Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The Lancair pilot's failure to see and avoid the aerobatic airplane. Contributing to the accident was the Lancair pilot's inadequate use of collision avoidance strategies while inbound to an area of known potential aerobatic activity.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On August 20, 2011, about 1315 eastern daylight time, an amateur-built Lancair IV P, N71DM, and a Yakolev Yak-55M, N521BC, were substantially damaged when they collided near Hammonton Airport (N81), Hammonton, New Jersey. The certificated private pilot of the Lancair was fatally injured, and the certificated private pilot of the Yak, who parachuted from his airplane, was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for either flight. The Lancair departed South Jersey Regional Airport (VAY), Mount Holly, New Jersey, for an undetermined destination, and the Yak departed N81 on a local aerobatic flight. The personal flights were conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.
Family members of the Lancair pilot stated that they knew he had gone to the airport, but did not know if he was even going to fly.
According to friends of the Yak pilot, he was performing maneuvers in an aerobatic practice area, also known as the "aerobatic box," while being watched by an observer/coach. The airspace in which the Yak was maneuvering, to the east of runway 3/21, was uncontrolled.
According to a witness on the ground, she saw the Yak take off and commence aerobatic maneuvers. After about 20 minutes, she saw the Yak make a steep climb, then enter a steep dive. As it did so, she saw a white airplane, traveling "really fast come out of nowhere" in level flight and collide with the Yak. Neither airplane appeared to have altered its course before the collision.
An observer was seated in a chair located across the runway (on the west side) from the fueling station (on the east side) with a hand-held radio on either side of him. According to the observer, one of the radios was tuned to the aerobatic box frequency, while the other was tuned to the CTAF. The observer thought the CTAF radio was functioning normally, as he had previously heard other pilots transmitting over the frequency during takeoffs.
The observer also stated that there was no pre-established sequence of maneuvers for the Yak pilot to perform. The Yak pilot would radio the maneuvers he intended to perform, and the observer would watch them in order to later provide a postflight critique. The maneuver during which the accident occurred was number six in a series, a hammerhead stall. The observer also noted that he had seen the Yak make clearing turns prior to the initiation of the maneuvers.
The observer further noted that as the Yak was about to commence the hammerhead maneuver, it was in the far right [southeast] corner of the aerobatic box. The Yak began a push up at what the observer estimated was between 2,400 and 2,500 feet, with the cockpit facing west, toward the runway, and the landing gear to the east. As the Yak was climbing, the observer heard the sound of another airplane south of the airport, then saw a blue and white Cessna at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. Although the observer felt it wouldn't be a factor, he called the Yak pilot to advise him of the Cessna's presence.
The observer also stated that he believed that the Yak had completed its turn at the top of the maneuver, and was headed down at a slow speed when the accident occurred. He didn't see the Lancair approach the Yak due to sun glare, but saw the Yak split into two pieces and begin to fall. At that point he also saw the Lancair still in level flight, but then it started to roll to the left, and about 4 feet of its wing came off. The Lancair continued to roll left, perhaps another 45 degrees, while descending at an increasing angle in the center of the aerobatic box. As the Lancair was descending, the observer was shouting over the radio for the Yak pilot to jump, and estimated that the majority of the Yak was about 1,600 to 1,700 feet above the ground when the pilot did so.
The observer further stated that he did not hear either the Cessna or the Lancair pilot transmit over the radio prior to the accident.
According to the pilot of a Cessna 172, he was returning to N81 after a departure earlier that morning, and was aware of the aerobatic activity. Approaching the airport from over the Atlantic City Expressway, he radioed on the CTAF that he was inbound to the airport, but heard no response. He continued inbound at a 45-degree angle for a "close" downwind for runway 21. His airplane was initially at an altitude of about 1,500 feet at the Expressway, but descended until it was about 1,200 to 1,000 feet, before turning onto the downwind leg.
As the Cessna neared the airport, the pilot saw the Yak climbing vertically and very rapidly, with a lot of smoke trailing it, which he assumed was airshow smoke. The Yak was climbing on the downwind side of the airport, but off to the Cessna pilot's right side (toward the east), and he guessed that it was between 2,000 and 3,000 feet when he saw it.
