N690SM

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On November 23, 2011, about 1831 mountain standard time, a Rockwell International (Aero Commander) 690A airplane, N690SM, was destroyed when it impacted terrain in the Superstition Mountains near Apache Junction, Arizona. The commercial pilot and the five passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was registered to Ponderosa Aviation, Inc. (PAI) and operated by PAI under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight. Night visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed, and no flight plan was filed. The airplane had departed Falcon Field (FFZ), Mesa, Arizona, about 1825 and was destined for Safford Regional Airport (SAD), Safford, Arizona.

PAI's director of maintenance (DOM) and the director of operations (DO), who were co owners of PAI along with the president, conducted a personal flight from SAD to FFZ. The DO flew the leg from SAD to FFZ under visual flight rules (VFR) in night VMC. After arriving at FFZ and in preparation for the flight back to SAD, the DOM moved to the left front seat to act as the pilot flying. The airplane departed FFZ about 12 minutes after it arrived. According to a witness, engine start and taxi-out appeared normal.

Review of the recorded communications between the pilot and the FFZ tower air traffic controllers revealed that when the pilot requested taxi clearance, he advised the ground controller that he was planning an "eastbound departure." The flight was cleared for takeoff on runway 4R, and the pilot was instructed to maintain runway heading until advised, due to an inbound aircraft. About 90 seconds later, when the airplane was about 1.1 miles from the departure end of the runway, the tower local controller issued a "right turn approved" advisory to the flight, which the pilot acknowledged. Radar data revealed that the airplane flew the runway heading for about 1.5 miles then began a right turn toward SAD and climbed through an altitude of about 2,600 feet mean sea level (msl). About 1828, after it momentarily climbed to an altitude of 4,700 feet, the airplane descended to an altitude of 4,500 feet, where it remained and tracked in an essentially straight line until it impacted the mountain. The last radar return was received at 1830:56 and was approximately coincident with the impact location. The impact location was near the top of a steep mountain that projected to over 5,000 feet msl. Witnesses reported seeing a fireball, and law enforcement helicopters were dispatched.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Pilot (General Information)

The pilot, age 31, held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for single-engine and multiengine land and instrument airplane. He also held a mechanic certificate with ratings for airframe and powerplant. His Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second class medical certificate was issued in July 2011. The pilot was a co-owner of PAI and was PAI's DOM.

The pilot's personal flight records contained entries until February 2011, at which time the pilot recorded that he had 1,151.9 hours in single-engine airplanes and 951.5 hours in multiengine airplanes. On his most recent FAA medical certificate application, the pilot reported a total flight experience of 2,500 hours.

The computerized PAI flight record (which began tracking 14 CFR Part 135 flights only in February 2011) indicated that the pilot had 116.5 hours total flight experience, including 18 hours in night VMC. According to the records, during the preceding 90 and 30 days, the pilot had accumulated about 28.5 and 5.3 flight hours, respectively. The records showed that the pilot had flown 2 hours on two different flights in the week before the accident. The most recent flight was in night VMC from SAD to FFZ and back. Examination of the flight records revealed that the pilot had flown that round trip flight at least twice, in the previous 2 weeks.

Pilot Training

According to PAI and its FAA principal operations inspector (POI), employee pilots receive annual training over a 2- to 3-day period. The chief pilot organized most of the training, which consisted of regulation review, company policy, and actual flight training. The POI observed parts of the training. According to company training records, the pilot's most recent 14 CFR Part 135 competency/proficiency check was satisfactorily completed on September 24, 2011.

Pilot's 72-Hour History

According to the pilot's wife, in the 3 days before and including the accident day, the pilot awoke about 0630 and left for work about 0700. Two days before the accident, he flew to FFZ, arriving back at SAD about 2145.

