N130HS – Eurocopter (Airbus Helicopters) EC 130 B4 – 2005-11-21 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 20, 2005, about 2048 eastern standard time, an Aerospatiale AS-350B (AS-350B) helicopter, N264BH, registered to and operated by Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, and a Eurocopter France EC 130 B4 (EC 130 B4) helicopter, N130HS, registered to Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, and operated by HeliFlight, Inc., dba HelicopterShuttle.com, also as a 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight, collided in-flight while both helicopters were on approach to land at Motorsports Complex VIP Heliport (Speedway Heliport), Homestead, Florida. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for either flight. Both helicopters were substantially damaged, and the commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the AS-350B helicopter was not injured. The commercial-rated pilot, the sole occupant of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was fatally injured. The AS-350B flight originated about 2043, from Ocean Reef Club Airport, Key Largo, Florida. The EC 130 B4 flight originated about 2038, from Kendall-Tamiami Executive Airport (KTMB), Miami, Florida.

A Ford 400 NASCAR Nextel Cup Series car race had previously ended at the Homestead-Miami Speedway. Both helicopters were in-bound to pick-up passengers at the Speedway Heliport.

According to a Memorandum from the air traffic manager of KTMB Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT), at 2037:30, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter contacted the facility on frequency 134.6 mHz and requested an "Echo" departure. The flight was cleared for takeoff and at 2039:31, the pilot requested frequency change to "Homestead Tower."

According to a transcription of communications with Homestead Air Reserve Base (KHST) ATCT for the frequency 133.45 mHz, at 2039:55, the pilot of the EC 130B4 helicopter established contact and advised the controller that his flight was 6 miles to the north, and inbound for landing at the Speedway Heliport. The controller acknowledged that transmission and advised the pilot "Watch for two others inbound from the north" and also provided an altimeter setting. The pilot responded, "Oh I got him." At 2042:42, the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter contacted the KHST controller and advised that the flight was "off Ocean Reef back to the track." The controller advised the pilot to proceed, "Direct to the track" and provided the altimeter setting, which the pilot acknowledged. At 2043:42, the pilot of the EC 130 B4 requested frequency change to the track, to which the controller responded, "Yes sir, zero hotel sierra. Frequency change approved, thirty four three." The pilot correctly repeated the frequency. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. At 2044:26, the controller advised the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter, "and uh six four bravo hotel, there is about four of them ahead of you. Contact track control." The pilot acknowledged that transmission. There were no further recorded transmissions from the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter.

The AS-350B pilot stated that he contacted "race control" on frequency 134.3 mHz, and advised that he was 2 nautical miles southeast of the Speedway Heliport, inbound. He was advised to report when his flight was 1 mile south of the Speedway Heliport, which he complied with. He was advised to follow an Agusta 109 helicopter "to the pad." The Agusta 109 helicopter at the time of his radio call was located just north of the westernmost pad at the Speedway Heliport, and was in a 5-foot hover. He (AS-350B pilot) was on a modified right base for landing to the east at the Speedway Heliport, and turned onto final where, " shortly after that (I am not sure exactly how long) I felt a shudder and then the aircraft started to vibrate significantly (I do not remember my altitude or airspeed at that time)." He reported hearing the president of Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., advise over the frequency that there had been a midair collision. He performed a run-on landing on grass west of the helipads, and while the helicopter started to slow, it began turning and listing to the left. He braced when he saw the main rotor blades contacting the ground, and when they slowed, he executed the "emergency shutdown procedures." He then exited the helicopter from the right main cabin door. He further reported he does not recall hearing "a radio transmission from the other aircraft involved in the accident. Nor, do I remember seeing any aircraft in the landing pattern, except SK aircraft in the landing area." He also reported the nearby area was well lit, and he saw a lot of blinking lights from police cars that were located on a road that paralleled the canal south of the Speedway Heliport. At the time of the accident he had on the strobe lights, position lights, instrument lights, and search lights.

The individual who was located at ground level at the Speedway Heliport and was handling ground-to-air communications at the time of the accident reported he had been on that position for approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour, and he was providing "VFR advisory service" to inbound helicopters. He was communicating with inbound and departing helicopters on frequency 134.3 mHz. The pilots of both helicopters announced on that frequency they were inbound to land at the Speedway Heliport. The pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter established contact with him 2 times, though he (the individual providing VFR advisory service) did not recall hearing the EC 130 B4 pilot provide a position report on initial contact. He (individual providing VFR advisory service) stated that he had visual contact with the AS-350B helicopter, but he never had visual contact by landing or strobe light with the EC 130 B4 helicopter, which was on a straight-in approach landing to the east. The AS-350B helicopter was assigned to the west side of the Speedway Heliport area, and the EC 130 B4 helicopter was assigned to the West pad, which was confirmed by the pilot. Approximately 2 minutes before the collision "tiny rockets" were launched from a nearby parking lot southwest of the Speedway Heliport.

