N2566W – Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta – 2004-08-02 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 2, 2004, about 0936 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R22 Beta helicopter, N2566W, registered to a private individual and leased to Helicenter International Corporation, dba Helicenter International Academy, collided with terrain in Everglades National Park, Miami, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 local, instructional flight from the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport, Miami, Florida. The helicopter was destroyed by a postcrash fire and the certified flight instructor (CFI) was fatally injured. The dual student (student) sustained minor injuries. The flight originated about 0925, from the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport.

According to a transcription of communications with the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), an occupant of the helicopter established initial contacted with the facility at 0925:10, which the controller acknowledged. At 0925:17, an occupant then requested "...spot two request whiskey departure." At 0925:20, the controller responded "november six six whiskey proceed as requested on whiskey departure use caution." That transmission was acknowledged by an occupant who used the last 3 of the registration of the helicopter; there were no further recorded transmissions received by the KTMB ATCT from the accident helicopter.

The student reported that the purpose of the flight was for him to become familiar with rotorcraft operations; the flight duration was intended to be approximately 20-30 minutes. Before departure, both fuel tanks were topped off. The CFI demonstrated to him and several other students the preflight inspection of the helicopter step by step using the checklist, which included checking the flight controls. While following the checklist, the CFI pointed out the component on the helicopter. With respect to the hardware that secures the push/pull tubes to the swashplate assembly, the student later reported to the NTSB that the CFI stepped on the frame of the helicopter and visually inspected the hardware and mentioned that it needed to be tight, secure, and safetied. The student did not report any discrepancies that were found during the preflight inspection. The engine was started, and the flight departed to the west climbing to 500 feet mean sea level (msl). The flight continued westbound and after passing a radar ball located near "QEEZY" which is a fan marker and non-directional beacon, he noted the helicopter was descending and brought that to the CFI's attention who reported he was intentionally descending to 300 feet. While flying at that altitude at 60 knots, the CFI maneuvered the helicopter left and right then while flying northbound straight and level at 300 feet while the student was looking outside, the helicopter banked left and nose down, "...making it impossible for the instructor to control the aircraft...." The CFI responded several times with, "what happened", and tried to recover. The student noted that the CFI moved the cyclic control in an attempt to recover but due to his (student's) confusion, could not recall what position he was moving it to. The CFI was unable to recover from the attitude and when the helicopter was close to the ground, he (student) closed his eyes and perceived the helicopter impacted the ground first with the left skid. He wasn't sure of the airspeed and couldn't recall the impact. Following the impact which was later determined to have occurred approximately 11 minutes after the flight departed, the student released his restraint, exited the helicopter, then heard the CFI ask for assistance. He went back to the helicopter, released the CFI's restraint, and pulled him from the wreckage. He then called 911 using the CFI's cell phone; several calls were disconnected; however, rescue units arrived and both were transported to a hospital. The student further reported he did not notice any change in engine sound from the time of takeoff to the moment the helicopter banked left and nose down.

Review of radar data revealed that after takeoff, the flight proceeded in a westerly direction, climbed to 500 feet, turned to a southwesterly direction and descended initially to approximately 400 feet then to 100 feet. A gap in radar returns was noted south of the accident site but the location and time of the subsequent returns were consistent with the performance capability of the helicopter. The radar data further indicates that the helicopter was noted to maneuver for approximately 45 seconds at 100 feet south-southwest of the accident site. The last radar return associated with the helicopter occurred at 0936:09.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

A review of CFI's Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman file pertaining to rotorcraft certificates and ratings revealed he was issued a private pilot certificate with a rotorcraft helicopter rating on January 15, 1982. He obtained a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft helicopter rating on March 22, 1982, and on October 30, 1985, obtained his initial flight instructor certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter rating. Since the initial CFI certificate was issued, he has continuously renewed it, with the last renewal occurring on June 3, 2003. He added an airplane single engine rating to his CFI certificate on August 5, 2003, which qualified as a flight review in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.56. He was the holder of a 2nd class medical certificate issued on April 13, 2004, with the medical restriction, "must wear corrective lenses." He listed a total civilian flight time of 6,300 hours on the application for his last medical certificate. There were no FAA enforcement actions or previous accident/incident records associated with his pilot certificate.

