N86CE

*** THIS REPORT WAS MODIFIED ON DECEMBER 18, 2007 **

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On January 24, 2006, approximately 0640 Pacific standard time, a Cessna Citation 560, N86CE, impacted the localizer antenna platform during an aborted landing (go-around) on runway 24 at McClellan-Palomar Airport, Carlsbad, California. The two airline transport pilots and their two passengers received fatal injuries, and the aircraft, which was owned by GOSHIP AIR, LLC, of Ketchum, Idaho, was destroyed by the impact sequence and the post crash fire. The flight, which was carried out under 14 CFR Part 91, departed Friedman Memorial Airport, Hailey, Idaho, at 0600 mountain standard time (MST), and was being operated under an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. At the time of the accident, the crew had canceled their IFR flight plan, and were executing a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) approach to runway 24 in visual meteorological conditions.

The owners (principles) of GOSHIP AIR, LLC, were two businessmen with no professional aviation experience. According to one of the two principals of GOSHIP AIR, LLC, the flight to Carlsbad was scheduled on the day prior to the flight as a result of a phone call from JAXAIR, LLC, which consisted of one individual who was a pilot and was hired to manage the accident airplane for GOSHIP AIR (see the "Additional Data and Information" for detailed information regarding GOSHIP AIR and JAXAIR), According to the GOSHIP AIR principal, during this phone call, he was advised that JAXAIR and a local businessman had discussed the possibility of using the accident airplane to fly that individual to Carlsbad for a scheduled business meeting in San Diego. Permission was granted, and the wife of the GOSHIP AIR principal, who desired to visit family members in Southern California, was added as a second passenger. JAXAIR then advised Sun Valley Aviation, the owners of the hangar where the aircraft was kept, that the aircraft should be made ready for a 0530 departure the next morning.

According to Sun Valley Aviation, on the morning of the accident flight, the co-pilot arrived at the hangar at 0455, and proceeded to preflight the aircraft. The JAXAIR captain arrived at 0520, the business passenger at 0532, and the wife of the GOSHIP AIR principal arrived last at 0545. After the passengers were loaded, the aircraft was started using a ground power unit (GPU), and then it taxied for takeoff at 0555. Discussions with personnel at Sun Valley Aviation, and a review of their security camera videos did not reveal any unusual actions or activities on the part of the flight crew, nor any obvious anomaly associated with the aircraft.

The aircraft departed Hailey at 0600 MST (0500 Pacific standard time), climbed to an en route altitude of flight level 380, and remained there until 0605 Pacific standard time (PST), when it was cleared by Los Angeles Center to descend to flight level 350. At the time the clearance was issued, the aircraft was approximately 170 nautical miles straight-line distance, at a bearing of 026 degrees magnetic from the destination airport (although longer by flight path). Two minutes later, at 0607, the aircraft was cleared down to flight level 310. Approximately six minutes later, at 0613, the crew was given a clearance of direct Thermal (TRM), direct ESCON intersection, direct Carlsbad, and also cleared down to flight level 280. Three minutes later, at 0616, the crew was cleared down to flight level 240, and three minutes after that (0619), they were cleared to descend to 16,000 feet.

The aircraft reached 16,000 feet mean sea level (MSL) just after 0626, and about one minute later the crew was cleared down to 12,000 feet. The aircraft reached 12,000 feet between 0630 and 0631, and at 0631:11, the crew was cleared to fly direct to ESCON intersection, and to descend to 8,000 feet. They were also advised to expect the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach to runway 24, and they were told that the ILS glideslope was unusable. Approximately one minute later, at 0632:39, the crew was cleared to descend and maintain 5,200 feet. Thirty seconds later, at 0633:09, the crew was cleared down to 3,500 feet, advised that they were five miles from ESCON intersection, and told to maintain 3,500 feet until they were established on the ILS for runway 24. At 0635:01 the crew was advised that the airport was at their 12 o'clock position at six and one-half miles, and they acknowledged that it was in sight. At 0635:07, the controller at Southern California (SOCAL) Approach Control advised the crew to contact the Palomar tower. About six seconds later, the controller told the crew to disregard the switch to tower, since it did not open for another 25 minutes. He then advised the crew to either cancel their IFR clearance with him (the controller), or to report a cancellation within five minutes after landing. At 0635:22, the crew advised the controller that they were canceling their IFR clearance and switching to frequency 118.6 (Polomar common traffic advisory frequency).