The individual providing VFR advisory service further reported he noticed the AS-350B helicopter was on a right base and noted an obscuration, which either could have been road dust, or smoke from the previously launched "tiny rockets." He didn't notice the obscuration until the collision; the AS-350B helicopter was in a right turn when the collision occurred. He did not see the EC 130 B4 helicopter until it was descending to the ground, nor did he recall seeing any lights from it. The sequence for landing was the AS-350B, followed by the EC 130 B4. His impression was that the EC 130 B4 helicopter was "farther away." When on an east operation, traffic will do a straight-in approach to the helipad; "long final approaches are normal." He also stated that he is able to see helicopters 2-3 deep lined up for final approach to the Speedway Heliport based on seeing landing lights. He was generally/typically looking for strobe or landing lights to visually observe inbound helicopters. At the time of the collision, he was only in contact with the pilots of the accident helicopters; there was no communication difficulty and he was not distracted by other duties. Additionally, helicopters were located on the east and center pads at the Heliport; both were preparing to depart.

Numerous witnesses reported seeing the AS-350B helicopter, which was observed flying southwest of the Speedway Heliport, turn to the east. Simultaneously, the EC 130 B4 helicopter was flying in an easterly direction, and was located west of the Speedway Heliport. The witnesses reported the AS-350B helicopter was slightly higher and to the right of the EC 130 B4 helicopter, and the AS-350B helicopter appeared to be flying at a faster speed than the EC 130 B4 helicopter. One witness reported that the AS-350B helicopter was "coming in hard" with respect to speed and vertical descent rate, while another witness reported that the AS-350B helicopter overtook the EC 130 B4 helicopter, and appeared to be flying at twice the speed of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. Following the collision, the EC 130 B4 helicopter descended almost immediately, while the AS-350B helicopter flew in an easterly direction and landed at the Speedway Heliport.

Bystanders responded to both accident sites and offered assistance or first aid. The president of the company operating the AS-350B helicopter, who was located at a tent where the ground-to-air communications were occurring, reported first responding to the AS-350B helicopter. When he arrived the pilot appeared to be all right, and was exiting the helicopter. He then went to the EC 130 B4 helicopter and noticed lights on the center console, and one landing light blinded him. A person reporting to be a doctor arrived and began rendering first aid.

The NTSB Operational Factors Division located in Washington, D.C., received and processed recorded radar data from FAA Miami International Airport Air Traffic Control Tower. A review of NTSB prepared plots of radar targets revealed radar targets near each respective departure airport for each helicopter at about the approximate time of departure. The radar plots indicate an aircraft on transponder code 1200 was noted approximately 6 miles northwest of the Ocean Reef Club Airport, proceeding in a northwesterly direction towards the vicinity of the Speedway Heliport. The radar plots also indicate an aircraft on transponder code 1200 east of the KTMB Airport, proceeding east then south towards the vicinity of the Speedway Heliport, where both presumed targets descended below radar coverage.

Witnesses reported that at the time of the accident, an undetermined number of police cars with their overhead lights flashing were located on S.W. 344th Street, which is an east/west oriented street located south of the Speedway Heliport.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot of the AS-350B helicopter seated in the right seat holds an airline transport pilot certificate with airplane multiengine land rating. He also holds a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and rotorcraft helicopter ratings, last issued on December 17, 2001. He was issued a first-class medical certificate on February 15, 2005, with a restriction, "holder shall wear corrective lenses while exercising the privileges of his/her airman certificate."

Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., previously employed the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter from June 1987, to December 1989, and also in various capacities from 1996, to 1999. He resumed flying with Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., as a contract pilot on October 11, 2005. With respect to the accident make and model helicopter, he completed his aircraft ground training, which included general subjects, aircraft systems, and systems integration on October 12, 2005. A review of his "Flight Training Record" forms, "Crewmember Training Record" form, and "Certificate of Flight Training" form revealed he flew with 2 different instructors on separate flights in the accident helicopter for his initial pilot-in-command training on November 3, 2005. The total right seat hours "Block-to-Block" time was recorded to be 4.5 hours; the "Flight Grade" of both was listed as satisfactory. On November 6, 2005, he received a "night check" in the accident helicopter. A "Flight Grade" was not listed; however, no columns other than the "Proficient" column were checked. The "Crewmember Training Record" form indicates that with respect to the position "PIC" and the aircraft type "AS350", on November 9, 2005, he "successfully completed the training requirements specified by the FAA-approved training program." A review of an undated resume with a work history ending June 2005, revealed his total helicopter time was listed as 4,500 hours, and his total time was listed as 6,900 hours. A review of company records revealed he had accumulated 43.6 flight hours since October 11, 2005. He accumulated 6.4 flight hours on the accident date. A review of the NTSB "Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report" form signed by the pilot revealed his total rotorcraft time was 4,600 hours, and his total time was 7,000 hours.

The pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter seated in the left seat was the holder of a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft helicopter, and instrument helicopter ratings, last issued on December 24, 2003. He was issued a second-class medical certificate on September 21, 2005, with a limitation "holder shall wear corrective lenses while operating his airman certificate."

The pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was hired by HeliFlight, Inc., on January 10, 2005, and with respect to the accident make and model helicopter, completed his crew member emergency ground training drills on April 15, 2005. On April 18, 2005, he completed the initial or transition ground training, and on April 20, 2005, he completed the initial or transition flight training. He was "Assigned to Duty as Pilot-in-Command" in the accident make and model helicopter on April 21, 2005. His last "Airman Competency/Proficiency Check flight in accordance with 14 CFR Part 135.293 and 299 was performed in the accident helicopter on April 20, 2005; the result was listed as "Approved." A review of the pilots resume dated October 22, 2004, indicated his total turbine helicopter time to date was listed as 323 hours. His total time on the resume was listed as 2,305 hours. A review of company records revealed he had accumulated 311.3 hours since employment; the month of November was not included in the total time since employment. A review of the NTSB "Pilot/Operator Aircraft Accident/Incident Report" form signed by the director of operations revealed the pilot's total flight time and total rotorcraft flight time were each listed as 2,717 hours.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The AS-350B helicopter was manufactured by Aerospatiale in 1981, and was designated serial number 1370. It was originally manufactured as an AS-350D, but later converted to an AS-350B by compliance with Service Bulletin No. 10.12, Mod # AMS350A070096 Revision 2. The helicopter data plate still indicated the model as "350D." The helicopter was certificated in the normal category, and was equipped with a landing light, position lights, and upper strobe light.

A review of the "Aircraft Maintenance Log" sheets for the AS-350B helicopter revealed that from April 1, 2005, through the last undated sheet, no entries related to the landing, taxi, position, or upper strobe lights. Two discrepancies related to the aircraft's radios were noted; both were corrected. The first discrepancy was dated May 6, 2005, and the last discrepancy was dated August 11, 2005. Between April 1, 2005, and the accident date, the helicopter was operated a total of 135.5 hours.

Further review of the "Aircraft Maintenance Log" sheets for the AS-350B helicopter revealed it was last inspected in accordance with a 100-hour inspection on September 29, 2005; the total time since manufacture at that time was recorded to be 6,482.8 hours. At the time of the accident, the helicopter had accumulated 41.3 hours since the last inspection.

A review of the AS-350B helicopter "Flight Manual" revealed that daily helicopter operation requires three checks consisting of a check before the first flight of the day, a check in conjunction with flight, and a check after the last flight of the day. The flight manual indicates, "these daily checks may be carried out by qualified maintenance personnel or by a qualified pilot." A review of the items listed in all three checks revealed no specific mention to check the exterior lights. The operator does not have paperwork to sign off specifically related to compliance with the three checks. The operator does however have an "Aircraft Maintenance Log" sheet, which indicates pilot compliance with a preflight inspection.

A review of the AS-350B "ASTAR EXTERNAL PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTION" checklist provided by the operator revealed specific mention to check the landing, taxi, instrument, and Nos. 1 and 2 collision lights. A review of an undated "Aircraft Maintenance Log" sheet presumed to be for the accident date revealed a signature of the accident pilot.

The EC 130 B4 helicopter was manufactured by Eurocopter France in 2004, and was designated serial number 3856. A standard/normal U.S. Airworthiness Certificate was issued by an FAA Designated Airworthiness Representative (DAR) on March 5, 2005. The helicopter was equipped with a fixed-position landing light, a taxi light, position lights, a red colored strobe light installed at the top of the vertical stabilizer, and a strobe light mounted on the bottom of the fuselage near the aft skid location. American Eurocopter LLC installed a Supplemental Belly Anti-Collision and Vertical Fin Anti-Collision strobes in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SR09270RC-D.

A review of the maintenance records for the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed on April 29, 2005, a new "tail position light bulb", and "landing gear light bulb" were installed. On May 17, 2005, a new "Tail position light bulb" was installed, and on June 26, 2005, a new "connector on tail position light and a new light bulb" was installed. A review of the work order associated with the work performed to the tail position light revealed the "tipcap" was removed and all electrical connections were disconnected. The corrective action entry on the work order indicates, "reconnected all electrical cables and performed MOC on tail position light and found OK. Reinstalled vertical fin tipcap." Both a mechanic and inspector signed the entry on the "Work Order Discrepancy Sheet."

According to a technical representative of American Eurocopter, the issue of the navigation lights burning out on the EC 130 B4 helicopter was traced to vibration from the fenestron. The vibration issue was corrected which solved the navigation light problem.

Further review of the maintenance records for the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed it was last inspected in accordance with a 100-hour inspection on September 7, 2005; the total time since manufacture at that time was recorded to be 181.3 hours. At the time of the accident, the helicopter had accumulated approximately 76 hours since the last inspection.