The CFI attended the FAA-Approved Flight Instructor Refresher Clinic at Robinson Helicopter Company, located in Torrance, California, from March 12-15, 2003. The "Instructor/Pilot Evaluation" form dated March 14, 2003, indicates he was rated "above average" in straight autorotations, 180 autorotations, and hovering autorotations. He was also rated "above average" in overall handling and maneuvering with the comment, "smooth & safe." With respect to simulated engine out procedures he was rated "average."

The CFI became employed by Helicenter International Corporation as an independent subcontractor on September 22, 2003. A review of his resume provided by the operator indicates at the time, he had a total rotorcraft flight time of 5,291 hours, of which 5,195 hours were as pilot-in-command. Of the total rotorcraft flight hours, more than 2,000 hours were in Robinson model helicopters. Since employment, the operator reported he had flown a total of 826.9 hours, of which 644.7 hours were in the Robinson R22 model helicopter.

A review of copies of the CFI's pilot logbooks that begin with an entry dated November 26, 2003, to the last entry dated July 31, 2004, revealed he logged a total rotorcraft helicopter time of approximately 6,271 hours, and 5,739.0 hours as a flight instructor. He also logged approximately 6,152 hours as pilot-in-command.

Prior to the accident flight, the student seated in the right seat did not possess any pilot certificate, and had never been in a helicopter. He is a 2nd Lieutenant in the Dominican Republic Army, and was at Helicenter International Corporation to receive flight training.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The helicopter was manufactured in 1986 by Robinson Helicopter Company as a R22 Beta, and designated serial number 0616. A standard airworthiness certificate in the normal category was issued on December 18, 1986.

The helicopter was purchased by the current owner on August 22, 2003, and leased to Helicenter International Corporation for a 1-year period beginning on August 12, 2003. An individual from Helicenter International Corporation flew the helicopter to their facility, and during a review of the maintenance records noted items that needed correction. The helicopter was then flown to a maintenance facility located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, where extensive maintenance took place between October 2003, and February 2004. The maintenance included in part removal and reinstallation of the swashplate. Additionally, tracking and balancing of the main rotor blades was accomplished. The corrective action associated with the installation of the push/pull tubes to the swashplate assembly does not indicate new metal self locking nuts or palnuts were used. The helicopter was approved for return to service on February 3, 2004, and returned to the operator.

The Director of Maintenance for the facility that performed the extensive maintenance reported metal self locking nuts are reused if there is resistance during installation, and would be replaced if there is no resistance; the palnut is always replaced with a new one. At that time of the extensive maintenance, the helicopter had a total time of 2,810.8 hours.

The first 100-Hour inspection signed off by a mechanic with Helicopter International Corporation occurred on March 6, 2004. At that time, the helicopter total time was 2,910.8 hours. The helicopter then underwent two 100-Hour inspections performed by the same individual with Helicopter International Corporation. The last 100-Hour inspection which was also performed by personnel from Helicopter International Corporation, was signed off on April 22, 2004; the helicopter total time at that time was reported to be 3,110.8 hours. The helicopter had accumulated approximately 69 hours since the last 100-Hour inspection at the time of the accident. An entry in the maintenance records dated July 29, 2004, which was signed off by the director of maintenance (DOM) for the operator indicated, "...performed tracking and balancing to main rotor blades. Adjust to 0.10 IPS 12:00 o'clock [in accordance with] Chadwick 2000 reading. Work done [in accordance with] RHC [maintenance manual] R-22 Sections 10.200 to 12.232 [figure] 10.10-[page] 10.29. Tracking adjusted to hover, climb, 50, 70, 80, 90 knots [in accordance with] RHC [maintenance manual] R-22 Section 10-233 [figure] 10-12." There were no further entries in the airframe maintenance records.

