N877AF

Substantial
None

PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD PC-12/47S/N: 877

Accident Details

Date
Friday, June 12, 2009
NTSB Number
ERA09LA339
Location
Bridgeport, CT
Event ID
20090612X14538
Coordinates
41.163333, -73.126113
Aircraft Damage
Substantial
Highest Injury
None
Fatalities
0
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
7
Total Aboard
7

Probable Cause and Findings

The flight crew's misjudgment of speed and distance, which resulted in an overrun of the wet runway.

Aircraft Information

Registration
N877AF
Make
PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD
Serial Number
877
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Model / ICAO
PC-12/47PC12
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On June 12, 2009 at 0756 eastern daylight time, a Pilatus PC-12/47 airplane, N877AF, was substantially damaged when it impacted a blast fence during landing at Igor I. Sikorsky Memorial Airport (BDR), Bridgeport, Connecticut. The two pilots and five passengers were not injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the flight that originated at Norwood Memorial Airport (OWD), Norwood, Massachusetts, at 0711. The aircraft was fractionally owned by private individuals who delegated the management of the airplane to Alpha Flying, Inc. The fractional ownership flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91, Subpart K.

According to the pilots, they checked the weather prior to departure from OWD and determined they would not be able to fly to their original destination of White Plains, New York. The captain discussed the weather with the operator and they decided to amend their destination to BDR. The pilots reported that at the time of their departure, the recorded weather at BDR included an overcast ceiling of 700 feet above ground level (agl) with 7 miles visibility and light rain.

When they arrived in the Bridgeport area, the pilots conducted the VOR (very-high frequency omnidirectional radio range) 24 approach "to minimums." When they were not able to visually acquire the runway environment at the missed approach point, they conducted a missed approach. The pilots then received "vectors to final" for the ILS (instrument landing system) 6 approach. The captain flew the approach with the autopilot engaged, and as the airplane reached the minimum decision altitude of 307 feet msl (300 feet agl), the co-pilot visually acquired the runway lights and the captain disconnected the autopilot and continued the descent. As the airplane descended to an altitude of approximately 200 feet, the pilots visually acquired the runway and the captain decreased the power and called for "flaps 30."

Both pilots stated they knew they were "landing long;" however, they had "plenty of runway" in front of them to safely touch down and stop on the runway. The captain estimated the airplane touched down about halfway down the 4,677-foot-long runway, and she immediately applied "max reverse" thrust, and "more than average braking." The airplane initially began to slow, and then "started hydroplaning" on the wet runway. The pilots observed a fence at the end of the runway, and decided they would not be able to perform a go-around. The airplane continued to skid on the runway and impacted the fence before coming to a stop.

The pilots completed an "emergency shut down," and assisted the passengers in evacuating out the main cabin door.

Both pilots stated they did not perform any landing distance calculations prior to or during the flight. They also reported no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane or engine.

Several witnesses observed the airplane land on runway 6. One witness reported the airplane "appeared to be floating in ground effect" before touching down near the intersection of runway 11/29, "at a high rate of speed." Another witnesses observed the airplane at a height of approximately 15 feet, as it passed the intersection of runway 11/29. A third witness reported the airplane "touched down fast" near the runway intersection, "followed by an aggressive reverse and sound of impact." The witness thought the cloud ceiling was indefinite at 100 feet agl, and the visibility was 1 mile in fog and mist.

According to statements from the passengers, they felt the airplane "hydroplane" after landing and then swerve before striking the fence. One passenger reported the airplane "took a long time to touchdown." He also stated he observed the ground lights when the airplane was about 200-300 feet above the ground.

An airport surveillance camera captured the airplane landing on runway 6. The camera was affixed to a fixed base operator on the North Ramp, along taxiway Delta, and was oriented toward the departure end of runway 6. Examination of the recorded surveillance video revealed the airplane had not touched down as it passed the touchdown zone markings for runway 24. The touchdown zone markings were 1,000 feet from the end of the runway.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The captain, age 27, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. She also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. Her most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical was issued on October 22, 2008. At that time, she reported 2,700 total hours of flight experience.

According to records provided by the operator, as of the date of the accident, the captain had accumulated 2,840 hours of total flight experience, 660 of which were in the make and model of the accident airplane. She accumulated 70 hours of actual instrument experience and 90 hours of simulated instrument experience.

