airport has several published non-precision approaches. The primary approach for Runway 13 is a localizer approach. There are also two Very-High-Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) approaches, a Non Directional Beacon (NDB) approach, and a Global Positioning system (GPS) approach. Personnel at the FBO reported that due to the airport's close proximity to the Mexican border, runway 13 was the designated primary (no wind) runway.
Runway 13 is equipped with a Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) with a 3 degree slope angle. The PAPI is located on the right side of the runway. Navigational aids include the Kotti NDB, located approximately 6 nautical miles northwest of DRT, and the Laughlin VOR, located on the Laughlin Air Force Base, approximately 7.8 nautical miles east of DRT.
Other than a 30-foot section of the perimeter fence, there was no other damage to the airport property.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
At 1653, the automated surface observing system at DRT reported, wind variable at 4 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear, temperature 82 degrees Fahrenheit, dew point 63 degrees Fahrenheit, and an altimeter setting of 30.03 inches of Mercury.
The density altitude was calculated by the Investigator-in-Charge to be 2,675 feet mean sea level (msl). Pressure altitude was calculated to be 898 feet msl.
Several eyewitnesses at or near the airp...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# FTW03FA229