According to the Director of Maintenance of the operator who signed off the last main rotor tracking and balance procedure, the work was performed by himself and another company mechanic. The DOM witnessed the mechanic performing the work after the equipment was installed, read the instrument once with the accident pilot, and once again with the president of the operator. Any changes and/or adjustments if any, and the removal of the equipment used during the procedure was performed by the other mechanic.

The mechanic who installed the equipment used for the main rotor track and balance procedure reported either in writing or verbally that he performed the work under the supervision of the DOM and in accordance with the helicopter maintenance manual. He reportedly installed the bracket used for the main rotor track and balance procedure on the right side of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly. The main rotor tracking and balance procedure began on July 26, 2004, and the helicopter was flown; after which time, he and the DOM made adjustments of balance and tracking in accordance with the maintenance manual. The equipment used for the main rotor track and balance procedure was removed on either July 27th, or July 28th, and the rod end and rod end spherical bearing of the right and aft push/pull tubes were inspected with no discrepancies noted. He further reported the bolts used to secure the push/pull tubes to the right and aft lugs of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate were also inspected with no discrepancies noted. He could not recall if he changed the nuts (P/N MS 21042L4) used to secure the right and aft push/pull tubes; he dry torqued the nuts to 120-inch pounds. He did use new palnuts (P/N B330-13), at the right and aft push/pull tube connections; he torqued them to 11-25 inch pounds. He also applied torque seal to the fasteners in accordance with the maintenance manual.

According to a statement by the president and vice president of Helicenter International Corporation, the accident CFI flew the accident helicopter on two flights on the 29th of July; the flights were related to the tracking and balance checks. The mechanic who performed the work was on-board for both flights which lasted a total of approximately 1.5 hours. The helicopter was then flown the following day (July 30th) on 2 separate flights by the president of Helicenter International Corporation to finish the tracking checks. He later reported that during his preflight inspection of the helicopter before both flights, a bracket used for the main rotor tracking and balance procedure was installed at the left side of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly when viewed from the cockpit looking forward. Both flights on that date (July 30th) lasted a total of approximately 2.0 hours. One of the flights was with the mechanic who performed the work on-board, and the other flight was with the DOM on-board. The helicopter was not flown between the last flight by the president of Helicenter International Corporation on the 30th of July, and the accident flight. The accident flight was the first flight since the bracket used during the main rotor track and balance procedure was removed, and the flight control push/pull tubes were required to be properly reinstalled to the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly.

The operator provided a document which indicated that the hour meter reading at the start of the accident flight (3,176.4) was the same as the hour meter reading recorded in the maintenance records for an entry dated July 27, 2004. As previously reported, the helicopter had been operated approximately 3.5 hours during several maintenance related flights on July 29th and 30th.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A METAR weather observation taken from the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB) at 0953, or approximately 12 minutes after the accident indicates the wind was from 170 degrees at 6 knots, the visibility was 10 statute miles, few clouds existed at 2,500 feet above ground level (agl), broken clouds existed at 9,000 and 25,000 feet agl, the temperature and dewpoint were 27 and 25 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 29.99 inHg. The accident site was located 9.86 nautical miles and 263 degrees from KTMB.

COMMUNICATIONS

The CFI was not in contact with any air traffic control facility at the time of the accident.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The helicopter crashed in the Everglades National Park; the wreckage was located at 25 degrees 37.038 minutes North latitude and 080 degrees 35.227 minutes West longitude, or 9.86 nautical miles and 263 magnetic degrees from the center of the Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport.

