Summary
On August 07, 2005, a Allegro 2000 (N9164M) was involved in an accident near Supply, NC. The accident resulted in 2 fatal injuries. The aircraft sustained substantial damage.
The National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause of this accident to be: The instructor pilot's failure to maintain airspeed for unknown reasons, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and subsequent collision with the ground.
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On August 7, 2005, at an undetermined time, a Fantasy Air Allegro 2000 light sport airplane, N9164M, registered to and operated by Sport Inc., as a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight, collided with the ground in the vicinity of Supply, North Carolina. The airplane was located during an aerial search on August 7, 2005, at 1630. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The flight originated from Brunswick County Airport, Oak Island, North Carolina, on August 7, 2005, at approximately 1030 eastern daylight time.
This accident is documented in NTSB report ATL05LA140. AviatorDB cross-references NTSB investigation data with FAA registry records to provide comprehensive safety information for aircraft N9164M.
Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The instructor pilot's failure to maintain airspeed for unknown reasons, resulting in an aerodynamic stall and subsequent collision with the ground.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On August 7, 2005, at an undetermined time, a Fantasy Air Allegro 2000 light sport airplane, N9164M, registered to and operated by Sport Inc., as a 14 CFR Part 91 instructional flight, collided with the ground in the vicinity of Supply, North Carolina. The airplane was located during an aerial search on August 7, 2005, at 1630. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The airplane received substantial damage. The flight instructor and student pilot were fatally injured. The flight originated from Brunswick County Airport, Oak Island, North Carolina, on August 7, 2005, at approximately 1030 eastern daylight time.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
Flight Instructor.
Review of information on file with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Airman's Certification Division, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, revealed the flight instructor was issued a commercial pilot certificate on August 19, 2005, with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument helicopter. The flight instructor also held a private pilot certificate issued on August 19, 2005 with ratings for airplane single engine land. The flight instructor was also issued a ground instructor certificate on August 19, 2005.
The flight instructor was issued a Sport Pilot Flight Instructor certificate on June 11, 2005. The flight instructor's last recorded flight review was conducted on May 8, 2005. The flight instructor indicated on his application for the Sport Pilot Flight Instructor certificate that he had accumulated 2,149 total flight hours of which 20 hours were in the Allegro 2000 airplane. The flight instructor's logbook was not located in the airplane in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.51 (c) (5). Review of the flight instructor's logbook revealed he had logged a total of 2,995.5 total flight hours of which 2,708.7 hours were as pilot-in-command. The flight instructor's first flight in an Allegro 2000 was on November 17, 2004. The flight instructor had accumulated 104.2 total flight hours in the Allegro 2000, of which 3 hours were dual instruction, and 67.7 hours were as a Sport Pilot instructor. The flight instructor had flown 104.2 hours in the last 90 days and 53.7 hours in the last 30 days not including the accident flight.
The flight instructor held an FAA third-class medical certificate issued on August 23, 2004, with the restriction "must have available glasses for near vision. Not valid for any class after August 31, 2005." Review of the flight instructor's application for the third-class medical certificate revealed the flight instructor had accumulated 2,850 total flight hours of which 50 were flown in the last six months. The flight instructor's pilot's logbook or other evidence of required authorized instructor endorsements on all flights when providing flight training was not located in the airplane in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.51 (c) (5).
Student Pilot.
The student pilot held a valid North Carolina, Class C drivers license with no restrictions in accordance with 14 CFR Part 61.303, Subpart J, Sport Pilot (a) (2). An FAA third class medical certificate was not required. Review of the student pilot's logbook revealed he had flown seven dual flights with the flight instructor for a total of 10.6 hours not including the accident flight. No endorsements were recorded in the logbook.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The Fantasy Air Allegro 2000 is a high-wing, single-engine, light sport airplane manufactured in the Czech Republic and distributed by B-BAR-D Aviation in Whitsett, North Carolina. The two-seat airplane was certified as a production aircraft by the FAA in the Special Light Sport Aircraft (S-LSA) category.
