N554CP

Substantial
None

McDonnell Douglas Helicopters 369ES/N: 0542E

Accident Details

Date
Saturday, August 19, 2006
NTSB Number
CHI06GA241
Location
Columbus, OH
Event ID
20060828X01241
Coordinates
40.068889, -82.968330
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
None
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
2
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The uncontained engine failure due to the fatigue failure of the gas producer turbine tie bolt.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N554CP
Make
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS HELICOPTERS
Serial Number
0542E
Model / ICAO
369E

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On August 19, 2006, at 1639 eastern daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas Helicopters model 369E, N554CP, operated by the City of Columbus Police Department and piloted by a commercial pilot, was substantially damaged during an uncontained engine failure while in cruise flight over Columbus, Ohio. The pilot performed an autorotation and landed without further damage to the helicopter. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The public-use flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. The pilot and the observer officer were not injured. The local area flight departed at 1600 from the Columbus Heliport (OH52), Columbus, Ohio.

The flight crew was conducting a routine patrol flight over the Columbus area when they were dispatched to a crime scene to provide aerial support for responding ground units. The pilot increased engine power and accelerated to a cruise speed of about 110 knots indicated air speed (KIAS). While en route to the crime scene, between 1,300 and 1,400 feet mean sea level (msl), the pilot heard a loud explosion. At that point, the N1 (gas producer) gauge displayed zero percent rpm, the engine power output (EPO) warning horn sounded, and the annunicator panel displayed several warnings.

The pilot stated that the airframe was shaking significantly as he entered an emergency autorotation. He performed a run-on landing to an open parking lot area, and the helicopter slid 150-180 feet before coming to rest upright. The pilot performed an emergency shutdown of the helicopter; rotated the throttle to the off position, pulled the emergency fuel shut-off, and turned-off the battery, generator, and ignition. The observer officer released his safety restraints and exited the helicopter without difficulty. He proceeded to the rear of the helicopter and notified the pilot of an engine fire. The pilot immediately released his safety restraints and exited the helicopter without difficulty. He then extinguished the engine fire using a hand-held Halon fire extinguisher.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot of N554CP, age 45, held a commercial pilot certificate with rotorcraft-helicopter and airplane single-engine land ratings. His airplane rating was limited to private pilot privileges. He was not instrument rated. The pilot's last aviation medical examination was completed on September 29, 2005, when he was issued a second-class medical certificate with the limitation that he wear corrective lenses.

The pilot reported having 973.3 hours total flight time. He had flown 874.0 hours in rotorcraft and 99.3 hours in single-engine airplanes. He had accumulated 842.0 hours as pilot-in-command (PIC) in rotorcraft. He had flown 826.4 hours in a McDonnell Douglas Helicopters model 369E. His last flight review was completed on July 10, 2005, in a McDonnell Douglas Helicopters model 369E.

During the previous 90-days, 30-days, and 24-hours, the pilot had flown 110.4 hours, 35.7 hours, and 0.7 hours total flight time, respectively. The flight time accumulated during those periods was completed in a McDonnell Douglas Helicopters model 369E.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The City of Columbus Police Department used the 1999 McDonnell Douglas Helicopters model 369E, serial number 0542E, as a public-use helicopter. The helicopter had a five-bladed main rotor system, a four-bladed tail rotor system, and was powered by a single 420 shaft-horsepower Rolls-Royce model 250-C20B, serial number CAE 836964, turbo shaft engine. The helicopter's maximum gross weight was 3,000 pounds and was configured to accommodate a pilot and three passengers. At the time of the accident, the airframe and engine had accumulated 6,639.7 hours in service. The helicopter had accumulated 41.4 hours since the last maintenance inspection, which was completed on August 8, 2006.

At the time of departure, the helicopter had 64-gallons of Jet-A fuel onboard and weighed 2,534 lbs, with a center-of-gravity location of 100.9 inches aft of datum.

A review of the maintenance logbook records found no history of unresolved airworthiness issues.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The closest weather reporting facility was at the Ohio State University Airport (OSU), about 5.2 miles west-northwest of the accident site. The airport was equipped with an automated surface observing system (ASOS).

At 1653, the OSU ASOS reported the following weather conditions: Wind 310 degrees true at 11 knots; visibility 10 miles; scattered clouds at 3,600 feet above ground level (agl), broken ceilings at 4,700 and 6,000 feet agl; temperature 28 degrees Celsius; dew point 21 degrees Celsius; altimeter setting 29.91 inches of mercury.