The NTSB first examined the accident site and wreckage 2 days after the accident; the accident area consisted of open terrain with low vegetation and shallow water. The helicopter was resting on the left side with the longitudinal axis oriented on a magnetic heading of 350 degrees. Sections of the left skid were located along the energy path which was oriented on a magnetic heading of 247 degrees. The cockpit, and engine compartment were consumed by postcrash fire; the gearbox was also consumed by postcrash fire. The tailboom was separated at the end of Bay 1, but located in close proximity to the main wreckage; heat damage was noted to the skin in that area and all five tail boom securing hardware were in place. Tail rotor drive continuity was confirmed from the bevel gear at the gearbox through the tail rotor gearbox to the tail rotor blades; 360 degrees of rotation of the tail rotor blades was noted. Examination of the swash plate assembly revealed push/pull tube assembly (part number (P/N) A121-7), was not connected to the left lug on the forward side of the non rotating portion of the swash plate assembly; the lug was not fractured. The rod end and securing hardware were not located. A section of push/pull tube assembly (P/N A121-7), was connected to the right lug on the forward side of the non rotating portion of the swash plate assembly. A metal nut and palnut were in position; heat damage to the attached section of push/pull tube was noted. A section of heat damaged push/pull tube assembly (P/N A121-5), was connected to the aft lug on the non rotating portion of the swash plate assembly; however, the bolt did not extend beyond the end of the nut (P/N MS 21042L4), and no palnut (P/N B330-13) was in position. Additionally, a gap was noted between the rod end and the lug, and the bolt was noted to be bent. Visual examination of the bolt and nut used to secure the push/pull tube assembly (P/N A121-5) to the aft lug revealed no evidence of damage to the threads of the nut or bolt. No other separations of the main or tail rotor flight control push/push tubes were noted at the observed attach points. Heat damage was noted to all main rotor flight control push/pull tubes, and to the tail rotor push/pull tubes from the cockpit to the end of Bay 1. The tail rotor flight control push/pull tube was continuous from the end of Bay 1 to the bellcrank assembly (P/N A120-1). The helicopter was recovered from the park and secured for further examination.

Further examination of the helicopter revealed the left skid toe was fractured approximately 2 feet 7 inches aft from the tip; longitudinal scoring on the fractured section of skid tube outboard of the skid shoe was noted. The remaining portion of the left skid was continuous in length; however, the forward and aft struts were separated from the left skid tube. The forward strut was connected to the forward crosstube which was fractured approximately 12 inches inboard of the left forward elbow. The rear crosstube remained attached to both struts. The left rear strut was rotated aft approximately 30 degrees relative to the right strut. The right skid was fractured approximately 2 inches forward of the ground handling wheel attachment lug; no crushing was noted at the fracture point. The electronic governor was destroyed by fire. The throttle position in the cockpit was determined to be near idle. Main rotor continuity was confirmed from the beveled gear in the gearbox to the main rotor mast. Further visual examination of the swashplate revealed the slider tube exhibited two large and two small creases. The upper and lower large creases were both centered at 100 degrees clockwise from the index mark, while the upper extended approximately 90 degrees, and the lower extended approximately 120 degrees. Both small creases were centered at 315 degrees from the index mark and extended approximately 90 degrees. Additionally, impact marks were noted on one of the swashplate arms. The swash plate assembly was retained for further examination.

Examination of the cockpit revealed the guarded cover of the clutch switch was closed (engaged), and the magneto switch was in the both position. The airspeed indicator needle was captured at approximately 66 knots. No significant stretching was noted of the filaments of the following annunciator bulbs: 1) main rotor temp, 2) main rotor chip, 3) governor off, 4) tail rotor chip, 5) low fuel, 6) clutch, and 7) main rotor. The filaments of the oil pressure and alternator annunciator bulbs were not easily observed and were retained for further examination by the NTSB Materials Laboratory.

Examination of the engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valve train continuity. The carburetor and magnetos were heat damaged which precluded testing. No evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine assembly was noted.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The CFI died while hospitalized on August 7, 2004; a postmortem examination of the certified flight instructor was performed by the Dade-County Medical Examiner's office. The cause of death was listed as complications of helicopter crash.

Toxicological analysis of specimens of the CFI taken upon admittance to the hospital was performed by the FAA Toxicology and Accident Research Laboratory. The results of the submitted blood specimen was positive for morphine (1.155 ug/ml) which is consistent with medical intervention. Testing for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and volatiles was not performed.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The operator reported that when the accident flight departed, the CFI was wearing a green colored long sleeve flight suit without gloves, and he was known to wear black boots. No determination was made as to the type of material of the flight suit. The operator reported that the student was wearing denim jeans, a short sleeved shirt, and tennis type shoes.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