Because the Yak was maneuvering on the same side of the airport, the Cessna pilot decided to cross the airport runway to fly a downwind leg on the other (west) side. As he started turning the Cessna to the left, he saw the Yak again, coming at him and appearing larger, until it overflew the Cessna "very close," then headed straight down. After that, he saw an open parachute in front of him, which he avoided before crossing the airport to land on runway 21.
The Cessna pilot reiterated that he was sure his radio was on the airport CTAF, that no one responded to his call in, and that he never heard the Lancair pilot call in. A pilot-rated passenger in the Cessna was interviewed separately and related essentially the same observations.
The Yak pilot was briefly interviewed by a police officer after the accident, and according to the police report, stated that he was maneuvering the airplane when the control stick "suddenly went loose," and the airplane began to tumble. The pilot then parachuted into woods, walked to a nearby road, and was transported to a hospital.
On August 31, 2011, FAA personnel visited the Yak pilot in the hospital. An FAA inspector noted that due to his injuries, the pilot was still unable to speak, but wrote on a whiteboard that he thought his airplane was hit while it was in a climb. He had entered the hammerhead maneuver from inverted flight, climbed the airplane vertically, and planned to roll it into the wind. He didn't know until he was on the ground that a collision had occurred. He also noted that he completed a climbing clearing turn as the first of a two-part sequence to commence the hammerhead maneuver.
Radar data was provided by the FAA, both in data that was converted to radar plots, and in a moving display similar to a radar scope presentation. Radar plots and the moving display are included in the public docket for this accident.
The moving display did not include time marks, but did portray a number of targets in motion, along with some background information such as a stationary circle to denote the approximate position of N81. In addition to the moving targets, transponder altitudes were also presented, but were occasionally intermittent.
Radar tracks were correlated to all three airplanes, which were all utilizing transponder code 1200. However, as the tracks converged in the vicinity of N81, the lack of presentation fidelity made the Yak and the Lancair difficult to distinguish.
The track that correlated with the Cessna indicated that it arrived from the southwest, and gradually descended until it was at an altitude of about 1,100 feet at the time of the accident.
The track correlating to the Yak was mostly maintaining itself in an area just east of the runway, at varying altitudes and with numerous data points missing.
The track correlating to the Lancair was first observed west southwest of VAY. It then proceeded south, and about 8 miles west of N81, turned southeast before turning east. Near the end of the track, it turned northeast. Altitudes inbound toward N81 averaged about 3,500 feet, but dipped to 3,300 feet approaching N81 before climbing back up again to 3,500 feet.
Nearing the airport, the Lancair and Cessna tracks converged but did not overlap, with the Lancair about 2,300 feet above the Cessna. The Yak track then appeared northwest of the other two airplanes, but subsequently disappeared, and the entire display then briefly froze. The next return indicated a radar contact at 3,400 feet followed by another at 3,600 feet; however, it could not be determined whether the contacts were the Lancair or the Yak. A final contact then occurred to the northeast, also at 3,600 feet.
Radar plots revealed similar results, and were also hampered due to fidelity. One plot revealed the Lancair first appeared on radar west-southwest of VAY before it turned south towards N81.
A number of radar-plotted Lancair position points near N81 were re-plotted on Google Earth, and utilizing the distances between positions in relation to elapsed times, resulted in calculated approximate ground speeds of about 190 knots.
The Yak was equipped with an electronic flight information system (EFIS) that retained limited non-volatile memory with six recorded parameters every 10 seconds. Because of the length of time between recorded parameters, maximums and minimums were not necessarily recorded.
At recorded time 1311:50, the Yak was at a pressure altitude of 3,046 feet, pitch about 10 degrees nose up, left roll of about 43 degrees, heading about 115 degrees, airspeed 100 knots.
At recorded time 1312:00, the Yak was at a pressure altitude of 3,313 feet, pitch about 55 degrees nose up, right roll of about 3 degrees, heading about 141 degrees, airspeed 52 knots.
At recorded time 1312:10, the Yak was at a pressure altitude of 3,455 feet, pitch about 29 degrees nose low, right roll about 176 degrees, heading about 309 degrees, airspeed 102 knots.
At the last recorded time, at 1312:20, the Yak was at a pressure altitude of 2,314 feet, pitch 19 degrees nose up, right roll a...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA11FA468