The airplane maintenance logbooks were not located.
The Allegro 2000 Operating Manual indicates that the stall speed at the maximum take-off weight 560 lbs-level flight is "…53 miles per hour (MPH) indicated airspeed (IAS) or 51 MPH calibrated airspeed (CAS) with zero flaps at idle engine power. The airplane will stall at 48 MPH IAS or 47 MPH CAS with flaps at position one at idle engine power. The airplane will stall at 45 MPH IAS or 44 MPH CAS with flaps at position two at idle engine power."
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The Brunswick County Airport, Oak Island, North Carolina, 1440 surface weather observation was: winds 100-magnetic, at six knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 81 degrees Fahrenheit, dew-point 66-degrees Fahrenheit, and altimeter 30.15.
WRECKAGE SITE INFORMATION
The wreckage was located in an open field adjacent to a highway in Supply, North Carolina. Examination of the crash site revealed the airplane collided with the ground on a heading of 060-degrees magnetic and came to rest 40 yards past the initial point of impact. One propeller blade was separated at the initial point of impact and was delaminated. The FAA inspector on scene stated there was no evidence of broken tree branches from a tree line located about 35 yards northwest of the initial point of impact. A friend, who was also a student of the deceased instructor pilot, stated a broken tree branch was located about 30 feet from the tree line. The friend and the FAA could not determine where the tree branch came from or if there was any other damage in the trees. Browning of vegetation was located along the crash debris line extending 20 yards along the direction of travel behind the main wreckage.
The wreckage was recovered by a local wrecker service and transported to the flight instructor's hangar located at Brunswick County Airport, Oak Island, North Carolina, on August 7, 2005. The wreckage was picked up and transported to Griffin, Georgia, on August 10, 2005 by a recovery company under the supervision of Safety Board investigators.
Examination of the wreckage revealed the following:
The engine assembly was displaced to the left; the engine mount remained attached to the front engine bulkhead and was bent upward under the No. 2 engine cylinder. The engine mount bolt located under the No. 2 cylinder was sheared. The engine firewall was bent upward. The upper and lower engine cowling was in place. The propeller assembly remained attached to the propeller crankshaft flange. The composite propeller spinner was cracked. One propeller blade's forward one-half outer lamination had separated and was not located. The remaining propeller blade was fractured, delaminated, and exhibited leading and trailing edge damage. The nose wheel leg remained attached to the front engine bulkhead. The nose wheel fork separated to the left with a 6-inch piece of the nose wheel leg attached.
Examination of the fuselage cabin structure revealed the transparent windshield had separated from the fuselage, the cabin floor was compressed upward, and the cabin roof was compressed downward. The left and right cabin seats remained in the cabin area. The left seat lower left and right seatbelt attachment brackets were intact. The left upper inner attachment bracket was intact. The left upper outer attachment bracket was missing. The right seat lower left and right seatbelt attachment brackets were intact. The right seat upper inner and outer attachment brackets were intact.
The instrument panel was separated. The fuel pump and auxiliary fuel pump were found in the "ON" position. The left and right fuel accelerator lever was separated from the fuselage and the cable was intact. The choke control lever was separated and found in the "L" position. The master switch and ignition switches were in the on position. The fuel and fuel pressure gauge indicated zero. The fuel selector lever was damaged and in the on position. The engine water thermometer gauge indicated zero. The engine oil thermometer and oil pressure gauge indicated zero. The tachometer gauge indicated 0. The Hobbs meter indicated 90 hours. The altimeter indicated 165 feet. The airspeed indicator indicated 0. The vertical speed indicator indicated 100 feet up. The turn and slip indicator moved freely in the race. Electrical power was applied to the VHF radio; the VHF radio frequency in use was 123.0 and the stand by frequency was 129.17. The electrical flap indicator cable was cut.