The helicopter maintenance manual specifies that the bolts used to secure the push/pull tubes to the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly are to be installed with the bolt head pointing in the direction of rotation. The rod ends of the push/pull tubes at the left and right lugs on the forward side of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly are positioned on the left side of the lug, and the rod end of the push/pull tube at the aft lug of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly is positioned on the right side of the lug. Two threads minimum must be exposed beyond a nut on any installation to insure proper locking of fastener, and "Any nut damaged due to handling or whose nut drag has deteriorated appreciably must be replaced." The manual does not specify what "nut drag" or what "appreciable nut drag deterioration" are, and does not specify to replace the metal self locking nut after removal. The maintenance manual does specify that a seconday locking mechanism is required on all critical fasteners, with a note that specifies, "A critical fastener is one which, if removed or lost, would jeopardize safe operation of the helicopter. This includes joints in the primary control system..."; but does not specify that another mechanic must/should inspect a joint in the primary control system following maintenance. A magnetic pickup bracket (Robinson part number PT121), used during the main rotor tracking and balance procedure, is installed against the right face of the right forward lug, and against the right side of the rod end bearing at the aft lug. Installation of the bracket at the right forward lug requires the removal of the palnut and metal self locking nut, and installation of the bracket at the aft lug requires removal of the bolt.

As previously reported, the magnetic pickup bracket used during the last main rotor tracking and balancing was installed on the left forward and aft lugs of the swash plate assembly when viewed from the cockpit looking forward. The installation of the bracket at the left forward lug of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly required removal of the bolt. Also previously reported, postaccident examination of the left lug of the swash plate revealed the securing hardware and push/pull tube were not in place, and the examination of the aft lug of the swashplate revealed the nut (P/N MS 21042L4), used to secure the push/pull tube did not have any threads of the bolt extended beyond it; no palnut was installed.

Robinson Helicopter Company personnel report that with respect to either the left or right lugs on the forward side of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly, and the rod end and attach hardware properly positioned and installed; respectively, the threads of the bolt begin approximately .060 inch inside the hole as measured from the right face of the lug when viewed from the cockpit looking forward.

Examination of the swash plate assembly and retained annunciator bulbs was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory located in Washington, D.C. The results of the examination of the left lug of the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly revealed no elongation of the hole. The interior surface of the hole exhibited regular nearly circumferential linear impressions on the forward and aft sides of the hole. Five deep linear impressions were observed on the forward side of the hole about mid-depth, and two deep linear impressions were noted on the diametrically opposed aft side near the left edge of the hole. The impressions made on the forward side of the hole went from a small length of approximately 0.04 inch to a larger length of approximately 0.19 inch, progressing from the right to the left sides. The linear impressions had a similar angle when compared with the threads of an exemplar bolt. Specifically, the impressions were angled approximately 5 degrees from the circumferential direction and the spacing of the impressions was between 0.029 and 0.038 inch. An exemplar bolt threaded angle was approximately 5 degrees, and the thread spacing was 28 threads per inch, or approximately 0.036 inch. Two impressions on the aft side of the bolt hole were 0.11 to 0.2 inch in length and were approximately 0.060 to 0.023 inch from the left edge of the hole, with a spacing of approximately 0.037 inch. Some of the deeper impressions on both sides of the hole had raised material near the edges and some had a clearly defined transition at the base of the impression consistent with those left by a crowned thread. The right forward lug was examined for comparison purposes which revealed that with the bolt in position, the threaded portion of the bolt extended approximately 0.050 inch into the hole from the right face of the lug. Following removal of the bolt, the interior surface of the hole was examined which revealed light, angled, linear impressions consistent with thread impressions; however, the depth and length of those impressions were much less than the depth and length of the impressions on the interior surface of the left lug hole. Examination of the bolt in the aft lug revealed the threaded end of the bolt extended approximately 0.31 inch beyond the lug. Following removal of the bolt, the interior surface of the aft lug was examined which revealed light, angled linear impressions consistent with thread impressions; however, the depth and length of those impressions were much less than the depth and length of the impressions made in the interior surface of the left lug. Deeper impressions were observed nearly circumferentially near the left edge of the lug, or in a normal location where the bolt threads are located. Examination of the bulb filaments from the main rotor, alternator, and oil pressure annunciator bulbs revealed all three filaments were not failed and were not stretched.