A review of the EC 130 B4 helicopter "Flight Manual" revealed that daily operating checks called "Flight-Related Checks (VLV)" must be performed after the last flight of the previous day or before the first flight of the day by a "suitably trained pilot referring to present Flight Manual or by a qualified mechanic complying with the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (MMA)." Listed items include condition of the taxi, landing, and external lights on the vertical stabilizer and fin.

Paperwork located in the EC 130 B4 wreckage titled, "Daily Inspection" contained an entry dated "11/20/2005." The column titled "Pilot's Signature" for that date contains a signature that is consistent with other signatures of the accident pilot.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A METAR observation taken at Homestead Air Reserve Base (KHST) at 2055, or approximately 7 minutes after the accident, indicates the wind was from 150 degrees at 2 knots, the visibility was 7 statute miles, few clouds existed at 2,000 and 9,000 feet, broken clouds existed at 12,000 feet. The temperature and dew point were 24 and 23 degrees Celsius, respectively, and the altimeter setting was 30.00 inHg. The accident site was located approximately 2.9 nautical miles and 219 degrees magnetic from KHST.

COMMUNICATIONS

Personnel at the Speedway Heliport were communicating with arriving and departing helicopters on frequency 134.3 mHz. That frequency is one of two VHF local control communication frequencies assigned to North Perry Airport (KHWO) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT). The individual who was handling communications at the Speedway Heliport at the time of the accident reported he did not have permission from the facility or FAA to utilize that frequency for the event.

There were no reported communication difficulties from KTMB ATCT or KHST ATCT related to communications from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. Additionally, there were no reported communication difficulties from the individual handling ground-to-air communications at the Speedway Heliport related to communications from the pilot of either helicopter.

According to the KHWO Air Traffic Manager, he listened to the tower tape recordings for the day of the accident for frequency 134.3 mHz, and reported that between 1700 hours to 2100 hours local time, "there is nothing on the Frequency or tape. Probably the distance and the altitude of the aircraft precluded our receiving the transmissions."

According to FCC personnel, the use of a government frequency (KHWO ATCT frequency) at a ground station (Speedway Heliport) requires approval from FCC, who coordinates with FAA. The FCC did not authorize the use of the KHWO ATCT frequency for communications to and from arriving and departing aircraft to the Speedway Heliport.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

The FAA Approved Speedway Heliport, identifier VI2, is located on the southwest corner of the Homestead-Miami Speedway, and consists in part of 3-lighted concrete pads. The city of Homestead owns the land and Speedway Heliport, but the Speedway has operational control of the Speedway Heliport. The Speedway Heliport was not equipped with a permanent or semi-permanent facility to handle air traffic communications of inbound and outbound aircraft. Temporary elevated lighting was installed on speedway property just west of the Speedway Heliport. The Speedway Heliport is located approximately 2.9 nautical miles and 219 degrees from KHST.

A review of the Homestead-Miami Speedway Operations Manual (Operations Manual) dated October 1, 1999, revealed that the "Radio Operator" is "responsible to guide aircraft movements on the Homestead-Miami Speedway Heliport." Additionally, section "B" titled, "Normal Procedures/General Information", item 7 indicates, "Arriving and departing helicopter shall make every effort to arrive and depart via the canal that runs east and west (south of the helipad's)." The Operations Manual also indicates that the "Heliport Operations Manager" is responsible for operations at the Speedway Heliport and also "shall assure safe and efficient handling of helicopter traffic." The "Arrival Procedures" section of the Operations Manual indicates that a, "slightly steeper than normal or a confined area may offer the best option and help reduce the exposure and risk." The Operations Manual does not specify speeds to approach the Speedway Heliport, a single point entry, nor does it specify to use reporting points when contacting the heliport for arrival.

A Homestead-Miami Speedway document titled "Use Requirements For Homestead-Miami Speedway Heliport" (Use Requirements) contains an application titled Homestead-Miami Speedway Heliport Application (Application), which requires a signature, lists the names of 2 pilots and aircraft, company name and address, and insurance information. Information contained on the application form above the signature location indicates, "I certify that I have a copy of the Homestead-Miami Speedway Heliport Operations Manual ("Manual") and the use requirements ("Use Requirements"), which accompany this application. I have read and I understand and agree to follow the procedures and other terms and conditions contained within the Manual and Use Requirements."

The application to operate into the Speedway Heliport was signed by the "Chief Pilot" of HelicopterShuttle.com, and was completed on November 9, 2005. The application included the name of the accident pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. An application to operate into the Speedway Heliport for Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., was dated October 23, 2002, but did not list the name of the AS-350B pilot. No application for Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., with the name of the accident pilot was located.

