N45BP

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On September 20, 2003, at 1854 central daylight time, a Hawker Siddeley HS-125-700A, N45BP, operated by Starflite Management Group, Inc., of Houston, Texas, was destroyed when it impacted terrain approximately 15 miles northwest of Southeast Texas Regional Airport (BPT), Beaumont, Texas. The airline transport certificated flight instructor, and the airline transport pilot and commercial pilot who were receiving instruction (hereinafter referred to as the instructor-pilot, first pilot, and second pilot, respectively) were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed. An IFR (instrument flight rules) flight plan had been filed for the instructional flight being conducted under Title 14 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 91. The flight originated at Houston-Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas, at 1759.

According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the instructor-pilot was preparing the first and second pilots for their FAA Part 135 competency and proficiency checks scheduled to be conducted in the accident airplane the following week. Operator proving tests were to follow shortly thereafter. The operator, Starflite Aviation, had five other airplanes on its air carrier certificate: a Beech 200 King Air, an IA-1121 Commodore Jet, two IA-1124 Westwinds, and a Lockheed L-1329 JetStar.

According to FAA documents, the first pilot obtained a CSC (Computer Science Corporation) DUATS (Direct User Access Terminal Service) weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan, indicating the airplane would fly to Beaumont in 23 minutes at 250 KTAS (knots true airspeed) and at 5,000 feet. The instructor-pilot was listed as the pilot-in-command. An IFR clearance to Beaumont was issued at 1748, and taxi clearance to runway 22 came at 1749. After the 1759 takeoff, the crew contacted Houston Departure Control at 1801, and was handed off to Beaumont Approach Control at 1810. At 1815, the flight was cleared into a practice area, the boundaries being between the 270-degree and 360 degree radials and within 20 DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) miles of the Beaumont VORTAC (Very high frequency Omnidirectional Radio range TACtical Air Navigation). The airplane was to remain between 5,000 and 7,000 feet msl. At 1828, Beaumont Approach Control instructed the crew to turn eastbound because they was approaching the fringes of its practice area and entering Houston airspace. The crew acknowledged and said that they were turning around. That was the last radio contact with the airplane.

The closed-loop cockpit voice recorder, that records ambient cockpit sounds for the past 30 minutes, started at 1822:50 and ended at 1854:27. Only the last 13 minutes of the recording, beginning at 1841:14 and ending at 1854:27, were transcribed. Prior to the start of the transcript, several steep turns and stalls had been performed. The second pilot was complimented on his performance. He remarked that he had never flown a jet before and would have to get use to its feel. The instructor-pilot then asked the first pilot to perform a stall in the approach configuration. The first pilot asked the instructor-pilot if he had "ever done stalls in the airplane?" The instructor-pilot replied, "It's been awhile." The first pilot remarked, "This is the first time I've probably done stalls in a jet. Nah, I take that back, I've done them in a (Lear)." The instructor-pilot said he had stalled "the JetStar on a [FAR] one thirty five ride."

At 1848:18, the first pilot asked for approach flaps (15 degrees) and for the landing gear to be lowered. The second pilot complied. The stall was performed and the recovery was accomplished. At 1849:57, the second pilot announced, "Five thousand feet, gear's up and locked. Vee two plus twenty, your flaps [are] up."

At 1850:22, the instructor-pilot briefed the pilots on the next maneuver, an approach-to-landing stall: "Okay, accelerate back to two hundred knots, five thousand feet. Find the ref[erence] speed. Do the checklist for the ref speed for our weight. We're at uh fourteen and seven is twenty one. Approach to landing stall is next. What did I say, twenty one? One twenty two for the ref. Your power is gonna be back at idle, you know. What else? Flaps. You know, approach flaps, gear. You don't wanna get flaps in there * late. No, no more trimming past, I think its one fifty or one sixty. Recover. Just like a go-around maneuver. Power, positive rate, flaps ten, okay, positive rate. Gear up. Ref plus twenty. Flaps up." The second pilot questioned the configuration: "So this one the flaps don't go all the way to forty-five, they just go to twenty-five?" The instructor-pilot said, "No, full flaps." A discussion followed as to whether the stall should be performed in a turn or straight ahead. It was decided that the stall would be done straight ahead.

