Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed during a missed approach leading to the inadvertent stall. Contributing to the accident were the pilot’s lack of experience in the type of operation conducted, the certificate holder’s loss of operational control, and the lack of adequate oversight of the operation by the Federal Aviation Administration.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 11, 2008, approximately 1915 central daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corporation SR22, N193BS, sustained substantial damage when it impacted terrain during a nonprecision instrument approach to runway 36 at the Lakeland Airport/Noble F. Lee Memorial Field (ARV), Minocqua-Woodruff, Wisconsin. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand passenger flight was operating on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The pilot and two revenue passengers received fatal injuries. The flight departed from General Mitchell International Airport (MKE), Milwaukee, Wisconsin, at 1745, and was en route to ARV. According to available documentation, the airplane was registered to Bluesky Taxi Inc. (BST), Lincolnshire, Illinois, and was listed on Midwest Air Transport, Inc's (MAT) Part 135 operating certificate.
Earlier on the day of the accident, the pilot had flown his airplane to Lafayette, Indiana, and arrived about 1045 eastern daylight time to meet a friend. The friend stated that the pilot was in “fine” condition, in a “great mood,” and “relaxed.” The pilot told his friend that the Bluesky Taxi (BST) operating certificate was owned by a private individual, but that individual did not operate the flights. The pilot also told him that the owners of BST were the operators and that they assigned the flights. The pilot also told his friend that there was no dispatcher and that the pilots dispatch themselves and would try to fly under visual flight rules (VFR) as much as possible to minimize the cost to the customers as much as possible. The pilot further told him that he would get a call from the chief pilot of BST if he flew IFR and did not absolutely have to. The pilot then departed from Lafayette in the afternoon to return to his home in Illinois.
The president of MAT stated that the accident flight was originally scheduled with a pilot who could only fly under VFR; however, IMC conditions prevailed to the north along the intended route of flight, so the MAT president called the accident pilot via telephone and asked if he was available. The pilot said he was available and was provided flight itinerary information. The pilot was dispatched from DuPage Airport (DPA), West Chicago, Illinois, in N193BS because the airplane was closer to the accident pilot’s home. The president stated that he believed that he talked to the originally scheduled pilot and the accident pilot before 1500, a couple of hours before the scheduled pick-up at 1700. The pilot left his house about 1600 to pick up the airplane at DPA.
At 1627:58, a caller representing himself as the pilot of N193BS called Kankakee automated flight service station (AFSS) and filed two IFR flight plans from MKE to ARV and ARV to DPA. The caller filed the first flight plan for N193BS and specified the airplane equipment capability as “slash golf” (Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), including GPS or WAAS, with en route and terminal capability). The proposed departure time from MKE was 1700, at an altitude of 8,000 feet, destination ARV, time en route of 1 hour 15 minutes, and 3 hours 30 minutes of fuel on board. The caller filed a return flight plan with a proposed departure time from ARV to DPA at an altitude of 8,000 feet, with a proposed arrival time of 2330. The FSS specialist asked the caller if he had the latest information on weather conditions, to which the caller responded by saying, “yes I do since (unintelligible).” The specialist then provided the caller with convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) for thunderstorms and an Airmen's Meteorological Information (AIRMET) for IFR.
At 1631:16, the call to Kankakee AFSS was concluded.
A credit card receipt from Signature Flight Support at MKE shows a charge for 30 gallons of 100 low lead fuel for N193BS and the customer listed is “Bluesky Taxi LLC.”
The following is a chronological summary of voice communications of the airplane and airplane flight data extruded from the airplane flight instruments.
At 1742:13, N193BS requested and was issued an IFR clearance to ARV by MKE Air Traffic Control (ATC). The clearance to ARV was via the Brew Three departure direct to Oshkosh, and to maintain 5,000 feet.
At 1743:36, N193BS requested and received a taxi clearance from Signature Flight to runway 19R by MKE ground control.
At 1745:00, N193BS was issued a takeoff clearance by MKE local control.
At 1831:50, Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), Sector 4 Radar Controller (ZMP04) transmitted, “tango November one niner three bravo sierra advise when you have the current arbor vitae weather---and the arbor vitae altimeter’s two nine eight niner.”
At 1831:57, N193BS transmitted, “yea we’ve got the weather.”
At 1831:59, ZMP04 transmitted, “and (your) tango november one niner three bravo sierra a couple notams at arbor vitae n d b is out of service runway three six i l s d m e is out of service.” [A Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) was issued on September 3, 2008, stating that the ARV nondirectional radio beacon (NDB) was out of service. A second NOTAM was issued on September 8, 2008, stating that the ARV runway 36 instrument landing system (ILS) distance measuring equipment (DME) was out of service.]
