Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
Both helicopter pilots’ failure to see and avoid the other helicopter on approach to the helipad. Contributing to the accident were the failure of N407GA’s pilot to follow flight arrival route guidelines, and the failure of N407MJ’s pilot to follow communications guidelines requiring him to report his position within a minimum of 5 miles from the helipad.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
"THIS CASE WAS MODIFIED MAY 29, 2009."
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On June 29, 2008, at 1547 mountain standard time, a Bell 407 emergency medical service (EMS) helicopter, N407GA, and a Bell 407 EMS helicopter, N407MJ, collided in mid air while approaching the Flagstaff Medical Center (FMC) helipad (3AZ0), Flagstaff, Arizona. Both helicopters were destroyed. N407GA's commercial pilot, flight nurse, and patient sustained fatal injuries; and N407MJ's commercial pilot, flight paramedic, flight nurse, and patient sustained fatal injuries. N407GA was operated by Air Methods Corporation, Englewood, Colorado, and registered to FMC, Flagstaff, Arizona. N407MJ was operated by Classic Helicopter Services, Page, Arizona, and registered to M&J Leisure, L.L.C., Ogden, Utah. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight plans were filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air medical flights. N407GA's flight departed Flagstaff Pulliam Airport (FLG), Flagstaff, Arizona, at 1544, and N407MJ's flight departed the Grand Canyon National Park Service South Rim helibase, Tusayan, Arizona, at 1517.
Audio recordings were obtained from Classic's communications center (Classic Control), Guardian Control, FMC, and the FLG Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT).
At 1516, the pilot for the Air Methods helicopter, N407GA, call sign Angel 1, contacted Guardian Control via aircraft radios and reported that they were departing Winslow, Arizona, with four people on board; the pilot, two flight nurses, and a patient. The pilot stated that his estimated time en route was 25 minutes and he was either going to land at FLG or at FMC. He was not sure if he would be at the proper weight to land with enough power to execute a safe out of ground effect hover at FMC with all four occupants onboard.
At 1517, the pilot of Angel 1 contacted Guardian Control via onboard radios and requested the current weather conditions at FLG. The on-call transportation coordinator (TC) provided the requested information, and within two minutes, she contacted FMC and told them that Angel 1 was inbound to the helipad in approximately 23 minutes.
At 1517, the pilot for Classic helicopter, N407MJ, call sign Lifeguard 2, contacted Classic Control via onboard radios and reported that they had departed the south rim of the Grand Canyon and were en route to the FMC with an estimated time of arrival of 32 minutes. There were four people on board; the pilot, a flight nurse, a flight paramedic, and a patient.
Approximately one minute later, the pilot on Angel 1 called Guardian Control via onboard radios and reported that they were going to "drop one" at FLG before proceeding to FMC.
At 1523, the dispatcher on duty at Classic Control contacted Guardian Control via landline and reported that Lifeguard 2 was en route to the FMC and would be arriving from the north. He also reported that it would be a "cold drop" and the emergency department at the hospital had already been notified. The Guardian Control TC then informed the Classic dispatcher that Angel 1 was also en route and would be landing at FMC in 20 minutes. The Classic dispatcher then stated, "Ohh okay, I'll let them know when I talk to them next, and I'll tell them to be sure and get a hold of you."
At the end of this call, the Guardian Control TC called FMC's emergency department (ED) via land-line and stated that Lifeguard 2 would also be landing at the hospital in "about 28 minutes...and they know about mine coming in." The person who answered the landline responded, "All right." The TC then contacted the pilot of Angel 1 via onboard radio and informed him that Lifeguard 2 would also be landing at FMC in approximately 28 minutes. The Angel 1 pilot responded, "Roger will be looking for 'em thanks."
At 1532, the pilot of Lifeguard 2 contacted Classic Control via onboard radios, provided a position report and said they were 15 minutes from landing at FMC. The dispatcher on duty responded, "Comm center copies all sir...I'll talk to you on the ground in 15 minutes, 1532." This was the last recorded communication from the Lifeguard 2 pilot.
Also at 1532, the Angel 1 pilot contacted Guardian Control via onboard radios and reported that they were 10 minutes from landing at FLG in order to drop off a flight nurse due to weight considerations.
At 1534, the Angel 1 pilot called Guardian Control via onboard radios and asked the TC to contact FMC and request additional ground support to assist in moving the patient from the helicopter. The TC then contacted FMC and made the request.