A review of the descent profile revealed that at the time the crew leveled off at 16,000 feet, the groundspeed of the aircraft was approximately 350 knots. When the crew leveled at 12,000 feet, the groundspeed of the aircraft decreased to about 295 knots, and then increased to about 330 knots for about one minute, before momentarily decreasing to 280 knots. The groundspeed then increased again to about 300 knots, and remained there for about another minute. About 0634:30, as the aircraft was descending through an altitude of about 6,700 feet, the groundspeed began a relatively linear decrease that brought it from about 300 knots to approximately 150 knots in a period of about two minutes. At the beginning of this speed decrease, the aircraft was about 8.5 miles from the end of the runway, and approximately 3,200 feet above the ILS glideslope. At the end of this two-minute period, the aircraft was seven-tenths of a mile from the end of the runway, and according to the NTSB performance data profile, within the glideslope two-dot deviation limit.

About four-tenths of a mile from the end of the runway, the flightcrew went below the two-dot deviation limit, decreased their rate of descent from the 3,000-4,000 feet per minute that they had maintained for the previous minute, to about 1,000 feet per minute, and then crossed the runway threshold at a groundspeed between 130 and 140 knots. This groundspeed equated to a calibrated airspeed of 124 to 134 knots, with a six-knot tailwind. According to the Cessna Aircraft Company, the recommended reference airspeed for the accident airplane under the known landing weight conditions was 101 knots (see the "Airplane Information" section for detailed information regarding the calculation of this recommended reference airspeed).

A review of the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and the recorded air traffic control communication during the descent revealed that the fight crew acquired both the Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) airport information and the Automated Surface Observation System (ASOS) weather information about 0622. At that time, their descent was approaching flight level 220, and the winds at Palomar were reported from 040 degrees at six knots. At 0632:14, the First Officer stated, "I'll be off on one," and the Captain responded with "Okay." From 0632:20 until 0633:49 (about one minute and thirty seconds) the First Officer was communicating with Western Flight Services, primarily about transportation for the passengers, and the Captain was communicating with Approach Control. During that period, approach control advised the crew that they were five miles from ESCON, and instructed them to maintain 3,500 feet until established on the localizer, and that they were cleared for the ILS to runway 24.

Then after a brief pause, the controller added "You gonna be able to get down okay?" The Captain responded to the controller's question with, "ah yeah, thank you," but he did not read back the clearance, and the First Officer told the Captain to, "say thirty-five hundred until established." The First Officer then went back to his communications with Western Flight Services, but the Captain did not read back the clearance.

At 0633:53, about four seconds after completing his Western Flight Services communications, the First Officer asked the Captain to confirm that they had been cleared for the approach, and the Captain responded with, "That's what he said." About six seconds after asking the Captain to confirm that they had been cleared for the approach, the First Officer stated, "Is that the airport down there," and the Captain responded with, "yeah," followed by what sounded like a chuckle.

About six seconds after the Captain's response, the First Officer asked the Captain if he wanted to use speed brakes, and the Captain responded, "No, I thought it would be a go-around, land to the east …" (A landing "to the east" would have placed the airplane in a position to land on runway 6, which would have been the opposite end of runway 24, and would have been into the reported wind direction). Almost immediately after that communication, a portion of the ASOS transmission is heard again, and the First Officer advised the Captain that the winds were from 040 degrees, which the Captain acknowledged.

About 40 seconds after the First Officer gave the Captain the updated wind direction, the controller advised the crew that the airport was at their 12 o'clock position at six and one-half miles. The First Officer advised the controller that it was "in sight," and the controller responded by advising the crew that they could "use S-turns to get down." The First Officer then thanked the controller for that clearance. At that time, the aircraft was about 5.8 miles from the end of the runway, and descending through 5,000 feet. At 0635:20, there was an increase in CVR background noise, which according to the ...