According to a "Letter of Agreement" dated September 1, 2000, between "Homestead ARS (HST) Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) and Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC (HMS)", signed by the president of HMS and the KHST Air Traffic Control Manager, the purpose is to provide operating procedures "into and out of the VIP pad located on the Complex." A section of the Letter or Agreement titled, "Responsibilities" indicates, "All aircraft shall be responsible for providing their own separation under VFR flight rules during entry/exit to HMS Complex and while operating in the vicinity of said area." The Letter of Agreement also indicates that with respect to shuttle helicopters unless otherwise directed by HST ATCT, "Arrivals from the east and south will enter the Delta Airspace in the vicinity of Turkey Point at or below 500' MSL and proceed direct to Point "S", direct to VIP pad." As previously reported, the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter, which was flying from the southeast towards the Speedway Heliport, was advised by the KHST ATCT controller to proceed direct to the racetrack.

According to the Air Traffic Manager of KHST ATCT, he reported verbally briefing by telephone an individual from HelicopterShuttle.com, pertaining to the procedures spelled out on the Letter of Agreement. He did not provide a full briefing, as he had not done so in the previous 5 years.

Both helicopters were listed by registration as being authorized to enter the "HMS Special Use Airspace All Hours, 11/19 & 11/20/2005."

According to the FAA inspector-in-charge (FAA-IIC), FAA personnel have surveillance oversight of operations at the Speedway Heliport during sporting events, and are there to verify that the procedures specified in the Operations Manual are being followed.

One pilot who departed from the Speedway Heliport during the hours of darkness, or at approximately 2000 hours, reported that the "whole place was lit up" and "It was almost like daylight there down on the ground."

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The EC 130 B4 helicopter came to rest in an area of parked recreational vehicles located west-southwest of the Speedway Heliport. The accident site was located at 25 degrees 26.894 minutes North latitude and 080 degrees 24.782 minutes West longitude. The AS-350B helicopter came to rest on grass west of the westernmost pad of the Speedway Heliport. The AS-350B was resting on the left side of the fuselage and left horizontal stabilizer, and was on a magnetic heading of 046 degrees. The AS-350B helicopter came to rest located at 25 degrees 26.899 minutes North latitude and 080 degrees 24.646 minutes West longitude.

Examination of the accident site of the AS-350B helicopter revealed arcing skid marks in the grass that measure 86 feet 6 inches from the initial contact point to the location where the helicopter came to rest. The forward portion of the left skid (approximately 18 inches in length) was found near the initial touchdown point on the grass. Evidence of dirt was noted on the leading edges of all three main rotor blades. The helicopter was removed for further examination.

Examination of the AS-350B helicopter revealed the left skid assembly was fractured in numerous pieces. The left forward cross tube exhibited a circular indentation approximately 7 inches above the "ankle" as measured from the bottom of the skid and the left aft cross tube exhibited a circular indentation approximately 14 inches above the "ankle" as measured from the bottom of the skid. Burgundy colored paint was noted beneath the outer white paint layer on the left forward cross tube.

Postaccident operational testing of the AS-350B navigation, taxi, landing, and strobe lights revealed the navigation light fuse was in an open condition; impact damage was noted to the right navigation light assembly. The fuse was replaced and electrical power was noted to all position lights. The taxi, landing, and strobe lights were operationally tested with no discrepancies noted. The active frequency of the No. 1 communication transceiver was set to 122.70 mHz, while the standby frequency was set to 131.05 mHz. The active and standby frequencies of the No. 2 communication transceiver were set to 120.00 mHz. The communication selector was set to the No. 2 position.

Examination of the accident site of the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed it came to rest on its right side resting against two recreational vehicles. Fire and/or impact damage was noted to both trailers. The helicopter came to rest on a magnetic heading of 269 degrees. The left step of the AS-350B helicopter was found in the wreckage of the EC 130 B4 helicopter. Debris from the main rotor blades consisting of skin pieces and internal material were found on the ground west of the accident site. The identified main rotor blade skin pieces were recovered and retained. The helicopter was removed for further examination.

Examination of the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed the fenestron was separated at the attach point and was found in close proximity to the main wreckage. According to an FAA inspector who was on-scene within 5 minutes of the accident, the fire department reportedly moved it to allow access for rescue vehicles. All 3 main rotor blades remained connected to the main rotor mast. The left float was inflated while the right float was partially inflated. The right horizontal stabilizer was bent down approximately 90 degrees; impact damage was noted to the right navigation light assembly. The lower strobe light lens and bulb were separated. No impact damage was noted to the bottom of the fuselage near the landing or taxi lights. The instrument panel was separated but remained electrically connected. Impact damage to the cockpit canopy was greater on the right side than the left side. The pilot's restraint consisting of the lapbelt and shoulder harness were not connected.

