N457PH

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On December 1, 2003, at 0821 central standard time, a Bell 407 single-engine helicopter, N457PH, registered to and operated by Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI), of Lafayette, Louisiana, was destroyed when it impacted water following a loss of power while operating over open ocean water in the Gulf of Mexico in the vicinity of offshore platform High Island 560 (HI 560). The commercial pilot, who was the sole occupant, sustained fatal injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a flight plan was not filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi cargo flight. The flight departed from offshore platform, High Island 573, at 0814, and was en route to offshore platform High Island 264 when the accident occurred. The call sign for the flight was "El Paso 63."

The following is a chronology of the helicopter's flight activity on the morning of the accident:

0700 - Departed offshore platform, High Island 264A, with no passengers.

0702 - Landed on High Island 264C and picked up 5 passengers.

0705 - Departed High Island 264C

0723 - Landed on High Island 573 and dropped off 2 passengers.

0725 - Departed High Island 573 with 3 passengers.

0737 - Landed on High Island 582 and dropped off 3 passengers.

0739 - Departed High Island 582 with no passengers.

0754 - Landed on High Island 573 and shut down. The shut down was due to a wait for cargo.

0814 - Departed High Island 573 with cargo (5, ten-pound safety valves which were placed in the baggage department).

0821 - A "Mayday" call received was on company operating frequency 122.82mhz. The call was digitally recorded by the operator's communications center: "Mayday, Mayday, Mayday," and then a short pause, following by, "El Paso six-three, Mayday, Mayday, Mayday."

No further radio transmissions were received and response from the communications center was unanswered. Approximately 1150, the pilot’s body was found floating and recovered by a rescue vessel. Three days later, the submerged helicopter wreckage was recovered from approximately 240 feet of water.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a valid commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft and instrument helicopter ratings. His most recent second-class medical certificate was issued on November 13, 2003, with the limitation to wear corrective lenses. The pilot had accumulated over 14,000 hours of flight time in his career as a pilot, 10,700 hours of which were as pilot- in-command (PIC) of single-engine turbine helicopters while employed by PHI. He had accumulated 844 hours in the Bell 407 as PIC. Most of the pilot's flight time was accumulated flying offshore in the Gulf of Mexico. The pilot's most recent airman proficiency check was successfully completed on December 11, 2002. The pilot had 151 hours in the Bell 407 in the previous 90 days before the accident and 52 hours in the previous 30 days.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter, serial number 53147, was manufactured in March of 1997, received its initial airworthiness certificate on May 23, 1997, and was delivered to the operator on May 30, 1997. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had accumulated a total time of 4600.1 hours. The engine, a Rolls Royce model 250-C47B, serial number CAE-847043, had accumulated a total time of 4647.2 hours. Research of the airframe records showed the last major inspection accomplished was the 300-hour/3-month inspection at 4576.55 total airframe time on November 11, 2003. All of the life limited components were within limits and verified. Part numbers and serial numbers of actual installed components was verified. The last inspection of the aircraft was accomplished on November 11, 2003 (daily inspection). In addition, the 600-hour Lead The Fleet (LTF) inspection was accomplished on November 11, 2003, and the 25/50 LTF inspection was accomplished on November 11, 2003. The last major component change was the 1800-hour rotor brake overhaul accomplished on November 11, 2003 at 4537.05 total airframe hours. Airworthiness Directive research showed that all directives were accomplished prior to their required due date.