At 1832:10, N193BS transmitted, “ah the i l s completely out or is it just the d m e.”
At 1832:16, ZMP04 transmitted, “tango november one niner three bravo sierra say again.”
At 1832:19, N193BS transmitted, “is the i l s completely out or is it just the d m e.”
At 1832:22, ZMP04 transmitted, “and i am just showing three six i l s d m e is out of service.”
At 1832:27, N193BS transmitted, “o k well ah that may be a problem for us to get in then i’ve got to figure something out and get back to you.”
At 1834, ZMP04 instructed N193BS to contact Minneapolis ARTCC with a frequency change. N193BS then initiated contact with the Minneapolis ARTCC, Sector 03 Radar Controller (ZMP03) and reported an altitude of 8,000 feet.
At 1835:55, N193BS transmitted, and Minneapolis three bravo sierra so for planning purposes uh (unintelligible) we are going to get radar vectors to the localizer three six.”
At 1836:01, ZMP03 transmitted, “november three bravo sierra affirmative.”
At 1904:49, ZMP03 transmitted, “a november three bravo sierra’s four south of dougy maintain three thousand five hundred til on a published portion of the approach cleared for the localizer three six approach arbor vitae.”
At 1905:07, N193BS transmitted, “ah i got all that ah three thousand five hundred till on a published segment (unintelligible) cleared three six approach.”
At 1905:13, ZMP03 transmitted, “November three bravo sierra roger and are you going to be able to shoot the approach from a couple south of the marker there.”
At 1905:19, N193BS transmitted, “i’m sorry what.”
At 1905:20, ZMP03 transmitted, “are you going to be able to make the approach from fifty two hundred from a couple south of the marker.”
At 1905:29, the autopilot (AP) was selected OFF at a pressure altitude of 5,033 feet and a heading of 359 degrees magnetic.
At 1906, N193BS transmitted, “yea i’m going to need to go back around three bravo sierra if i can just do one oval i should be o k.” ZMP03 approved a left 360 degree turn.
At 1906:07, the active waypoint transitioned from DOUGY to runway 36 at a pressure altitude of 4,509 feet and a heading of 354 degrees. The airplane started a descending left hand 360 degree turn without the AP selected ON.
At 19:07:04, 190 degrees into the turn the AP was selected ON and the turn continued using the heading bug selection. The autopilot altitude reference selected was initially set at 3,500 feet and adjusted to 3,200 feet during the descent.
At 1907:30, ZMP03 transmitted, “november three bravo sierra let me know when uh you’re reestablished inbound on the loc.”
At 1907:34, N193BS transmitted, “yea we are starting to turn back now.”
At 1910:05, ZMP03 transmitted, “o k show you right over the marker now you can change to advisory cancellation or down time um ah with me or forward it through flight
service.”
At 1910:11, N193BS transmitted, “wilco three bravo sierra.” There were no further recorded transmissions from N193BS.
At 1910:11, the final recorded altitude and heading bug settings were 1,900 feet and 0 (360) degrees.
At 1910:24, the AP was selected OFF. The AP remained OFF for the remainder of the recording. The final descent into ARV began just after the AP OFF selection.
At 1910:42, the flap setting changed from 0 percent to 50 percent.
At 1912:06, the engine RPM was at 1,670 rpm.
At 1912:07, the Horizontal Deviation Indication started to indicate a fly right command and the altitude rate, indicating a descent, began a transition to a climb.
At 1912:12, the engine RPM increased to 2,590 rpm.
At 1912:14, a maximum pitch of 45.5 degrees was recorded. The indicated airspeed was 73.2 knots and a roll attitude of 15 degree left wing down.
Prior to a stall warning discrete, the Recoverable Data Module (RDM) recorded an increase in engine manifold pressure, fuel flow, and engine speed.
At 1912:16, the stall warning discrete was set on the RDM. The indicated airspeed was 60 knots, ground speed 61 knots, pitch attitude 39 degrees, and a roll attitude of 32 degrees left wing down.
At 1912:24, the recorded data ends.
WITNESSES
The pilot of a Piper PA-32R-301, which preceded N193BS on the approach, stated that he held a private pilot certificate with an instrument rating and accumulated 5,018 hours of flight time of which 1,017 hours was instrument flight time. The pilot was en route from Dubuque, Iowa, to ARV. The ARV automated weather observing system (AWOS) was reporting ceiling height of 400 feet and a visibility of 3 miles the entire time he was en route. He stated that the cloud tops were about 5,000 feet, but he did not recall the sky condition above the top...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CHI08FA282