N3402Q

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On October 6, 2010, about 1204 central daylight time, a Piper PA-32R-300, N3402Q, impacted a building after takeoff from runway 36 at Naper Aero Club Airport (LL10), Naperville, Illinois. The certificated private pilot and a passenger received serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the fuselage and wings. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane was registered to Airplane Holding Company and operated by the pilot under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. An instrument rules flight plan was on file and the flight was destined to Allegheny County Airport, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The flight was originating at the time of the accident.

A witness, who was preflighting his airplane at LL10, stated that he saw the airplane during its run-up and thought it unusual that its engine did not sound very loud compared to other higher performance airplane engines. He said he saw the airplane taxi onto runway 36 and without stopping, power was applied for the takeoff. The witness watched the airplane during the takeoff and was surprised to see it use the entire runway and not lift off. He said that it was similar to an airplane that has landed and taxies to the runway end for a turnoff. The witness said he saw the airplane in a slow climb followed by an immediate and moderate bank to the left, which was corrected for to the right. He said that the climb performance was very weak.

Another witness, who was located at the southeast corner of the building that was struck by the airplane, stated that the airplane seemed to be very low. The airplane was in a twenty degree nose-high attitude with the wings level. The engine was running but seemed to be struggling.

On November 6, 2010, the pilot was interviewed by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspectors from the Dupage Flight Standards District Office, West Chicago, Illinois. During the interview, the pilot stated that the winds were from the west and there was a direct crosswind at the start of the accident takeoff roll. The pilot stated that he believed there was no tailwind for the takeoff roll. When asked if there were any ‘out of the ordinary observations’ prior to, during, and after the takeoff roll of power settings, airspeeds, manifold pressure, and engine speed settings, the pilot said that all appeared normal. The pilot stated that he has performed numerous weight and balance calculations and knew that the airplane’s load was lighter than normal and was in limits. The pilot stated that ‘everything was normal at the mid-point of the runway. I did not hear anything out of the ordinary. I rotated the aircraft at the end of the runway at the stall warning; the aircraft didn’t seem to want to climb. I tried to gain altitude so I could turn the airplane but I couldn’t.’ The pilot was then asked if he had completed a runway performance calculation prior to takeoff. The pilot then responded by saying that he would not answer anymore questions until he had an attorney.

According to the pilot’s written statement received on November 10, 2010, the pilot had performed a “normal” preflight and after liftoff, the engine was developing full power. The airplane then impacted a building while maneuvering for an emergency landing.

On November 18, 2010, two mechanics that performed the last 100-hour/annual inspection of the airplane were interviewed by the National Transportation Safety Board Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) with a court reporter.

On April 15, 2011, the pilot was interviewed by the IIC with a court reporter and his attorney present. During that interview, the pilot stated that for the takeoff, he used a short field technique with the flaps extended to the second setting (25 degrees). He set the manifold pressure to 25 inches of mercury (Hg) while the airplane was stopped, and during the takeoff roll he increased the manifold pressure to 29 inches of Hg. He first realized that there was a problem when the airplane lifted off and did not have any climb power. The liftoff occurred beyond the runway midpoint. He did not remember what the airspeed was at takeoff rotation. The stall warning horn sounded when the airplane was about 5 feet above the runway. He did not retract the flaps. The manifold pressure was about 29 inches of Hg, the mixture was full rich, and the propeller was set for full power.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The pilot, age 66, held a private pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings. He was issued a third class airman medical certificate on August 26, 2010.

On August 30, 1986, the pilot was issued a private pilot certificate and on October 26, 1988, he was issued an instrument airplane rating at a total flight time of 1,179 hours.

The pilot had three logbook entries dated September 29, 2010, and in the accident airplane. The first entry was a flight from LL10 to MDW that was 0.5 hours in duration with no remarks. The second entry was from MDW to MDW that was 1.6 hours in duration of which 1.6 hours was dual flight instruction with a remark of an “IPC- endorsement….” The third entry was from MDW to LL10 that was 0.4 hours in duration with no remarks. The total time for the third entry, which was also the last of all the entries in the logbook was 1,141.1 hours.