The 3-position flap switch separated from the console. Examination of the flap motor located behind the cabin seats revealed the flap actuator was at the first limiter position, which equates to 15-degrees of flaps. The Emergency Locator Transmitter was found in the off position.
The single control/joystick was intact. The left and right seat rudder cables were intact from the rudder pedals aft to the rudder control surface. The elevator control tubes were intact from the control stick/joystick aft to an idler, aft to the elevator bell crank, and aft to the elevator. The elevator trim lever was separated from its mounting bracket and the cable was cut. The aileron control tubes were intact from the control stick/joystick aft and up to the left and right aileron push pull tubes, and extended outboard to the left and right aileron bell cranks and to the ailerons.
The left and right cabin doors were separated from the fuselage. The right main landing gear was separated and the formed bracket was intact. The landing gear bolts were intact. The left main landing gear was separated and the formed bracket was bent. The aft bolt of the formed bracket was missing. The cabin structure separated from the fuselage 5 inches aft of the central pilot bulkhead.
The right wing exhibited impact damage that indicated it was pushed both aft and forward. The leading edge of the right wing had diagonal crushing extending from the leading edge of the wing root outboard 16 inches. A dent was present on the leading edge of the wing 111 inches outboard of the wing root. The remaining leading edge was not damaged. The wing tip cap was broken. The fuselage aft wing attachment was pushed aft with the wing attachment bolt attached. The fuselage structure forward wing attachment was bent forward. The wing attachment bolt was not located during the airframe examination on March 30, 2006.
The wing aft attachment point was broken and bent forward and the aft attachment bolt was installed. The wing forward attachment point was bent forward. The right aileron remained attached. The right flap outer hinge remained attached. The inner flap hinge pin was disconnected and bent upward. The right flap lever was bent forward. The right wing strut remained attached to the wing strut fitting and was bent forward. The lower wing strut separated from the fuselage wing strut fitting. The fuselage wing strut fitting was bent rearward. The pitot tube on the right wing strut was bent aft.
The fuselage separated 42 inches aft of the right wing rear attachment fitting. The remaining aft fuselage was not damaged. The vertical tail fin was not damaged. The rudder remained attached to the tail section. The bottom 12 inches of the rudder was bent upward and to the left. The top trailing edge of the rudder was bent to the left. The fixed rudder trim tab was not damaged. The left horizontal stabilizer tip was bent downward. The left elevator was bent downward with diagonal crushing present at a point 6 inches inboard of the elevator tip. The elevator trim tab stop was bent to the right.
The left wing exhibited impact damage indicating that it was accelerated forward. The leading edge of the left wing was not damaged except for 2-inches outboard of the wing root leading edge. The left wing tip was cracked at midspan. The bottom wing skin was buckled 8-inches outboard of the wing root. The fuselage aft wing attachment was twisted forward. The fuselage structure forward wing attachment was bent forward. The wing aft attachment point was bent forward. The wing forward attachment point was bent forward. The wing attachment bolts were not located during the airframe reexamination on March 30, 2006. The left aileron and flap remained attached. The left flap lever was disconnected from the flap pins. The left wing strut remained attached to the wing strut fitting and was bent aft. The lower wing strut separated from the fuselage wing strut fitting. The fuselage wing strut fitting was bent forward.
Examination of the engine revealed the oil pump housing was damaged and the oil filter had separated from the engine. No oil was visible on the dipstick. The oil lines were not breached and oil and fuel were located on the ground at the crash site. The oil cooler was damaged. The oil reservoir was not damaged. The fuel lines had been cut by the FAA inspector at the crash scene forward of the carburetor inlet fittings. A fuel sample was taken and no contamination was found. The carburetors were inspected and no anomalies were noted. The electrical fuel pump was removed and tested with 12-volt electrical power; the pump was able to operate during the testing.
