N289DT

Destroyed
Fatal

Daniel R. Lloyd Trish's Ride HomeS/N: 40269

Accident Details

Date
Friday, November 2, 2007
NTSB Number
NYC08FA023
Location
Greenville, PA
Event ID
20071120X01821
Coordinates
41.457778, -80.373611
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
1
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
1

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot/builder's improper installation of the electrical system.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N289DT
Make
DANIEL R. LLOYD
Serial Number
40269
Engine Type
Reciprocating
Year Built
2007
Model / ICAO
Trish's Ride HomeBPAT
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Registered Owner (Historical)

Name
LLOYD DANIEL R
Address
3249 TIMBER LN
Status
Deregistered
City
HERMITAGE
State / Zip Code
PA 16148-6033
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 2, 2007, at 0832 eastern daylight time, an experimental amateur-built Vans RV-10, N289DT, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain near Greenville, Pennsylvania. The private pilot/builder was fatally injured. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the local flight that departed Greenville Municipal Airport (4G1), Greenville, Pennsylvania. No flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.

According to a family member, the pilot had driven to the airport to practice "touch and go's" and to make sure everything was functioning properly, prior to a planned afternoon trip in the airplane with his family to Boston, Massachusetts.

Witness interviews were conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Safety Board, and while no one saw the airplane depart 4G1, the airplane was observed by a witness at approximately 0800 traveling in a northwesterly direction at low altitude, moving "fast" and sounding like it was "running strong like a Ford Mustang (turbocharged) Cobra that the witness once owned." At approximately 0825, the airplane was again observed; this time by multiple witnesses. Descriptions varied between witness statements as to the altitude, direction of flight, and velocity of the airplane; however, the preponderance of witness statements were that the airplane was flying north on the east side of Pennsylvania State Route 58, and seemed to make a circle to the left at approximately 500 feet above ground level (agl). It was next observed to travel in a westerly direction, fly across Route 58 and make another turn to the left with the engine "revving up and down" and losing altitude. When it reached approximately 50-feet agl, heading east, the airplane rolled wings level and impacted a cornfield and a fireball erupted.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot held a private pilot certificate, with a rating for airplane single engine land. His most recent FAA third class medical certificate was issued on March 14, 2006. According to his pilot logbook, he had accrued 221.4 total hours of flight experience.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The experimental amateur-built airplane, was a four place, low wing monoplane. It was equipped with a non-certificated Eggenfellner E6T/220, water cooled, fuel injected, turbo-charged, 220 horsepower, six cylinder engine. The airplane's special airworthiness certificate was issued on July 10, 2007.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

A weather observation taken about 23 minutes after the accident at Port Meadville Airport (GKJ), Meadville, Pennsylvania, located about 14 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, recorded the winds as 090 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 10 miles, sky clear, temperature 1 degree Celsius, dew point -2 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.36 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

Examination of the accident site by an FAA inspector revealed that a post impact fire had ensued. The airplane had come to rest inverted on route 58. Further examination of the accident site revealed that the airplane had impacted in a 35 to 60 degree nose down attitude. An approximately 100-foot debris path extended from the point of impact in the cornfield to the shoulder of Route 58.

The left wing was bent aft at the root with evidence of aft bending along the length of the wing panel. The right wing exhibited compression damage in an aft direction from the wingtip inboard, for approximately one third of its length. The empennage was intact but was partially separated from the fuselage just aft of the rear window location, lying forward of the left wing tip, and was found inverted from its normal mounting position.

The engine and firewall were separated from the fuselage and the majority of the hoses and belts had been consumed or were heavily fire damaged. Three of the four composite propeller blades were found at the initial impact point and one was found under the main wreckage.

Post recovery examination of the wreckage by the National Transportation Safety Board revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures of the airframe. The doors were closed and latched during the impact sequence, the structure had experienced heavy impact damage and tumbling, and the upper and lower baggage bulkheads were missing.

Engine Examination

Examination of the engine, and propeller speed reduction unit (PSRU), revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions. Both engine timing chains were intact, the crankshaft was rotated by hand, and drive train continuity was confirmed. The PSRU contained oil, and rotated freely. Compression was obtained on all cylinders. Oil was present throughout the lubrication system. The intake and exhaust systems were compromised and exhibited breaks in the tubing. The turbocharger waste gate was closed and the turbocharger could be rotated by hand. All of the sparkplugs were intact.