Review of FAA records revealed that the DOM was issued a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings on June 28, 1996. There were no records of enforcement action under his mechanic's certificate number. There was one record of a surveillance inspection of the airman; the result was listed as satisfactory. The FAA records indicate that for the mechanic, he was issued a mechanic certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings on November 16, 2003; there were no records of enforcement action under his mechanic's certificate number. There were two surveillance inspections of the airman; both results were listed as satisfactory. The U.S. Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service "Employment Eligibility Verification" form completed in part by the mechanic indicates he was only authorized to work in the United States until June 2, 2004.

According to Robinson Helicopter Company records, the DOM attended R22/R44 Inspection Authorization Refresher Training Course, and Factory Maintenance Training Course, and was awarded certificates of completion on April 2, 2004, and July 1, 2004, respectively. The Robinson Helicopter Company records also indicate the mechanic attended the R22/R44 Maintenance Training Course from October 20-29, 2003. A review of the R22/R44 Maintenance Training Course syllabus revealed dynamic balance exercise is conducted during the first 5 days and again on the last day of training. The syllabus also indicates that on the fourth day of training, main rotor track and balance equipment installation is a covered subject. The "R22/R44 Maintenance Course Student Task List" for the mechanic indicates he performed installation of the magnetic pickup bracket per section 10.221 (b & c), which was initialed by the instructor.

Two days after the accident, the NTSB examined another one of the operator's helicopters (N122AK) that was in their hangar with the engine removed. The examination revealed in part that the left push/pull tube (P/N A121-7), was incorrectly installed to the non-rotating portion of the swash plate assembly, and the securing hardware was also incorrectly installed. The maintenance records for that helicopter revealed a new swash plate was installed by another facility in August 2003. The records further indicate that since the new swashplate was installed and the helicopter was maintained by the accident operator, the mechanic who performed the last main rotor tracking and balance of the accident helicopter inspected N122AK on five separate occasions in accordance with a 100-hour inspection. The entries for all the 100-hour inspections indicate all were performed exactly 100 hours from the previous inspection, and were performed in accordance with section 2.420 (Inspection Checklist) of the maintenance manual. The inspection procedures section (2.410) of the maintenance manual indicates the visible portions of the push/pull tubes at the swash plate are to be inspected for condition, security, and operating clearance; no indication is made to inspect for proper installation.

Postaccident inspection of the operators facility and helicopters was performed by several FAA inspectors. The inspections revealed one helicopter (N802WH), had the securing hardware of the push/pull tubes at the swash plate incorrectly installed, and at least one palnut was not installed. Additionally, several maintenance records discrepancies were reported.

Review of the helicopter "Pilot's Operating Handbook" (POH) revealed that with respect to the preflight inspection of the main rotor system, a pilot is required to check all rod ends for freedom without looseness. The student reported that he observed the flight instructor perform a "thorough" preflight inspection of the helicopter, to include checking the swashplate visually. The student also reported that the flight instructor moved the cyclic in full circles before starting the engine. The POH indicates that before starting the engine the cyclic is to be checked for full travel and freedom of movement.

According to Robinson Helicopter Company personnel, during straight and level flight at 60 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), or the approximate indicated airspeed reported by the student at the time the in-flight loss of control occurred, the left push/pull tube is in compression, with a maximum compressive load determined by flight testing to be 97.1 pounds. Calculations indicate that the left push/pull tube will fail in compression at 1,221 pounds of force, while the securing bolt will fail at 1,619 pounds of force. Personnel from the company also stated that "...if either of the forward push/pull tubes were to become disconnected at the lower swashplate, it is assumed that the helicopter would be uncontrollable."

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The helicopter minus NTSB retained components was released to David E. Gourgues, insurance adjuster for CTC Services Aviation (LAD, Inc.), on August 18, 2004. The NTSB retained components were also released to David Gourgues on January 6, 2005.