Engine records research showed the last major engine inspection was the 150-hour inspection accomplished at 4520.2 total airframe time. In addition, the 300-hour inspection was accomplished at 4528.55 total airframe time. The 2000-hour inspection was accomplished at 3489.0 total airframe time. The 100-hour Hydro-Mechanical Unit (HMU) inspection was accomplished at 4557.0 total airframe hours. The bleed valve was overhauled and replaced at 4378.55 airframe total time. Critical turbine component cycles (comprised of 4 turbine wheels) as of December 1, 2003, were: 1st stage wheel - 1,826 cycles; 2nd stage wheel - 1,826 cycles; 3rd stage wheel - 1,882 cycles; 4th stage wheel - 4,818 cycles. According to records, the turbine assembly p/n-23063354, s/n-CAT44419, had 3,940.5 hours of operation, and 890.1 hours remaining until the next overhaul.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Recovery: When the helicopter was raised by the recovery crew and placed on the barge, it was washed with fresh water. The general condition of the wreckage as it lay in-situ on the ocean floor was documented by divers as follows: All 4 main rotor blades were found attached to their respective grips and displayed minimal damage. The main rotor mast was not damaged and the main rotor pitch change links and horns were all attached and not damaged. The tail boom was attached to the fuselage and the tail rotor hub and blade assembly was intact. Several holes and dents were noted on the engine exhaust stack. Straps were attached around the main rotor mast, pitch change links, pitch change horns, and under the bottom of the fuselage to raise the wreckage to the surface. As the wreckage was brought to the surface and placed on the barge, it was noted that the main rotor pitch change links and pitch change horns were bent. The skid mounted floats were attached to the skids, not deployed, and the float inflation bottles were found fully charged. When the helicopter was removed from the barge and placed on the truck for transport, the four main rotor blades were removed from their respective grips, the skid assembly was removed, and the float bottles were discharged. The Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and HMU canon plugs were disconnected and washed with fresh water and covered with plastic. The ECU was preserved and shipped to Goodrich, West Hartford, Connecticut, for data retrieval.

An examination of the airframe and engine was conducted at the PHI facility, located in Lafayette, Louisiana, on December 5-7, 2003.

Airframe/ Main Fuselage: The fuselage was collapsed from impact forces, and the roof structure was fractured laterally in three different locations; in front of the forward transmission support legs, the aft passenger bulkhead, and behind the aft firewall. Associated with the aft roof fracture was a complete fracture of the aft fuselage, which was held together with mangled wires. The floor structure was also found fractured in three locations and a portion of the floor was missing on the pilot's side just ahead of the forward seat-frame support. The vertical tunnel was found fractured and deformed consistent with overload forces, and the nose exhibited significant crushing. All doors were missing except the latch portion of the right passenger door. The pilot's seat pan and seat structure were deformed downward. Several punctures were observed protruding through the bottom of the seat pan, and their respective imprints corresponded to several items under the seat pan (cyclic centering support, sensor for cyclic metering, and a heater hose T-connection). The pilot's left seat belt attachment fitting was found fractured at the hinge connection on the forward bulkhead. The seat buckle was found still buckled with the shoulder harness straps attached.

Landing Gear: The skid landing gear was mostly intact with all four saddles attached to corresponding skids and crosstubes, however, both crosstubes were spread consistent with high vertical loads at impact with the water. Both float steps were fractured and were missing except the forward section of the left step. Flattening of the crosstubes was more prevalent on the forward crosstube and on the right side of both crosstubes, which was consistent with airframe damage being more severe on the forward right side of the helicopter. The float bags had not deployed, and were secure in their skid mounted enclosures.

Tailboom & Tail Rotor: The tail boom was mostly intact with the exception that the right horizontal stabilizer was fractured in an upward direction. The bottoms of the right and left stabilizer endplates were bent inboard near the stabilizer attach points. Tail boom skin was deformed in two locations on its bottom right side consistent with water impact. The bottom of the vertical fin was bent left at the bottom of the support cast, and upward crushing of the fin honeycomb structure. The tail rotor driveshafts were found disconnected on either side of the oil cooler driveshaft consistent with impact forces. Drive continuity in the tail rotor drive system was established and all hangar bearings rotated freely. The tail rotor blades were found attached and secure in the hub. Free pitch change movement in the tail rotor hub was observed and transmitted forward through the control tube to the fracture at the aft portion of the fuselage.

Flight Controls: Numerous separations in the fixed flight controls were observed at locations associated with airframe deformations, fractures, and damage. The throttle cable was fractured consistent with impact forces. Control continuity was established from the collective and cyclic to the main rotor hub assembly. The collective was fractured at its base, and the collective jack-shaft was fractured away from its mount ...