N526CD

1.1 HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 9, 2006, at 1332 Pacific standard time, a Cirrus SR20, N526CD, impacted terrain while maneuvering to return to the runway following a simulated engine failure at General William J. Fox Airfield (WJF), Lancaster, California. Gene Hudson Flight Training was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 91. The certified flight instructor (CFI) pilot and the private pilot undergoing instruction (PUI) sustained fatal injuries; the airplane was destroyed. The local instructional flight departed Van Nuys, California, about 1250. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed. The approximate global positioning system (GPS) coordinates of the primary wreckage were 34 degrees 45.048 minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 11.738 minutes west longitude.

The National Transportation Safety Board investigator-in-charge (IIC) interviewed the WJF air traffic controllers who were on duty at the time of the accident. The controllers reported that the Cirrus reported inbound to WJF from the south and requested to do multiple touch-and-go takeoffs and landings. The Cirrus was cleared into the pattern and advised to use runway 6. After the Cirrus had completed multiple touch-and-go takeoffs and landings, the pilot requested to make a low approach to runway 6 and on climb out, simulate an engine failure, execute a teardrop maneuver, and land using runway 24. The controller advised that the winds were 060 degrees and 10 knots, gusting to 17, and approved the pilot's requested maneuver.

The controllers observed the Cirrus make the low approach to runway 6. At the departure end of the runway, the Cirrus made a slight right turn, followed by a sweeping left turn. The controllers said the Cirrus lost a significant amount of altitude before aborting the landing. The pilot then executed a go-around, and the airplane flew north of the runway and parallel. The pilot requested to "try that again," and the tower controller advised the Cirrus that the winds were 060 degrees and 15 knots.

The controllers observed the Cirrus make another low approach to runway 6; on the upwind leg, the airplane made a slight right turn followed by a sweeping left turn. The controller did not see the airplane impact the ground as a pillar in the control tower momentarily blocked the controller's view.

Ground witnesses, just south of the accident site, observed the airplane make a left turn and then "spin into the ground."

The Safety Board IIC reviewed transcripts and recordings from communications between WJF control tower personnel and the accident airplane pilots. The first radio contact with the Cirrus occurred at 1303:04 (all times related herein have been converted from universal coordinated time to Pacific standard time). At that time, the pilot stated that the airplane was 8.8 miles to the southwest and would be doing "touch-and-goes." The Cirrus made a straight in approach to runway 06, and completed several touch-and-go landings. At 1324:59, the CFI contacted the tower with the following request, "We want to do a turn back to the runway if there's nobody around. Wanna do an engine out at the top of the climb here and then just do a turn back to land the other way. Is this a good time?" The controller responded that the Cirrus was the only one in the pattern at the time. The controller also advised, "However, wind 060 at 10 gusting 17." The CFI responded that they would "like to do that." The controller cleared the Cirrus to land on runway 24.

As indicated above in the controller's statement, at approximately 1326, the Cirrus executed the first of two engine-out maneuvers to runway 06. At 1326:57, the Cirrus advised the tower "we are just to go back in the pattern and do normal stuff." The controller acknowledged the transmission and indicated that "you're the only one I have right now in the class delta, so advise whenever you want that approach." The pilot acknowledged the tower, continuing "we, we… if that stays that way we'll do it right now, thanks." The controller then confirmed, "Understand that you're going to be doing that this pass." The pilot responded "yes." The controller then cleared the Cirrus for a touch-and-go.

At 1331:36, the pilot advised that, "We're going to do the tear drop turning back again." The controller confirmed and reported, "wind 060 at 15, clear to land runway 24." As indicated above in the controller's statement, the Cirrus executed a low pass over runway 06, and, during the climb out, the Cirrus began a second "tear-drop" turn towards the left. The controller momentarily lost site of the Cirrus. At approximately 1332, the Cirrus impacted the terrain.

1.5 PERSONNEL INFORMATION

1.5.1 CERTIFIED FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR (CFI)

A review of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman records revealed that the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot also held a certified flight instructor (CFI) certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land.