The pilot had no previous FAA record of incidents, accidents, or enforcement actions.

The pilot stated that he had been a prior president of the Naper Aero Flying Club, which he said was a type of association that not all of the homeowners at LL10 belong to. He said that he first learned of mechanic A and mechanic B, when they were recommended to him by a previous airport manager for LL10. The pilot stated that the manager had experience with maintenance personnel and had owned a flight school in Schaumberg, Illinois, which was no longer in business. The pilot said that he did not remember the name of the flight school. The pilot said that he had used both mechanics for the past 10 years.

Mechanic A and Mechanic B had known each other since the 1990s while at a maintenance training facility at Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, Illinois. Mechanic B had been Mechanic A's supervisor while they were employed at an air carrier. Mechanic B stated that he had been employed by Northwest Aviation, Schaumberg, Illinois, which was no longer in business. At the time of their interviews, Mechanic A was employed as an aircraft mechanic at a maintenance facility and Mechanic B was not employed.

Mechanic B said that he may have first worked on the airplane since 2006 and it was the first time that he had seen the supplemental type certificate (STC) SE85WE turbocharger installation on this or any other airplane.

Both mechanics performed the last 100-hour/annual inspection, which was owner assisted. Mechanic B signed the airplane and engine logbooks annual inspection entries.

Mechanic B stated that he worked with Mechanic A on other aircraft including his (Mechanic B's) own. Both mechanics stated that they performed aircraft maintenance that included several private and flying club airplanes at LL10. Mechanic B said that they would get paid for their maintenance work but were not trying to make a profit. Mechanic B said that he has a standard base rate which was dependent upon the aircraft owner's [work] contribution.

Mechanic A’s last renewal for (IA) under Part 65.93 was February 23, 2009, the basis of which was 5 aircraft alterations, 2 repairs, and 12 annual inspections.

Mechanic B’s last renewal for (IA) under Part 65.93 was February 19, 2009, the basis of which was 13 annual inspections. Two of the annual inspections were on his (Mechanic B) own aircraft.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a 1977 Piper PA-32R-300, serial number 32R-7780310, which was powered by a Lycoming IO-540-K1G5D, serial number L-14210-48A, and engine. The engine was modified by the installation of a Rajay turbonormalized (to maintain sea level pressure of 29.92 inches of Hg) turbocharger system under STC SE85WE.

On November 10, 2010, the aircraft logbooks were received from the pilot's attorney following two written requests to the pilot that was dated October 18, 2010, and November 4, 2010.

A January 24, 2008, engine logbook entry for the replacement of cylinder numbers 3 and 4 was made by mechanic A at a tachometer time of 3,306.38 hours. Mechanic A signed the next entry dated January 11, 2010, at a tachometer time of 3,333.7 hours for the reinstallation of an overhauled fuel injection flow divider and replacement of 4 valve springs for the number 1 cylinder. There was no separate signed list of airworthiness directives (ADs) that had been complied with for the last annual inspection. The airframe and engine logbook annual inspection entries had cited several ADs but none of those cited AD 2009-02-03. AD 2009-02-03, effective February 9, 2009, was to be performed before further flight, for the installation of a new servo plug gasket to prevent a lean running engine, which could result in a substantial loss of engine power.

The airframe and engine 100-hour/annual inspection logbook entries since 2006 were signed by the mechanic B who had also signed the last 100-hour/annual inspection dated September 22, 2010, at a total airframe time, total engine time, and tachometer time of 3,339.85 hours. The engine time since overhaul at this inspection was 1,240.01 hours. The last 100-hour/annual inspection was owner assisted.

Engine logbook records from the last annual inspection stated that the compression ratios were: cylinder 1 – 72/80, cylinder 2 – 68/80, cylinder 3 – 77/80, cylinder 4 – 76/80, cylinder 5 – 70/80, cylinder 6 - 76/80.

The Piper Cherokee Six Service Manual, part number 753 690, for PA-32-260 PA-32-300, PA-32R-300 airplanes was issued May 1, 1965, and has had 16 revisions with the last dated March 27, 2008. The pilot wa...