The top spark plugs were removed from the engine. The electrodes were normal (light colored to brown) as depicted in the Rotax Maintenance Manual. The engine was not fitted with an overload clutch system. The gearbox was checked by turning the propeller and the gear lash was normal. Continuity of the gearbox was attempted by rotating the propeller by hand. The engine was rotated one turn and stopped. The engine was removed from the airframe in order to inspect the flywheel for damage. Examination revealed the tachometer trigger coil, fired by a metallic bar on the crankshaft flywheel, had been pushed inward. The tachometer trigger coil was moved outward and the flywheel and engine rotated freely. Oil was noted pumping from the crankcase while rotating the propeller by hand. The rocker arm covers were removed for inspection of the valve train. Continuity was confirmed to the gear and valve train by rotating the propeller by hand. The spark plugs and rocker arm covers were replaced. The engine was shipped to an authorized repair facility for an engine run.
The engine was mounted in a test stand and an oil pump assembly was installed. A test club propeller, water temperature gauge, oil temperature gauge, oil pressure gauge, RPM gauge, cylinder head temperature gauge, engine controls, and ignition grounding wires were installed. The engine was started and ran at 1600 rpm (idle power.) The throttle was advanced to 4000 rpm and a ignition check was completed. The rpm drop on the left and right ignition check was between 75 to 100 rpm. The throttle was advanced to 5400 rpm (full power) and stabilized. The throttle was returned back to the idle position for cool down.
PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION
The Brunswick County Medical Examiner, Jacksonville, North Carolina, performed the autopsy of the flight instructor on August 7, 2005. The reported cause of death was "multiple blunt traumatic injuries." The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, performed postmortem toxicology of specimens on the pilot. The toxicology results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol.
The Brunswick County Medical Examiner, Jacksonville, North Carolina, performed the autopsy on the student pilot on August 7, 2005. The reported cause of death was "multiple blunt traumatic injuries." The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, performed postmortem toxicology of specimens on the pilot. The toxicology results were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, drugs and alcohol.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
Background of FAA Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for Light-Sport Aircraft.
On September 1, 2004, the FAA issued the Final Rule for Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Sport Aircraft. The Final Rule allowed for the manufacture, certification, operation and maintenance of simple, low performance light-sport aircraft. The Final Rule also created a sport pilot certificate and sport pilot instructors certificate and allowed operation of light-sport aircraft by certificated pilots for sport and recreation, to carry a passenger, and to conduct flight training in a safe manner.
As defined by 14 CFR 1.1, light-sport aircraft are aircraft, other than helicopter or powered-lift, that have a maximum takeoff weight of 1,320 pounds for aircraft not intended for operation on water, or 1,430 pounds for an aircraft intended for operation on water. Light-sport aircraft have a maximum airspeed in level flight with maximum continuous power (VH) of not more than 120 knots calibrated airspeed (CAS), and a maximum stall speed or minimum steady flight speed without the use of lift-enhancing devices (VS1) of 45 knots CAS at the aircraft's maximum certificated takeoff weight and most critical center of gravity. Light-sport aircraft have a single reciprocating engine, fixed or ground-adjustable propeller, non-pressurized cabin and fixed landing gear, and a maximum seating capacity of two persons, including the pilot. There are five classes of aircraft in the light-sport aircraft category including airplanes, gliders, powered parachutes, weight-shift-control and lighter than air (balloons).
Two types of light-sport aircraft are classified in the final rule, special light-sport aircraft and experimental light-sport aircraft. A special light-sport aircraft is a factory-built ready-to-fly aircraft designed and constructed in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International consensus standards. Consensus standards are industry-developed standards that provide standard specifications for the design and performance of a light-sport airplane, operational safety monitoring of light-sport airplanes, maintenance and maintenance manuals for light-sport aircraft, and quality assurance in the manufacture of light-sport aircraft. Consensus standards were developed and issued by ASTM International with participation from light-sport aircraft manufacturers, Experimental Aircraft Association, FAA and other aviation industry organizations. Special light-sport aircraft can be used for recreational flying and for rental and flight instruction. The second category of light-sport aircraft is experimental light-sport aircraft which are sold as partially assembled kits for personal flight or personal flight training.