The CFI held a second-class medical certificate issued in April 2005. It had the limitations that the pilot must wear corrective lenses and possess glasses for near and intermediate vision.

An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated an estimated total flight time of 1,052 hours. He logged 92 hours in the last 90 days, and 31 hours in the last 30 days. He had an estimated 34 hours in this make and model. He obtained his CFI rating on September 14, 2005.

1.5.2 PILOT UNDER INSTRUCTION (PUI)

A review of FAA airman records revealed that the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for rotorcraft-helicopter. The pilot obtained this rating in October 1998.

The pilot held a third-class medical certificate issued March 2004. It had the limitation that the pilot must have available glasses for near vision.

An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated an estimated total flight time of 429.9 hours. He had an estimated 57.9 hours in this make and model.

1.6 AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a Cirrus SR20, serial number 1545, which received its airworthiness certificate on August 8, 2006, with a total flight time of 5.3 hours. A review of the airplane's logbooks revealed that the airplane had a total airframe time of 300.4 hours at the last 100-hour inspection that was completed on December 10, 2005. The Hobbs hour meter read 342.8 hours at the accident site.

The engine was a Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-360-ES6, serial number 360052, which was manufactured on July 8, 2005. Total time recorded on the engine at the last 100-hour inspection was 300.4 hours.

The propeller was a Hartzell PHC-J3YF-1RF, serial number FP3880B. Total time recorded on the propeller at the last 100-hour inspection was 300.4 hours.

Examination of the maintenance and flight department records revealed no unresolved maintenance discrepancies against the airplane prior to departure.

1.7 METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The closest official weather observation station was at General William J. Fox Airfield (WJF), Lancaster, which was located 1.5 nautical miles (nm) southwest of the accident site. The elevation of the weather observation station was 2,348 feet mean sea level (msl). An aviation routine weather report (METAR) for WJF was issued at 1256. It stated: winds from 070 degrees at 10 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; skies clear; temperature 14 degrees Celsius; dew point -04 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.31 inHg.

According to the tower transcript, when the CFI requested the touch-and-go with the simulated engine failure, the tower controller reported that the wind was 060 degrees at 10 knots, gusting to 17 knots. About 6 minutes later when the CFI requested the second attempt, the tower controller reported that the wind was 060 degrees at 15 knots.

At 1356, the METAR for WJF reported winds from 070 degrees at 12 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; skies clear; temperature 15 degrees Celsius; dew point -04 degrees Celsius; altimeter 30.29 inHg.

1.10 AIRPORT INFORMATION

The Airport/Facility Directory, Southwest U. S., indicated that WJF runway 06/24 was 7,201 feet long and 150 feet wide. The runway surface was asphalt.

1.12 WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Investigators from the Safety Board, the FAA, Cirrus Design, Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM), and BRS Parachutes examined the wreckage at the accident scene.

The first identified point of contact (FIPC) was a 35-foot-long ground scar along a magnetic heading of 110 degrees in an open field approximately 1 nautical mile northeast of the departure end of runway 06. The debris path was along a magnetic heading of 100 degrees.

The main impact point was centered 34 degrees 45.048 minutes north latitude and 118 degrees 11.738 minutes west longitude. The orientation of the wreckage was as follows: engine/fuselage, 020 heading; the fractured and separated empennage, 090-degree heading; wing spar (tip to tip), 110 degrees. There were no ground scars leading up to the main impact point.

The debris field extended out from the main impact point between 010 degrees to 150 degrees. The main debris field was between 060 degrees and 120 degrees, with a section of fuselage skin, the furthermost component, coming to rest approximately 65 feet at 070 degrees from the main impact point. Both cabin doors and the upper engine cowling were located within the main debris field and in close proximity to the main impact point. The right aileron was located approximately 60 feet at 150 degrees from the main impact point.

The engine and propeller were located in the center of the main impact point. Both were embedded in the ground approximately 2 feet at a 70-degree angle. All flight control surfaces and components of the airplane were located at the main impact site. The 35-foot ground scar was observed o...