Examination of the cockpit of the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed the taxi light switch on the pilot's collective control was in the on position, while the landing light switch was in the off position. The anti-collision, strobe, and position light switch positions on the Systems Control Unit (SCU) were not determined during the postaccident investigation due to inadvertent movement of the switch(s) during examination of the SCU. The pilot's seat outboard lapbelt anchor was fractured above the attach point on the seat; the anchor exhibited a manufactured line across one of the fracture surfaces. Each buckle for the pilot's shoulder harness exhibited gouges near the latch point. The pilot's seat was attached to the seat tracks, but attenuated to the right approximately 1 5/16 inches. The NTSB retained the fractured lapbelt anchor for the pilot's seat.

Examination of the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed the landing light bulb filament was broken with evidence of dark discoloration internally; no stretching of the filament was noted. A ball of material was noted at one end of the fractured filament. The electrical connection for the upper position light was found disconnected. A portion of wiring with the attached electrical connector was located outside the tip cap of the stabilizer. Following removal of the vertical stabilizer tip cap, the upper strobe light electrical connection was also found disconnected. No obvious distress was noted to either electrical connection for the upper strobe light. The end of the electrical wiring connector from the strobe power supply was found in close proximity to the electrical connection at the strobe light. The electrical connection near the upper strobe does not have interlocking devices on either connection; the connection was tight when tested by hand. The wiring for the upper strobe was fractured near the location where the fenestron was fractured. Examination of the position lights revealed the filaments of all bulbs were broken. Examination of the right position light bulb revealed localized discoloration on a section of the bulb base and also discoloration of one of the filament posts. The electrical wires of the position lights penetrated the skin of the horizontal stabilizer near one of the position lights.

Postaccident operational testing of the No. 1 communication transceiver from the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed the active frequency was set to 134.6 mHz, and the standby frequency was set to 118.9 mHz (both are VHF frequencies assigned to KTMB ATCT). The communication selector was set to "COMM 1." The taxi light operationally tested good using the switch on the pilot's collective, but the landing light did not illuminate when the landing light switch on the pilots collective was turned on. Further testing of the landing light electrical circuit revealed power was available at the electrical wire terminal ends adjacent to the light when the switch on the pilots collective was activated to the on position. Examination of the position light circuit revealed electrical continuity from the PP6 buss to pin 36 (power to the position light switch) of the electrical connection at the systems control unit (SCU) located in the center console in the cockpit. No continuity was noted through the switch with electrical power applied and the switch depressed, though the light in the switch was illuminated. The light in the position light switch remained illuminated when 1) the switch was depressed, 2) battery power was available for all electrical systems of the helicopter, and 3) the circuit breaker for the position lights was placed in an open condition. Electrical continuity was confirmed from pin 34 (power from the position light switch) of the electrical connection at the SCU, to each position light. Electrical continuity was noted to the power supply units at/for each strobe light. The SCU and components of the upper and lower strobe lights were retained for further examination.

Examination of the main rotor blades of the EC 130 B4 helicopter revealed the red blade was fractured 14 feet 6 inches outboard from the blade retention pin hole centerline; nominal blade span is 15 feet 5 inches. The blade exhibited burgundy colored paint transfer on the leading edge near the fracture surface location. The separated piece of the red main rotor blade was not recovered.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The EC 130 B4 pilot was rescued from the helicopter, and because of his injuries, a Miami-Dade air rescue helicopter was dispatched to the Speedway Heliport at 2056. The air rescue helicopter arrived at 2109, and departed with the pilot at 2122. The pilot was airlifted to the Ryder Trauma Center but died of his injuries.

A postmortem examination of the pilot was performed by the District 11 Medical Examiner's Office. The cause of death was listed as blunt force injuries to the head.

The District 11 Medical Examiner's office performed toxicology testing of blood and urine specimens from the EC 130 B4 helicopter pilot; the result was negative in blood for volatiles, and negative in urine for tested drugs.

Quest Diagnostics performed toxicological testing of urine specimens of the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter, and of the person handling ground-to-air communications at the Speedway Heliport at the time of the accident. The specimens of each were taken approximately 2 hours 22 minutes and 2 hours 42 minutes respectively, after the accident. The testing was for the "NIDA-5" drugs which included cannabinoids, cocaine, amphetamines, opiates, and phencyclidine; the results for both were negative.

Breath alcohol testing of the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter and the person handling ground-to-air communications at the Speedway Heliport was performed at 2313 (approximately 2 hours 25 minutes after the accident), and at 2324 hours (approximately 2 hours 36 minutes after the accident), respectively. The result for the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter was .006, and the result for the person handling ground-to-air communications was negative.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

According to the Director of Operations with HeliFlight, Inc., doing business as (DBA) HelicopterShuttle.com, the accident pilot had not been trained by his company to fly into the Speedway Helipad. He also stated there wasn't a safety briefing this year as there had been in past years. He reported that another company pilot and the accident pilot were handling flights associated with the race.

