N409UA

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On April 4, 2011, at about 0725 central daylight time (CDT), United Airlines flight 497, an Airbus 320-232, N409UA, departed the left side of runway 19 while conducting an emergency landing due to an avionics smoke warning at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport (MSY), New Orleans, Louisiana. An emergency evacuation was conducted. There were no injuries to the 104 passengers or five crew members and the airplane sustained only minor damage. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations part 121 regularly scheduled passenger flight and had originally departed MSY destined for San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California.

The first officer (FO) was the pilot flying for the flight and the captain was the pilot monitoring. According to flight crew statements and recorded data, the incident flight takeoff began at 0708. At about 0710:10, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the captain began the after takeoff checklist and stated, "…wait a minute what do we got here." The captain then states, "okay ECAM I got the uh— uh you got the jet. I got this." The CVR then records the captain beginning the Avionics Smoke ECAM checklist procedure.

The FO stated that about that time he became aware of an "avionics smoke" warning electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message and the captain stated that he noticed a "yellow" autothrust ECAM message. The FO reported he pushed the autothrust (ATHR) button on the mode control panel (MCP), but this did not succeed in re-engaging the autothrust. The captain said the autothrust message was followed by a red "LAND ASAP" ECAM message accompanied by the electrical page synoptic display and the "AVIONICS SMOKE" ECAM procedure.

The FO leveled the aircraft at 5,000 feet in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and retarded the thrust levers to slow the aircraft. The captain stated that the first item on the avionics smoke ECAM procedure was to don oxygen masks, but that he and the FO agreed not to don the masks because there was no smell of smoke. The captain did not recall seeing any conditional statements or a timer in the ECAM procedure.

At about 0711:22, the captain stated "line one off" followed by "okay emergency electrical power man on when uh emergency generator available. gen two off." Concurrent with the second generator being switched off, the flight data recorder stopped recording and there was about a six second power interruption of the CVR. When the CVR resumed recording, the captain is discussing the ram air turbine (RAT) and that the airplane is in emergency electrical configuration. The FO then lost his flight instrument displays and began using the captain's primary flight display for altitude, heading and airspeed. A short time later, the captain took control of the airplane.

The FO said that once the captain had taken control of the airplane, he stated that he thought they were in the emergency electrical configuration but he didn't know what the ECAM steps were for that configuration. He said he did not follow up on the ECAM actions, and he did not use the Quick Reference Checklist (QRC) while in flight.

The first officer then tried to alert the flight attendants (FA), but he said he "did not hear the bell" when he called and the FAs did not respond. He used the pedestal handset to call the FA's, but he got no response. He then opened the cockpit door and told the FAs that they were in an emergency and would be landing immediately.

The pilots both stated in interviews that they did not conduct an approach briefing, tune the navigation radios, enter an approach in the FMGC, check the ECAM status page, use the flight manual to determine what systems were affected or lost, conduct an approach descent checklist, conduct an overweight landing checklist, determine the applicable approach speed or landing distance from the FMGC or flight manual, or attempt to repower the electrical system. The captain later said that there was no time to do these things because of the severity of the emergency.

The captain said he knew he would be in direct law with no antiskid or nose wheel steering, but he did not recall telling the first officer this. He estimated that the approach speed should be 160 knots, based on the takeoff V2 of 147 knots, rounded up for wind additive. He said that normal landing distance was 3,500 to 4,000 feet and was confident the airplane would stop on the runway. Both pilots stated that they wanted to keep the approach speed above 140 knots in order to avoid stalling the ram air turbine (RAT).

The captain told ATC that they would need a vector back to the airport and requested "the longest runway." ATC advised that runway 10, which was 10,104 feet long, was still closed due to the equipment on the runway, but that airport personnel were attempting to clear the runway. At about 07:16:03, as the flightcrew lowered the landing gear, the CVR stopped recording.