The captain satisfactorily completed initial training in the airplane on October 24, 2007, and upgraded to captain on May 30, 2008. Her most recent instrument proficiency check (IPC) was completed on October 14, 2008, with an "average" rating, and her most recent annual check was completed on June 8, 2009 also with an "average" rating.

The co-pilot, age 43, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single and multi-engine land and instrument airplane. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical was issued on January 15, 2009. At that time, he reported 4,000 hours of total flight experience.

According to records provided by the operator, the co-pilot had accumulated 3,613 total hours of flight experience, 2,108 of which were in the make and model of the accident airplane. He accumulated 377 hours of actual instrument experience and 102 hours of simulated instrument experience.

The co-pilot completed his initial training in the airplane in April 2004. His most recent IPC was completed on October 14, 2008 with an "average" rating, and his most recent annual check was completed on May 26, 2009, also with an "average" rating.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The Pilatus PC-12 was a single-engine turboprop airplane powered by a Pratt & Whitney PT6A engine.

The most recent inspection performed on the airplane was a 100-hour inspection, completed on April 21, 2009.

At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated 983 total flight hours.

According to the Pilatus PC-12 Airplane Flight Manual, the prescribed landing configuration required using 40 degrees of flaps. In that configuration, the required landing distance for the airplane was 2,013 feet. Without reverse thrust, the airplane required approximately 2,404 feet of landing distance on a dry runway.

In a configuration of 30 degrees of flaps, and no reverse thrust, the airplane required 2,933 feet of landing distance.

There was no landing distance calculation for a wet runway.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

The BDR 0752 weather observation, included wind from 260 degrees at 5 knots, 2 miles visibility with light rain and mist, overcast clouds at 300 feet agl, temperature 17 degrees C, dew point 17 degrees C, and altimeter setting of 29.70 inches mercury.

At 0552, the recorded visibility was 7 miles with an overcast cloud ceiling of 700 feet.

At 0652, the recorded visibility was 3 miles with light rain and mist. An overcast cloud ceiling was reported at 700 feet, variable between 400 and 800 feet.

The 0753 weather observation at Tweed-New Haven (HVN), New Haven, Connecticut, 13 miles to the northeast, included calm winds, 1/2 mile visibility, light rain, fog, and a cloud ceiling of 200 feet.

The recorded weather at Waterbury-Oxford Airport(OXC), Waterbury, Connecticut, at 0745, included wind from 200 degrees at 4 knots, 1/8 mile visibility in fog, and indefinite ceiling 200 feet.

The terminal forecast for the Bridgeport area, issued at 0325, predicted 1 mile visibility in mist and an overcast cloud layer at 300 feet beginning at 0500. After 1000, the forecast predicted 5 miles visibility with light rain showers and mist, with an overcast cloud layer at 1,500 feet.

A review of the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) database revealed there were no NOTAMs issued for the day of the accident regarding the wet runway.

AIRPORT INFORMATION

BDR was publicly-owned by the City of Bridgeport, located in the town of Stratford, Connecticut. The airport was comprised of two intersecting runways, oriented in an 11/29 and 6/24 configuration. The airport had 7 instrument approaches to 3 of the 4 runways.

The inbound course for the ILS Runway 6 approach was 060 degrees magnetic, and the glideslope crossing altitude was 1,687 feet msl. The decision altitude was 307 feet msl and the touchdown zone elevation was 7 feet. The visibility requirement for the approach was 1 mile.

The ILS Runway 6 Approach was flight checked after the accident, during which no anomalies were noted.

Runway 6 at BDR was a 4,677-foot long, 150-foot wide, hard surfaced asphalt runway. The usable length of the runway when landing at the glideslope intercept point was 3,686 feet. No safety area existed at the end of runway 6. Runway 24 had a displaced threshold that extended 320 feet from the beginning of the runway.

The distance from the intersection of runway 6 and runway 11 to the departure end of runway 6 was 877 feet.

Blast Fence

An 8-foot 9-inch-high, nonfrangible metal blast fence was located about 342 feet prior to the runway 24 displaced threshold. The fence was installed to protect Connecticut State Highway 113, a public road that ran parallel to the fence, from jet/propeller blast of aircraft operating at the airport. The highway was ...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA09LA339