Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's inadequate preflight assembly and inspection which resulted in the pushrod connection to the left aileron not being connected, which led to a subsequent inflight loss of control and impact with terrain.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On January 25, 2009, at 0745 eastern standard time, a Remos Aircraft, Remos GX, Special Light Sport Aircraft, N9GX, was substantially damaged during impact with terrain, after experiencing a loss of control during the initial climb at Sebring Regional Airport (SEF), Sebring, Florida. The certificated commercial pilot was seriously injured and the passenger was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local aerial photography flight conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
According to the national service manager for Remos Aircraft, who took off in another company airplane in-trail of the accident airplane, the purpose of the flight was to obtain aerial photographs of the manufacturer's airplanes for an article in an aviation magazine.
After takeoff from runway 18, he observed the accident airplane which had the photographer in the right seat with the right cabin door removed, roll to the right when it was 25 to 50 feet above ground level (agl). He also observed that the rudder was fully deflected to the left, the accident airplane was in a slip to the right, and both the left and right ailerons were drooping trailing edge down.
As the witness continued to observe the accident airplane, it reached an altitude of approximately 100 feet agl, then began to descend while continuing to turn right, eventually completing an approximate 270-degree turn, and reaching a bank angle of about 80 degrees right wing down. The right wing made ground contact with the airport parking apron right wing tip first, followed by the nose of the airplane. The airplane then skidded around to the right, slid across the apron and came to rest in a depression next to taxiway "A," which paralleled runway 18.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a commercial pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on July 23, 2008. He reported to the Safety Board that he had approximately 1,600 total hours of flight experience, and "2 to 3 hours" of flight time in the accident airplane. Review of manufacturer's records also revealed that the pilot had accrued approximately 100 total hours of flight experience in the accident airplane make and model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident airplane was a high wing single engine monoplane of carbon fiber composite construction. It was powered by a Rotax 912 ULS engine that produced 100 horsepower. It was certificated as a Light Sport Aircraft and was equipped with a folding wing system.
According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2008. The airplane's most recent conditional inspection was completed on January 8, 2009. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 15 total hours of operation.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The reported weather at OBE, approximately 29 nautical miles southeast of the accident site, at 0745, included: calm winds, visibility 5 miles in mist, sky clear, temperature 8 degrees Celsius, dew point 7 degrees Celsius, and an altimeter setting of 30.19 inches of mercury.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
According to the Airport Facility Directory, SEF was a public use airport. It had two runways, oriented in an 18/36, and 14/32 configuration. Runway 18 was asphalt, in good condition. It was 5,234 feet long by 100 feet wide. The runway had basic markings that were in good condition. It was equipped with medium intensity runway edge lights, and a precision approach path indicator.
FLIGHT RECORDERS
The airplane was not equipped with a flight recorder. It was however equipped with a Garmin GPS-496 which recorded flight and navigation data in the unit's non-volatile memory (NVM) and a Dynon EMS D-10 which collected and stored engine parameter data in the EMS-10's NVM.
Review of the data from the two units confirmed that the engine was running at the time of the accident and also confirmed that the witness's observations were accurate regarding the flight path of the airplane.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Examination of the accident site revealed that after impacting the apron, the accident airplane traveled 262 feet in an easterly direction, before coming to rest on a 194-degree magnetic heading.
Examination of the area where the airplane first made ground contact revealed the existence of a wreckage path. Near the beginning of the wreckage path was evidence of three distinct propeller strikes. The wreckage path contained multiple fragmented portions of the airplane structure, including the right wing, which had separated into two parts; the right wing flap assembly which was separated from its mounts, and the right aileron assembly which had also separated from its mounts and had a portion of the roll control system still attached to it.
The lower and upper engine cowling were also discovered in the wreckage path, along with the propeller spinner.
Both propeller blades were found outside of and perpendicular to the main wreckage path. One blade was discovered 14 feet to the south of the wreckage path, and the other blade was discovered 138 feet north of the wreckage path. Both of the composite propeller blades were separated at the root, and displayed chordwise scratching on their leading edge erosion strips (one of which had separated from its respective propeller blade), portions of their blade surfaces, and on the blade tips which had been broken off of each propeller blade.
Examination of the engine revealed that it was still in its mounts. No evidence of any preimpact failure or malfunction of the engine was discovered. Further examination of the engine and firewall area revealed that the fuel lines were not fire sleeved, the fuel divider was made of aluminum, and a large opening was present were wiring passed through the firewall into the cabin area. Examination of the wiring also revealed a connector box that was made of plastic, and firewall carry throughs that were not sealed.
Examination of the airframe revealed no evidence of any preimpact malfunction or failure. The aft fuselage was inverted, and angled to the right of the longitudinal axis of the airplane by approximately 40 degrees. It was almost fully separated from the aft portion of the cockpit area and exhibited a vertical crack on the aft side of the vertical stabilizer. The left wing was still attached.
The left flap panel, left aileron, and the elevator had remained attached to their pivot points. The rudder was separated from its upper pivot point but had remained attached to the vertical stabilizer by its lower pivot point.
Examination of the horizontal stabilizer, left wing, and the fragmented right wing revealed that the horizontal stabilizer could be removed and the wings folded for storage or trailering. Closer examination revealed that the stabilizer-securing bolts and the wing-securing bolts were present, along with their securing pins.
Examination of the flight control system revealed that the airplane utilized cables and pulleys to connect the rudder to the rudder pedals, and push-pull rods and bell cranks to link the ailerons and elevator to the control sticks. The ailerons and elevator could be disconnected through the use of quick release rod-connectors.
Control continuity was established to the elevator, and from the right aileron bell crank assembly, to a break in the threaded portion of the rod end for the aileron push-pull rod, which displayed evidence of tensile overload, and from that break, to the right aileron's quick release rod-connector, which was found to be connected to the quick release connector fork. Examination of both the elevator's and right aileron's quick release rod-connectors revealed that they had the lock sleeve in the locked position and the release button was fully extended.
Control continuity could not be established to the left aileron. Examination revealed that there were no mechanical failures of the bell crank or push pull rod, but it was discovered that unlike the elevator's and right aileron's quick release rod-connectors, the left aileron's quick release rod-connector was not connected to the quick release connector fork.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
At the time of the accident the US Sport Aviation Expo was being held at SEF and Remos aircraft had two airplanes on display; N9GX (the accident airplane) and N78GX. On the day before the accident, the pilot and the national service manager for Remos Aircraft had been demonstrating the wing folding mechanism in the display area for prospective customers.
According to the national service manager, on the morning of the accident flight, he and the pilot of the accident airplane pulled both of the airplanes out from under a display tent. Both had their left wings in the folded position. When they pulled N9GX out from under the display tent, he was at the left wing root. He inserted the left wing's main wing securing bolt, installed the securing pin, and then went over to N78GX. He did not however, connect the pushrod connection for the aileron's before going over to N78GX, nor did he advise the pilot that the "coupling was not connected".
According to the pilot, he remembered that he and the national service manager greeted two representatives from an aviation magazine that morning outside the display tent. He remembered being at the left wingtip of N9GX with the national service manager at the wingroot when they were unfolding the wing. He thought that he remembered seeing him go inside the airplane and assumed that he was connecting the aileron. He next remembered being ready for takeoff and then "something was amiss with my controls." Then there was a "swirling of the airplane".
Pilot Operating Handbook
According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH), Section 7.1, "Preflight Check", a check for "free and f...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA09FA141