The next closest weather reporting facility was at the Port Columbus International Airport (CMH), about 6.3 miles southeast of the accident site. The airport was equipped with an ASOS.

At 1651, the CMH ASOS reported the following weather conditions: Wind 290 degrees true at 15 knots, gusting to 21 knots; visibility 10 miles; scattered towering cumulus clouds at 4,500 feet agl, broken ceiling at 20,000 feet agl; temperature 30 degrees Celsius; dew point 19 degrees Celsius; altimeter setting 29.89 inches of mercury.

FLIGHT RECORDERS

The accident helicopter was not equipped, nor was it required to be equipped, with a cockpit voice recorder or flight data recorder.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Initial inspection of the engine revealed that portions of the 1st-stage gas producer wheel had departed the engine. Parts of the 1st-stage gas producer wheel were found on the engine deck. The power turbine rotor turned freely by hand and remained attached to the power turbine output.

There were several punctures with outward deformation noted on the engine compartment, engine cowling, and engine access doors. Additionally, the tailboom primary structure and skin contained punctures with outward deformation. All of the observed punctures were consistent with projectile damage originating from an uncontained engine failure.

The engine was removed and shipped to the manufacturer for disassembly and examination.

TEST AND RESEARCH

The engine was disassembled at the Rolls-Royce Corporation facility in Indianapolis, Indiana, on September 6, 2006, under the supervision of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge.

The compressor section rotated freely after the remaining turbine components were removed. Visual inspection of the compressor components did not reveal any damage. The accessory gearbox rotated freely by hand and no anomalies were noted with either gearbox drive trains. Continuity was established to the power turbine and accessory drive outputs.

The gas producer support and corresponding aft bolt flange was fractured and missing about 240-degrees of its circumference. The energy absorption ring was fractured and deformed outward into an oval shape. The ring had circumferential scoring along its inner surface.

The 1st-stage gas producer turbine nozzle outer portion was fractured. The 1st-stage gas producer wheel was fractured into several segments and a portion of the wheel was not recovered. Visual inspection of the 2nd-stage gas producer nozzle revealed that that the 1st-stage blade path was fractured around the entire circumference. Only small fragments of the 1st-stage blade path were recovered. Several 2nd-stage gas producer nozzle airfoils were fractured and missing at the 120-degree position, as viewed from the pressure side. The 2nd-stage gas producer wheel had impact damage to the airfoil leading edges. Rub damage was noted along the 2nd-stage wheel airfoil tips, which corresponded with rub damage noted on the 2nd-stage gas producer nozzle blade path. The 3rd-stage turbine nozzle exhibited slight impact damage along the leading edges and suction side of the airfoils. The power turbine assembly was not disassembled. Visual inspection of the power turbine assembly did not reveal any damage to the wheels or nozzle.

Removal of the oil system supply lines and the oil scavenge sump revealed that there was residual oil throughout the engine. About 2 teaspoons of fuel were recovered from the fuel nozzle supply hose.

The turbine-to-compressor coupling was intact and exhibited light coking on the outer surface of the turbine end. The power turbine-to-pinion gear coupling was intact with both Teflon washers in place. The spur adapter gearshaft remained intact.

The gas producer turbine tie bolt (part number 23068265, serial number NM81907) was fractured immediately adjacent to the torque nut. The aft portion of the tie bolt remained engaged with the torque nut. Further examination of the tie bolt revealed fracture features consistent with fatigue, initiating at the thread root radius. The tie bolt fracture progressed across the tie bolt diameter about 0.130-inch (40-percent) in fatigue before separating in overload. The microstructure, chemistry, and hardness of the turbine tie bolt met engineering drawing specifications. No material anomalies were detected at the fracture surface. Damage to the fracture surface precluded the determination if the failure was associated with low or high cycle fatigue.

A review of the component history showed that the turbine tie bolt had completed 3,427 cycles, about 38 percent, of its published life limit of 9,000 cycles. The tie bolt had accumulated 4,993.8 hours since being manufactured. The failure was the first documented since the tie bolt was redesigned during the late 1990s. The redesign was to decrease the propensity of the gas producer rotor assembly to respond to resonant frequency that could result in high cycle fatigue failure. The redesigned tie bolt incorporated a thicker and stiffer cross-section that had a higher resonant frequency.

The tie bolt installation required that the bo...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CHI06GA241