At 1541, the Angel 1 pilot contacted the FLG ATCT via onboard radios and reported that he was one mile out. A controller provided traffic advisories and cleared Angel 1 to land.
At 1543, the Angel 1 pilot contacted the FLG ATCT via onboard radios and said, "...Angel 1 would like to depart to the north to the hospital with foxtrot." A controller responded, "Lifeguard Angel 1 wind variable at five taxiway alpha cleared for take off northbound to the hospital approved."
At 1544, the Angel 1 pilot contacted Guardian Control via onboard radios and stated, "Control Angel 1 if you haven't figured it out we've uh landed at the...airport departed and we're about two minutes out of the hospital." The TC responded and copied the transmission. This was the last recorded communication from the Angel 1 pilot.
At 1550, the Classic dispatcher contacted Guardian Control via landline and asked the TC if she had had any contact with "my ship." The TC said, "negative."
A review of the recorded transmissions made between both medical crews and the hospital revealed that both of the medical crews contacted the FMC ED and provided medical reports on their respective patients.
A Classic medical crewmember contacted FMC via an onboard cellular phone at 1525. The conversation ended 1528, at which time the crewmember reported an estimated arrival time of 18 minutes, or 1546.
The Air Methods medical crewmember contacted FMC via onboard radio (Med Channel 3/EMSCOMM) at 1532. The conversation ended at 1534; at which time the crewmember provided an estimated time of arrival of 15 minutes, or 1549.
Each crewmember spoke with a different nurse and physician. A review of both transmissions indicated normal communications and that both patients were medically stable.
The hospital staff that received the phone calls from both aircraft did not provide any information about the other helicopter that was also en route to the FMC. There is no requirement for FMC staff to provide arrival or departure information regarding other aircraft to medical flight crews. If any information is provided it is given as a courtesy only.
A surveillance camera, mounted on a parking garage at FMC, captured the collision on digital video. The video depicted one helicopter approaching from north and one helicopter approaching from the south, and shows both aircraft descending after the collision. The NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory, Washington, DC, examined the video, and extracted a series of still images which showed the collision sequence.
N407GA was equipped with a GPS-based OuterLink tracking system that recorded the helicopter's position every 30 seconds. A review of the data revealed that N407GA flew in a straight line from FLG to the location of the accident site, about 1/4-mile east of the FMC helipad. The data indicated that the aircraft had not initiated a turn onto final approach when the data ended.
N407MJ was equipped with a GPS-based Sky Router tracking system, which recorded the helicopter's position every five minutes. A review of the data revealed that the last recorded position was approximately ten miles northwest of the helipad. In addition, a Garmin GPSMAP 496 handheld GPS was located in the wreckage. The unit was shipped to the Vehicle Recorders Division at NTSB Headquarters, Washington, DC where it was downloaded on June 30, 2008. Examination of the unit revealed that it was not programmed to record the helicopter's flight track and there was no usable stored data for the accident flight.
No Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) radar services were available for the airspace surrounding FMC.
One witness, located approximately 1 mile southwest of the accident site, observed the collision of the two helicopters. He observed "a light aircraft" traveling west to east. As the aircraft turned to the south, he noticed a second helicopter traveling from the east to the west. The first helicopter appeared to be at the same altitude as the second helicopter when it started a turn to the south. The witness stated, "I saw both aircraft on what appeared to be a collision course. From the angle I was at, the second helicopter (red and white) did not appear to change direction and the first collided with it."
Two other witnesses observed the collision from the back porch of their residence approximately 1/2 mile south and west of the accident site. They observed the [Air Methods] helicopter approaching from the south and east on a "usual landing pattern." One of these witnesses observed a second helicopter "approaching the other from the [right], back side" just prior to the collision. The other witness observed the second helicopter just as the helicopters collided.
Another witness observed the collision from her residence four-tenths of a mile north and west of the accident site. She first heard a helicopter approaching from the north. She then heard a second helicopter coming from the south. The witness stated that she "looked up just as the northbound helicopter apparently clipped the rotor of the southbound [helicopter]. At that time, they both were in a turn to the hospital."
Several people witnessed the collision and reported seeing both helicopters descending into wooded terrain about 1/2-mile east from the heliport. There was a small fire noted rising from the hilly terrain, followed by a loud exp...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DEN08MA116