Relatives of the pilot stated that nothing unusual had occurred in his life in the 72-hour period before the accident. His wife reported that the pilot did not take medications, aside from a hypothyroidism medication that he had reported to the FAA, and he did not have any physical conditions or ailments aside from the hypothyroidism.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

The Forensic Science Center in Tucson, Arizona, conducted an autopsy on the pilot; the cause of death was cited as blunt force trauma. The FAA Forensic Toxicology Research Team at the Civil Aviation Medical Institute performed toxicological testing of specimens collected during the autopsy. The results of the specimens were negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, and listed drugs.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

General

The airplane was manufactured in 1976 by Rockwell International, and the type certificate holder at the time of the accident was Twin Commander, LLC. The airplane was equipped with two Honeywell TPE-331-series turboshaft engines and two Hartzell three-blade propellers. Maintenance records indicated that the airframe had accumulated a total time in service of about 8,188 hours. The left engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 545 hours, and the right engine had accumulated a total time since major overhaul of about 1,482 hours.

The airplane was recently purchased by PAI and was flown about 1,200 miles from Indiana to the PAI facility at SAD about 1 week before the accident. It was certificated for single-pilot operation. At the time of the accident, the airplane was configured for a pilot (left side), a copilot (right side), and five passengers.

According to the sale advertisement listing for the airplane, the airplane was equipped with very high frequency omnirange (VOR) and GPS (KLN 90B) navigation units, a radar altimeter, and an Avidyne EX-500 multifunction display, which were destroyed in the accident.

Ferry Permit Information

At the time of purchase by PAI, the airplane was not in compliance with an FAA required 150-hour inspection requirement, and PAI requested an FAA ferry permit to fly the airplane from Eagle Creek Airpark (EYE), Indianapolis, Indiana, to the PAI facility in Safford, Arizona. On November 16, 2011, the FAA issued a ferry permit for the relocation of the airplane. The permit was valid until arrival at SAD or November 25, 2011, whichever came first. It only permitted a direct flight between EYE and SAD and only allowed the pilot and essential crew on board. The airplane was flown by the PAI president, who was the brother of the accident pilot, from EYE to SAD on November 17, 2011. The arrival at SAD terminated the ferry permit.

PAI and FAA Scottsdale Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) personnel estimated that it would normally require two people 2 days to conduct the inspection necessary to render the airplane in compliance with the outstanding airworthiness items, exclusive of correcting any identified deficiencies. All available evidence indicated that no maintenance activity was accomplished on the airplane between its arrival at SAD and its departure to FFZ on the night of the accident; the condition that warranted the ferry permit had not been corrected.

Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) Equipment Information

Title 14 CFR 91.223 stated that with certain exceptions, turbine-powered, US registered airplanes configured with six or more passenger seats and manufactured before early 2002 could not be operated after March 29, 2005, unless the airplane was equipped with an approved TAWS unit.

Since the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976 and was turbine-powered, any exclusion from the TAWS requirement required that the airplane had to be configured with five or fewer passenger seating positions. According to the type certificate holder's documentation, the airplane was manufactured and delivered with six passenger seating positions. Therefore, the airplane's as manufactured configuration required the installation of TAWS by March 2005. No records indicating that the number of passenger seating positions was ever less than six before May 2005 were located. However, a detailed review of airplane maintenance records, preaccident photographs, TAWS equipment manufacturer's data, and a detailed inventory of the recovered wreckage indicated that the accident airplane was never equipped with TAWS. (The sale advertisement information for the airplane indicated that it was equipped with a KGP-560 TAWS B unit.)

Maintenance documentation indicated that in May 2005, the airplane seating configuration was changed to reduce passenger seat provisions from six to five by removing a seat belt from the aft divan, which was originally configured with seat belts for three people. Per the requirements of 14 CFR 91.223 and the reduced passenger seat count, the airplane was not required to be equipped with TAWS.

However, FAA and manufacturer/type certificate holder guidance indicated that any seating configuration changes should be approved by either the FAA or the manufacturer/type certificate holder, and examination of the maintenance documentation for the accident airplane revealed that neither requirement had been satisfied. The seating modification was not approved by the FAA or any other agency or documented either via a supplem...