At 1852:58, the first pilot asked for approach flaps and then for the landing gear to be lowered. The second pilot then reported, "Flaps twenty-five, set." The first pilot said, "Flaps," and the second pilot replied, "Flaps," and there was the sound of a click. The instructor-pilot reminded them, "*** power," and there followed the sound of decreasing power. According to the digital electronic engine control (DEEC) data, power decreased to 37 percent N1. At 1953:57, the stick shaker sounded. Radar-computed ground speed was 192 knots and decreasing rapidly. Altitude was 4,900 feet msl. DEEC data depicted a commanded increase to takeoff power and the instructor-pilot said, "Aww, don't do that now." DEEC data then showed a commanded power reduction to between 30 and 40 percent N1. At 1854:03, the first pilot said, "Gimme flaps." At 1854:08, the second pilot asked, "What do you want me to do?" Ground speed was between 112 and 113 knots. At 1854:10, the first pilot said, "Recover." There was the sound of increasing background noise, and at 1854:17, the second pilot said, "Power up, power up, power. Do something, man." The instructor-pilot said, "Power up." DEEC data did not record any increase in power, even though both engines were operating and controllable by pilot command. The CVR recording ended at 1854:27. Shortly thereafter, during the 1854 time frame, Beaumont Approach Control gave the flight a new altimeter setting. There was no acknowledgement. At 1855, the approach controller advised that he was not receiving the airplane's transponder signal. There was no reply. Repetitive calls were made at 1855, 1856, and 1908. There was no response to either call.

Twenty-five witnesses were either interviewed by telephone or in person. The consensus was that the airplane was flying at a low altitude and doing "erratic maneuvers." One witness said that when airplane emerged from the overcast, it "seemed to stop in midair," then it pitched nose down and disappeared behind the tree line. Several witnesses said the airplane was spinning --- some described it as a flat spin --- before it struck the marshy ground. One witness said the airplane fell "like a falling leaf."

The accident occurred during the hours of daylight at a location of 030 degrees, 08.44 minutes north latitude, and 094 degrees, 13.19 minutes west longitude, and at an elevation of 12 feet msl.

CREW INFORMATION

According to Title 14 CFR Part 1.1, the "pilot in command" is the person who: "(1) has final authority and responsibility for the operation and safety of the flight, (2) has been designated as pilot in command before or during the flight, and (3) holds the appropriate category, class, and type rating, if appropriate, for the conduct of the flight." Based on this definition, the pilot-in-command was the instructor-pilot, who, according to the CVR transcript, was seated in the jump seat. The instructor-pilot was also listed on the filed flight plan as being the pilot-in-command.

The instructor-pilot, age 36, held an airline transport pilot certificate, dated November 19, 2002, with an airplane multiengine land rating, type ratings in the Hawker Siddeley HS-125, Dassault DA-2000, and Lockheed L-1329, and commercial privileges in airplanes single-engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate, dated January 13, 2003, with airplane single/multiengine and instrument ratings, and a ground instructor certificate, dated May 20, 1988, with a basic rating. His first class airman medical certificate, dated July 18, 2003, contained no restrictions or limitations. He was hired by Starflite in June 2003, and completed company training in July 2003. His flight training record, dated July 22, 2003, contained the following notations: "Flight 1, 2. Good control - smooth - knows flows. Flight 3. Check ride ready. Flight 4. Retrain for check ride failure." According to his resume and personnel records, he had logged the following flight time (in hours):

Total time: 5,230

Pilot-in-command: 3,521

Second-in-command: 1,455

Turbine: 3,231

Pilot-in-command, turbine: 1,776

Multiengine: 3,290

Instrument: 367

The first pilot, age 42, held an airline transport pilot certificate, dated March 25, 2003, with an airplane multiengine land rating, type ratings in the Beech 300 and Hawker Siddeley HS-125, and commercial privileges in airplanes single-engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate, dated February 28, 2003, with airplane single/multiengine and instrument ratings. His first class airman medical certificate, dated June 30, 2003, contained no restrictions or limitations. According to his application for this medical certification, he indicated he had logged 3,800 total flight hours, of which 350 hours were accrued in the previous 6 months. Starflite hired him in August 2003. According to his resume and personnel records, he had logged the following flight time (in hours):

Total time: 3,817

Pilot-in-command: 2,684

Turbine: 1,575

Pilot-in-command, turbine: 617

Turbojet: 855

Pilot-in-command, turbojet: 80

Airplane, single-engine: 1,620

Airplane, multiengine: 2,19...