The HelicopterShuttle.com pilot who was also handling flights associated with the race for the company reported the accident pilot had flown into the Speedway Heliport one time before the race in September. The track was closed during that flight. The individual also reported that prior to the event, he contacted the "Race Track Representative" (person handling ground-to-air communications from the Speedway Heliport at the time of the accident), and asked about the mandatory pilot briefing. He was advised there would be no safety briefing this year since, "the operation is well established with a good safety record." The "Race Track Representative" briefed him on items including power lines, suggested approach paths, communications, and reporting points. On November 17, 2005, he (HelicopterShuttle.com pilot) briefed the accident pilot on what he was briefed on by the "Race Track Representative", and specifically discussed the "safety hazards, approach paths, radio communications, reporting points." He also suggested that a steep approach be conducted, but no approach speeds were discussed. The accident pilot was also provided the "Homestead Air [Force] Base Letter of Agreement and the Homestead-Miami Speedway Helicopter Operations Manual." Later that day he confirmed the accident pilot had received the documents and asked him if he had any questions. The accident pilot reported that he did not because the information was "straight forward and clear."

The president of the company operating the AS-350B helicopter reported that before the race, their chief pilot briefed the AS-350B pilot and all company pilots flying into the Speedway Heliport for the race, regarding the contents of the Homestead-Miami Speedway Operations Manual, and the Letter of Agreement between HST ATCT and Homestead-Miami Speedway, LLC (HMS). Additionally, the pilot of the AS-350B helicopter and another company pilot flew into the Speedway Heliport before the day of the race during the daytime to re-familiarize themselves with the heliport and surrounding area, installed equipment at the heliport, and procedures.

The NTSB Materials Laboratory located in Washington, D.C., examined the pilot's fractured lapbelt anchor from the EC 130 B4 helicopter. The examination revealed the fracture surfaces exhibited features consistent with overstress; no fatigue cracking was noted. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined close-up digital photographs of the landing light bulb and internal components of the bulb also from the EC 130 B4 helicopter. The examination revealed the ball of material at one of the ends of the fractured filaments is typical of a burned out filament, and the discoloration inside the glass envelope is from vaporized filament material. The filament breakage of the landing light bulb was not consistent with occurring because of acceleration forces during impact.

According to personnel with American Eurocopter LLC, the estimated G-loading on the pilot's restraint of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was 13-15 G's. The estimation was based on: a) a belt load application angle between 15 and 30 degrees, b) a pilot weight equal to 96 kg, or approximately 211 pounds (which was the weight listed on the pilot's last medical dated September 21, 2005), c) correct material characteristics, (d) correct fitting dimensions, and e) "a pure lateral crash."

The certification basis for the EC 130 B4 helicopter pertaining to airworthiness standards was in accordance with 14 CFR Part 27, titled "Airworthiness Standards: Normal Category Rotorcraft", Amendment 27-1 through 27-32. Regulation 14 CFR Part 27.952 pertaining to fuel system crash resistance was not adopted. A review of 14 CFR Part 27.561 titled "General" under "Emergency Landing Conditions" indicates that the ultimate inertial load factors are 8 G's sideward.

Examination of the components of the upper and lower strobe lights from the EC 130 B4 helicopter was performed at the strobe light manufacturers facility with FAA oversight. The upper strobe light and power supply for the lower strobe light operationally tested satisfactory. The lower strobe light was impact damaged which precluded testing, and the power supply for the upper strobe light was inoperative during the initial testing. Visual examination of the power supply for the upper strobe light revealed a dent in the cover, and damage to the circuit board. Further testing of the power supply for the upper strobe light revealed after removal of the cover, the unit began to operate intermittently. At times, the attached strobe light would not light, though the unit was seen firing to the light with the installed oscilloscope. Other than the damage to the circuit board, no other damage was noted. The unit then continued to operate and electrical power was removed from the unit. The cover was reinstalled, and electrical power was again applied to the unit. The unit functioned and the strobe flash rate was determined to be 52 flashes per minute (within specification). During removal of the test flash rate counter with electrical power applied, the unit was inadvertently dropped on the test bench and quit operating. The testing was then terminated.

Examination of the systems control unit box (SCU) of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was performed at the manufacturers facility with FAA oversight. Visual examination of the SCU revealed a crack on the lower right casing of the console. The SCU was placed in an exemplar helicopter and the following switches were engaged: "BAT EPU, DCT/BATT, STROBE, DOME LT, POS LT." All switches were disengaged, then the "BAT EPU" switch was engaged. The "A/COL LT" switch was then engaged which resulted in the operation of the "anti-collision" light located on the vertical stabilizer. The "POS LT" switch was then engaged and no power was noted to the individual navigation lights. Operational testing of the switch revealed it was functional. Further examination of the SCU revealed a "burn/split was observed on the POS LT trace of the printed circuit board." A jumper wire was used to join each end of the burn/split, and engagement of the "POS LT" switch revealed power to the navigation lights. The exemplar helicopter was not equipped with a strobe light located on the belly; therefore, the "STROBE" switch was positioned in the "A/COL LT" circuit. The "A/COL LT" switch was engaged and the anti-collision light operated.