FAR 21.190, Issue of a special airworthiness certificate for a light-sport category aircraft states:
"(a) Purpose. The FAA issues a special airworthiness certificate in the light-sport category to operate a light-sport aircraft, other than a gyroplane.
(b) Eligibility. To be eligible for a special airworthiness certificate in the light sport category:
1. An applicant must provide the FAA with-
i. The aircraft's operating instructions;
ii. The aircraft's maintenance and inspection procedures;
iii. The manufacture's statement of compliance as described in paragraph (c) of this section; and(iv) The aircraft's flight training supplement.
(2) The aircraft must not have been previously issued a standard, primary, restricted, limited, or provisional airworthiness certificate, or an equivalent airworthiness certificate issued by a foreign civil aviation authority.
(3) The aircraft must be inspected by the FAA and found to be in a condition for safe operation.
(c) Manufacture's statement of compliance for light-sport category aircraft. The manufacture's statement of compliance required in paragraph (b) (1) (iii) of this section must-
1. Identify the aircraft by make and model, serial number, class, date of manufacture, and consensus standard used;
2. State that the aircraft meets the provisions of the identified consensus standard;
3. State that the aircraft conforms to the manufacture's design data, using the manufacture's quality assurance system that meets the identified consensus standard:
4. State that the manufacturer will make available to any interested person the following documents that meet the identified consensus standard;
i. The aircraft's operating instructions.
ii. The aircraft's maintenance and inspection procedures.
iii. The aircraft's flight training supplement.
(5) State that the manufacture will monitor and correct safety-of-flight issues through the issuance of safety directives and a continued airworthiness system that meets the identified consensus standard;
(6) State that at the request of the FAA, the manufacture will provide unrestricted access to its facilities; and
(7) State that the manufacture, in accordance with a production acceptance test procedure that meets an applicable consensus standard has-
(i) Ground and flight tested the aircraft;
(ii) Found the aircraft performance acceptable; and
(iii) Determined that the aircraft is in a condition for safe operation."
Adherence to Aircraft Specifications.
For the Fantasy Air Allegro 2000 accident aircraft, the aircraft manufacturer sent FAA Form 8130-15, Light-Sport Statement of Compliance to the aircraft distributor on April 25, 2005. The manufacturer stated the airplane serial number 05-208 complies with the Consensus Standard F2245-04. The distributor sent FAA Form 8130-6 and FAA Form 8130-15 to the FAA on June 1, 2005, certifying that the aircraft was inspected, is airworthy, and eligible for the airworthiness certificate being requested. The FAA signed FAA Form 8130-6 on June 8, 2005, and issued FAA Form 8130-7, Special Airworthiness Certificate on June 8, 2005.
Safety Board investigators reviewed the documentation for the Fantasy Air Allegro 2000 light-sport airplane and noted deficiencies existed in the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH). ASTM consensus standard F2245-04, Standard Specification for Design and Performance of a Light-sport Airplane, Paragraph 9, provides specific minimum requirements for the content of the POH. The following paragraphs from ASTM consensus standard F2245-04 were omitted from the POH for the Fantasy Air Allegro 2000:
9.3.3 Fuel and Fuel Capacity
9.4.6 Service Ceiling
9.8.5 Best angle of climb speed (VX)
9.8.6 Best rate of climb speed (VY)
9.8.10 Short field takeoff and landing procedures, if any,
9.8.11 Balked landing procedures, and
9.9.2 Towing and tie-down instructions
As a result of the investigation, the POH was revised to ensure compliance with the ASTM consensus.
Compliance with Federal Air Regulations.
