N25PJ

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On November 17, 2010, about 1553 Pacific standard time, a Gates Lear Jet, 25B, N25PJ, experienced separation of its nose gear assembly upon impacting terrain during a landing overrun accident at the Portland-Hillsboro Airport (HIO), Portland, Oregon. The airplane was owned and operated by Premier Jets, Inc., Hillsboro, Oregon, and it was substantially damaged. Neither the airline transport certificated pilot-in-command (PIC) nor the commercial licensed second-in-command (SIC) was injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the positioning flight that was performed under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. The flight originated from Boise, Idaho, about 1545 mountain standard time (68 minutes before the accident).

The pilots reported to the National Transportation Safety Board investigator that the accident occurred on the return leg of a round-trip flight from HIO to Boise. No evidence of any mechanical malfunction or system anomaly was noted with the airplane on the outbound flight.

The PIC, who was the flying pilot during both the outbound and inbound legs, reported that on the return leg the air traffic controller cleared him to perform the VOR/DME-C instrument approach procedure (IAP) to HIO. He flew this approach and elected to circle to land on runway 30, rather than circle to land on runway 12. [There is no straight-in landing option on this IAP.] The PIC said that on short final approach the airplane was flown at the prescribed airspeed (Vref), with the wing flaps fully extended. According to the PIC, in all respects the approach and landing were normal.

The PIC further reported that he extended the wings' spoilers immediately after touchdown. He tested the brakes and normal brake pedal pressure was noted. However, during rollout he noted a lack of deceleration and more brake pressure was applied, with no discernable deceleration. The airplane's optional thrust reversers were not used; they had been previously rendered non-operational by company maintenance personnel and were therefore not functional.

According to the PIC, although the indicated brake pressure remained normal, within a few seconds both he and the second pilot recognized that the airplane was not appropriately decelerating. The PIC stated that he directed the SIC try applying his brakes. The SIC reported to the Safety Board investigator that he complied with the PIC's directions. However, the airplane did not appropriately decelerate.

The PIC stated that he thought about performing a go around, but believed that insufficient runway remained to ensure a safe takeoff. While trying to stop, he did not activate the emergency brakes. He stated that there was insufficient time, and he was preoccupied with maintaining control of the airplane. According to the PIC, he continued applying brake pedal pressure, and when the airplane was about 2,000 feet from the runway's end, it was still traveling about 100 knots. As the airplane rolled off the departure end on runway 30, which was wet, both pilots estimated that it was still travelling between 85 and 90 knots. (Activation of the emergency brakes is accomplished by applying downward pressure to an activation handle located adjacent to the center console. Activation of emergency brakes bypasses the antiskid system.)

The PIC further reported to the Safety Board investigator that he had no indication on any cockpit annunciator light of a system failure or malfunction. As the airplane was traversing the soft, wet field, its wheels partially sank into the ground. The nose gear sheared off in an aft direction when the airplane impacted and traversed the drainage ditch. Thereafter, the airplane slid on its nose until coming to a stop in the rain water-soaked field. While decelerating, soil impacted the landing gear wheels and struts where wiring to the antiskid brake system was located.

The PIC stated that after the airplane came to a stop he observed that the annunciator light associated with the antiskid system for the #2 wheel was illuminated (indicating a system failure). The other three annunciator lights (one for each wheel) were not illuminated.

During a subsequent conversation with the Safety Board investigator, the PIC initially opined that the brake and/or antiskid system appeared to have malfunctioned. The pilot stated that although the runway was wet, he did not believe the airplane hydroplaned. The pilot further stated that he opted to continue trying to decelerate rather than attempting to go-around because by the time he realized there was a deceleration problem, insufficient runway existed to ensure that a departure could be successfully performed from the remaining runway.

On duty Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control tower (ATCT) personnel reported that the airplane appeared to have touched down abeam the ATCT at the intersection of taxiway A6 and runway 30. This intersection is located about 1,900 feet from runway 30's approach end, and about 4,700 feet from the runway's departure end.