Review of FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 00-61, dated July 24, 2000, titled "Event Planning Guide" revealed the AC was developed as a partnership with the auto racing industry to improve aviation safety, with a goal of enhancing air and ground safety. The AC also indicates that a safety briefing that contains information pertaining to "all aerial and ground operations" should be conducted. The AC also indicates, "All participants should attend", and "Safety briefings should include weather/night considerations and alternative plans." A flight route is depicted but speed restrictions are not specified. It does depict a single altitude to be flown, a frequency change-over point, and one route to the "Event Site & Heliport."

Both operators reported there was no safety briefing associated with flight operations to the Speedway Heliport before flights began. Additionally, the president of one of the operators reported that it was planned to fly the route to the Speedway Heliport at night in the end of October to determine if there were any issues with in-place lighting, or any other issues. That flight test did not occur due to a natural disaster.

As previously reported, the active and standby frequencies of the No. 1 communication transceiver of the EC 130 B4 helicopter were set to frequencies assigned to the KTMB ATCT. A review of the KTMB ATCT tape revealed that for the period 2032 to 2053, there was no recorded contact from the pilot of the EC 130 B4 helicopter and the KTMB ATCT other than the contact when the accident flight departed.

A review of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.113(g) pertaining to right-of-way rules revealed, "When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage of this rule to cut in front of another which is on final approach to land or to overtake that aircraft."

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

The president/owner of the AS-350B helicopter reported that earlier in the day, he noticed the strobe light located on the vertical fin of the EC 130 B4 helicopter was not operating, and the "second strobe was flashing but at an unusual rate. I did not say anything because the pilot would catch it on preflight before we started night operations but thought it was strange that the light was not working properly on a new aircraft."

With respect to the EC 130 B4, as previously reported in the "Wreckage and Impact" and "Tests and Research" sections of this report, electrical continuity was confirmed for the upper strobe light from the switch on the SCU to the electrical connection near the strobe light assembly. Additionally, the upper strobe light operationally tested satisfactorily. Impact damage to the power supply for the upper strobe light was noted.

According to a pilot who flew the EC 130 B4 helicopter for 1.1 hours on November 17th (3 days before the accident date), there were no discrepancies related specifically to the exterior lights including the landing, taxi, position, strobe, and anti-collision. He further stated that there were no discrepancies during the 1.1 hours, and he conducted a post-flight inspection; no discrepancies were reported.

The chief pilot of Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., who has flown into the Speedway Heliport since it opened, reported that when flying into there at night, "it is sometimes difficult to locate an other aircraft while being sequenced to the helipad due to ground lights (motor vehicle traffic)." He also reported that, "ground check points are difficult to identify at night, making sequencing of aircraft uncertain at times, as aircraft are not always calling in (to the helipad) at regular or known checkpoints. This makes visually identifying other aircraft difficult for both pilots and ground (helipad) personnel. Maintaining a close listening watch to radio traffic is essential."

One individual who knows the pilots of both helicopters and who was located at the Miami International Airport reported that on the day of the accident at approximately 2000 hours, the EC 130 B4 helicopter arrived to do a "quick drop" but they never saw the flight arrive. At the time, a big floodlight was operating but they still could see helicopters when they were 8 miles out. After touchdown the pilot flew straight towards his position and landed. He walked to the helicopter and noticed the landing light was not on. He helped offload the passengers and advised the pilot to turn on the landing light. The pilot replied, "oh, sorry about that thanks man." The helicopter departed but the landing light was not illuminated.

One witness reported seeing the EC 130 B4 helicopter depart from the Speedway Heliport at approximately 2000 hours; the navigation and one strobe light were observed operating at the time. A tower controller at KTMB reported that when the EC 130 B4 flight departed on the accident flight, he saw position lights on each horizontal stabilizer but did not recall seeing strobe lights. Several witnesses reported seeing external lights illuminated on both helicopters before the collision. One witness near the speedway noticed, "belly lights" on both helicopters, while another noted that both helicopters had their landing lights on but did not recall seeing "blinking lights" from either helicopter. Still another witness associated with the operator of the EC 130 B4 helicopter who flew in it on 1 flight before the accident flight reported that after landing and exiting the helicopter, he saw a landing light, a "blinking" white light at the top of the vertical stabilizer, a green light, and also a "white flashing light" on the fuselage belly towards the rear by the skids. The individual associated with the operator of the EC 130 B4 helicopter reported in writing that he noted the helicopter "appeared to be lit as if it were a Christmas tree."

The AS-350B helicopter was released to Daryl Martin, of Biscayne Helicopters, Inc., on November 30, 2005. The EC 130 B4 helicopter minus the retained components was released to Charles "Red" Maynard, insurance adjuster for AIG Insurance, on December 2, 2005. The NTSB retained components of the EC 130 B4 helicopter were also released to Charles "Red" Maynard on November 7, 2006.