The aircraft manufacturer sent FAA Form 8130-15, Light Sport Statement of Compliance to the aircraft distributor on April 25, 2005. The manufacturer stated the airplane serial number 05-208 complies with the Consensus Standard (s) F2245-04.
Review of Federal Air Regulation (FAR) 21.190 revealed that the aircraft manufacturer did not comply with section C of part 3 which states: "State that the aircraft meets the provisions of the identified consensus standard;"
FAA Inspection Process for S-LSA Aircraft.
Prior to issuing special airworthiness certificates for light-sport category aircraft, the FAA reviews the applicant's documentation and verifies the documentation agrees with the applicable regulations. Along with the documentation review, the FAA also conducts a general airworthiness inspection of the aircraft to ensure it is in a condition of safe operation. During the airworthiness inspection, the FAA verifies the information on the aircraft's data plate matches the airworthiness application, the flight control systems and associated instruments operate properly and are appropriate for the class of light-sport aircraft, the instruments are appropriately marked, and needed placards are installed with placement for easy reference. The FAA also inspects to ensure system controls (for example, fuel controls, fuel selectors, electrical circuit breakers) are appropriately placed, clearly marked, provide easy access, operation and function in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications and applicable consensus standards. Following satisfactory completion of the records inspection, documentation review, and aircraft airworthiness inspection, the FAA will issue the special airworthiness certificate and the operating limitations for the aircraft.
Review of FAA Order 8130.2F, Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related Products, Change 1, dated April 1, 2005, Figure 4-28, on page 244, Sample Form 8130-15, Light Sport Aircraft Statement Of Compliance indicated that this document does not have any information pertaining to the Consensus Standards or the Manufacturers Quality Assurance System, and there are no written procedures in 8130.2F to show FAA inspectors what is included on the Statement of Compliance. The FAA stated in its final review of the Certification of Aircraft and Airmen for the Operation of Light-Support Aircraft, page 116, states, "The FAA believes that the manufacturer's statement of compliance is appropriate for determining whether a light-sport aircraft meets the consensus standards."
Training Requirements for FAA Inspectors Regarding S-LSA Certification.
FAA inspectors and FAA designated airworthiness representatives (DARs) review and approve the issuance of special airworthiness certificates for light-sport category aircraft. FAA Order 8130.33, Designated Airworthiness Representatives: Amateur Built and Light-sport Aircraft Certification Functions, provides policy for qualification and training of DARs who perform certification responsibilities on behalf of FAA inspectors. Prior to performing certification duties for light-sport aircraft, FAA Order 8130.33 requires DARs attend the DAR Initial Standardization Seminar for Light-Sport Aircraft Certification. The initial standardization training seminar ensures a proper understanding of the FAA regulations, policy, procedures, forms, and certification process for light-sport aircraft. The seminar also provides DARs with the requirements of the DAR program, procedures for certification of amateur-built and light-sport aircraft (FAA Order 8130.2), classes of aircraft and construction methods, common issues and problems, flight safety issues, and a certification project with sample aircraft inspection is completed. The seminar provides guidance on how the manufacturer's statement of compliance should be completed, information on the ASTM consensus standards, and a checklist is provided for certification of light-sport aircraft.
Although FAA Order 8130.33 provides qualification and training requirements for DARs, FAA inspectors are not required to attend the initial standardization training.
Requirements for Sport Pilot Certificate
Federal Air Regulations stated the following: "Except as specified in 61.329, to apply for a sport pilot certificate you must receive and log ground and flight training from an authorized instructor on the following areas of operation, as appropriate, for airplane-single engine land or sea....(e) Performance maneuvers,...(f) Ground reference maneuvers....(i) Slow flight....(j) Stalls".
Wreckage Release.
The student pilot's logbook was released to the student pilot's wife on March 3, 2006. The flight instructor's logbook was released to the son-in-law of the flight instructor on March 9, 2006. The airplane wreckage was released to Atlanta Air Recovery on April 6, 2006.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ATL05LA140