The HIO ATCT's front line manager reported that while in the control tower, he observed the airplane approach the airport on the VOR/DME-C approach. The local controller offered the pilot any runway of his choice to use for landing, and he issued the pilot a wind check which indicated that the wind was from 180 degrees at 10 knots, with 16 knot gusts. The pilot requested and was cleared to land on runway 30. The airplane touched down in front of the ATCT, near the intersection of taxiway A6 and runway 30.

Another HIO air traffic controller reported that it was raining when the airplane landed, and the runway was wet. The controller stated that he observed water spraying off the airplane's main gear as the airplane passed in front of the control tower at the intersection of taxiway A-6 and runway 30.

According to the SIC's statements and a review of the airplane's radar derived flight track as it approached the airport revealed that the airplane was tracking on a northeasterly course and approached the airport from the southwest. As the airplane approached the airport, the pilot maneuvered its flight path into the base leg for runway 30. Thereafter, the pilot made a left turn, entered onto the final approach course, and landed. The second pilot stated that he recalled the approach was stabilized at Vref when on the final approach leg. Also, the airplane was initially above the visual glide path, but when on short final approach the airplane was on the visual glide path.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot

The pilot, age 56, held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate with a multi-engine land rating, and type ratings in the Lear Jet series, Cessna 500, and the Swearingin SA-227. He also held commercial privileges for airplanes single engine land and sea. The pilot’s most recent Federal Aviation Administration FAA 14 CFR 135.293 and 135.299 checkrides were accomplished on September 19, 2010, in the Lear 25B. The pilot held a first class medical certificate that was issued September 1, 2010, with the limitation that correcting lenses be worn. The pilot reported a total of 6,000 flight hours, with his recent flight experience in the 90 and 30 days prior to the accident estimated at 23 and 18 respectively, with 5 hours accrued in the Lear 25B.

Co-pilot

The Second in Command (SIC), age 34, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplanes single and multi-engine land and instruments. He also held a first class medical certificate issued July 20, 2010, with the limitation that correcting lenses be worn. The pilot reported a total flight time of 652 hours, with 10 hours accrued in the Lear 25B. The pilot said that in the preceding 90 days to the accident he had flown 10 hours. The pilot’s most recent FAA 14 CFR 135.293 and 135.299 checkrides were accomplished on May 7, 2010, in a Lear 35. FAA inspectors examined the pilot’s records and determined that he met the qualifications to act as a Second in Command in Learjets as specified in 14 CFR 61.55(f)(2).

The PIC was the owner of Premier Jets. He employed the second-in-command, who worked on a full time basis as his office manager, and also served as an on-demand air taxi pilot for the company.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

Records review disclosed that the Lear 25B, serial number 25-111, was manufactured in 1973 and had accrued a total time in service of 8,453 hours at the time of the accident. The most recent maintenance check under the company’s approved inspection program was accomplished on July 29, 2010. The airplane was equipped with 2 GE CJ610-6 engines that had accrued total times in service of 8,561 hours for the left engine and 8,632 for the right.

The crew reported the airplanes landing weight as 10,800 pounds, and they used sea level altitude and an outside air temperature of 50 degrees F in calculating the required landing distance.

The crew used a company developed quick reference chart to determine the landing distance and Vref speed. Review of the quick reference chart and the ones from the Airplane Flight Manual disclosed they produced similar numbers. Reference of both charts for the stated conditions, found that 3,240 feet were required to stop the airplane on a dry runway in zero wind conditions. The wet runway correction factor was listed as 1.4 times the dry distance, yielding a wet runway stopping distance of 4,538 feet. The Vref speed was listed as 127 knots for 11,000 pounds. The SIC’s verbal and written statements noted that they crossed the runway threshold at 125 knots.

The quick reference chart used by the crew did not have correction factors for tailwind conditions. Bombardier Lear calculated the dry and wet stopping distance incorporating an 8 knot tailwind and reported stopping distances of 3,640 feet and 5,110 feet respectively.

METEOROLOGIC...