Propeller System Examination

The airplane was equipped with a 4-blade, in-flight adjustable, constant speed propeller. It consisted of an electric variable pitch hub manufactured by Quinti Avio, which was mated to the composite propeller blades manufactured by Sensenich.

Examination of the propeller hub and the remains of the propeller blades revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunction. Further examination of the propeller assembly revealed that the four composite propeller blades were separated at the 4-inch blade radius station, which corresponded to the positions of the hub barrel clamps.

Examinations of the blade surfaces indicated that the blades were not in rotation at time of impact. The electric pitch control motor end bell and exterior nylon slide exhibited severe melting. The blade retention nuts were also found tightened approximately 1/4 inch tighter than the index marks scribed on the hub. This however, did not appear to affect the pitch rotation friction. Disassembly of the propeller hub revealed that the pitch motor gearbox was intact and immobile, (as designed) and held the last pitch angle selected when under no electrical load. Examination of the blade shank assemblies, bearings, and pitch slide assembly revealed no anomalies, and measurements of the propeller pitch setting corresponded to a high pitch (cruise) setting.

Examination of the propeller control

Examination of the propeller controller revealed that it was not the propeller controller that was manufactured by the propeller manufacturer. Instead, a manual electric pitch change system had been installed that consisted of a double pole panel mounted switch that could change the polarity to the electric hub motor. The motor could either run clockwise or counterclockwise from fine to coarse pitch. It was incapable of monitoring propeller rpm, and could not maintain the propeller at a constant speed by automatically varying blade pitch angle.

Fuel System Examination

Examination of the fuel system revealed that all fuel filler caps were closed and latched and the fuel selector valve was in the right fuel tank position.

Instrument Panel Examination

Examination of the instrument panel revealed that the airplane was equipped with a dual screen Chelton Flight Systems Electronic Flight Information System (EFIS), A Dynon Avionics D10A backup EFIS, Dual Garmin SL-30 navigation and communication radios, a Garmin 496 Global Positioning System (GPS), and a Grand Rapids Technologies Engine Information System (EIS) monitor.

Further examination revealed that the panel switches were positioned for flight. The "X-TIE" switch was in the off position, The "FUEL" switch was in the "ON" position, the "IGNITION" switch was in the "ON" position, the "FUEL SELECTOR" (electric fuel pumps) switch was in the "MAIN" position, and the "BUSS SELECTOR" switch was in the "ON/MAIN" position.

Flight Control System Examination

Examination of the flight control system revealed no evidence of any preimpact failures. Control continuity was established from the ailerons, elevator, and rudder, to the breaks in the system, which displayed evidence of tensile overload.

Further examination of the flight control system revealed that, the outboard ends of the ailerons had been filled with foam and then fiberglass had been used to seal in the foam. A trim tab for the rudder was discovered to be attached with duct tape. The lock nuts which were used on the rod ends for the pitch control system could be spun by hand and were not tightened against the rod ends, and were found on the threaded portion of the rods approximately 1/4 inch away from what would be their normal seated positions. The right trim tab rod on the elevator was connected to its rod end by two threads and was shorter than the trim tab rod for the left trim tab. It displayed evidence that the end of the trim tab rod at one time had broken off, and then had been re-inserted into the rod end, as the rest of the threaded portion was not present.

Electrical System Examination

The remains of the batteries and contactor relays were located in the center tunnel area of the cabin.

Examination of the remains of the electrical system revealed that the batteries and contactor relays had been exposed to the post impact fire.

Multiple wires showed no evidence of having being connected prior to impact. Examination of the cableing connected to the electrical system's contactor relays, revealed that a cable was not secured to its corresponding terminal on the contactor relay.

Further examination revealed that the terminal bore no evidence of dimpling or indentation and its interior surface was sooted.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Office of the County Coroner, Mercer County, Pennsylvania. The cause of death was attributed to multiple blunt trauma.

Toxicological testing of the pilot was conducted at the FAA Bioaeronautical Sciences Res...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# NYC08FA023