The captain stated that he could hear the tower on the radio talking to the operations personnel working on runway 10 and he realized that they would not be able to clear that runway in time for the flight to land. The captain then told ATC "we've lost all our instruments, we need a PAR." The captain stated during his interview that he had attitude and compass information but no localizer, and that the screens started to fade during the approach. ATC told the flight that they would provide a no-gyro surveillance approach.

The captain did not advise the FO as he continued the descent through the cleared altitude of 2000 feet. The FO stated that he did not recall if they were cleared to descend out of 2000 feet. According to the ATC recording, the crew reported they "we're at 1000 feet now and we've got water contact, where are we from the airport?" The controller replied that he was at 330 degrees from the airport and said on their present heading they would be "set up for the shoreline 19." After some additional communication with ATC, the captain said "I've got it" and the controller replied "wind 180 at 16 gusts to 20, cleared to land." The captain stated that he landed with full flaps and used the PAPI for vertical guidance.

The captain stated that he landed on the centerline, approximately 1,500 feet down the runway. He also state that he "got on the brakes," used full reverse, and used right rudder to keep the airplane in the center of the runway. The FO stated that on touchdown the cockpit door swung open and that he turned and shouted "remain seated, remain seated." He said that when the engines came out of reverse the captain went to the tiller but the aircraft pulled to the left. The captain had said "I can't control it," and "we're going to evacuate." The airplane continued to veer to the left and the captain indicated he stepped harder on the right brake pedal. The airplane departed the left side of runway 19 approximately 5000 feet from the threshold at a low speed, and the nose gear sank into the soft groundoff the side of the runway.

Once the aircraft came to a stop, the flightcrew used the QRC to conduct the evacuation. The captain set off the evacuation signal and the first officer then silenced it. The first officer said the 1R slide did not inflate and he yelled "go the other way." He went down the 1L slide and began helping the passengers get away from the airplane. The captain came out a few minutes later with a megaphone, which he used to direct the passengers away from the aircraft.

INJURIES TO PERSONS:

There were no injuries to the 104 passengers, which included 3 children and 1 infant lap child, two flight crew, or three flight attendants.

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT:

Post incident inspection of the airplane revealed no evidence of fire or smoke in the avionics compartment, ducts, or anywhere on the airplane. The nose landing gear bracket and weight-on-wheels switch assembly was broken and an electrical conduit in the area of the nose landing gear received minor damage.

The right main landing gear tires were found deflated. The tread of the outboard tire had two flat spots, one of which was an open hole. The inboard tire (#3) was found deflated, the beads of the tire were not mounted on the wheel halves, and heavy abrasion was found to one tread shoulder.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION:

The captain, age 50, was hired by United Airlines on July 17, 1995. He held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, multi-engine land, with type ratings in A320, B737, B747-4, B767, B777, BAE125, CE500, and HS125. He held an FAA first class medical certificate with limitations: must have glasses for near and far vision. Company records indicate that he had 15,000 hours total time with 1,487 hours on the A320. He had no previous accidents, incidents, or violations. The incident flight was the first flight of the day for the Captain.

The first officer, age 51, was hired by United Airlines on April 13, 1998. He held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate, multi-engine land, with type ratings in the A320, B757, B767, and BA3100. He held an FAA first class medical certificate with the following limitations: must wear lenses for distant vision, must have glasses for near vision. He reported a total of 11,500 flight hours, with 1,154 hours in the A320. He had no previous accidents, incidents, or violations. The incident flight was the first flight of the day for the FO.

The three flight attendants were all current and qualified on the Airbus A320.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION:

The incident airplane was an Airbus Industries A320-232, registration N409UA, manufacturer serial number 462, and was equipped with two IAE Aerospace V2500 turbofan engines and an Auxiliary Power International Corporation (Hamilton Sundstrand Company) Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). The airplane was purchased new by United Air Lines, Inc. from Airbus Industries on March 21, 1994. The airplane had accumulated 58,253:02 flig...