Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's failure to maintain control of the helicopter after a loss of engine power. The reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined because examination did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded operation.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 10, 2012, about 1545 central daylight time, N281RG, a Robinson R22 Beta helicopter, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain during a low-altitude maneuvering flight in Houston, Texas. The commercial pilot and the passenger were fatally injured. The helicopter was registered to and operated by Helicopter Services, Incorporated, Spring, Texas. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident. No flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial photography flight. The helicopter had departed Baytown Airport (HPY), Baytown, Texas, approximately 1500.
The helicopter originally departed David Wayne Hooks Memorial Airport (DWH), Houston, Texas, about 1200, and flew in the local area before landing at HPY around 1425. Fueling records indicate the helicopter was serviced with 22.9 gallons of 100LL fuel at 1429. Around 1500, the Baytown Airport manager saw the pilot and the passenger depart toward the southwest. Approximately 45 minutes later, the helicopter was observed by several witnesses maneuvering over the steel pipe yard near the accident location.
A witness was driving west on Highway 90 toward the beltway when he first observed the helicopter. He said it was about a mile away and at first he thought it was a remote controlled helicopter. The witness said the helicopter was “way up there” and estimated that it was about 400-500 feet above the ground. The helicopter was spinning slowly (he did not recall what direction it was turning) around the main rotor shaft and was descending vertically about 70-80 miles per hour as if it had "lost power." There was no smoke or parts coming off the helicopter as it descended. The main rotor blades were turning "slower than expected" and were not deflected upward. The witness said that the tail rotor did not appear to be turning. The helicopter then impacted the ground, which resulted in a large dust cloud. The witness stopped his vehicle and ran towards the helicopter. After he negotiated a chain link fence, he and another witness used fire extinguishers to contain the post-impact fire, which he described being more intense on the right side of the helicopter, until the fire department arrived.
Another witness was driving east on Highway 90 toward the beltway when he first observed the helicopter about a mile away. It was 70 to 100 feet-high above the ground and was slowly spinning counter-clockwise around the main rotor shaft and was in a slow vertical descent. The witness said the helicopter seemed to move in “slow-motion.” When it was approximately 40 to 50 feet above the ground, the helicopter’s descent rate increased rapidly before it impacted the ground. The witness thought the pilot was trying to land and he did not observe any smoke coming from the helicopter prior to impact. He noted that the main rotor blades were turning “pretty slow” and it seemed “like he lost power.” The body of the helicopter was level and the main rotor blades were not deflected upward. The witness could not hear the helicopter prior to the impact, which occurred just as he was stepping out of his vehicle. After the impact, he observed a large dust plume as he was running to the steel yard. Seconds later, as he was trying to crawl under a chain link fence, he saw a fireball coming from the helicopter. He and another responder used fire extinguishers to contain the post-impact fire until the fire department arrived.
Two witnesses, who were driving together westbound on Highway 90, stated they first observed the helicopter when it was about 1 to 1.5 miles away. They said the helicopter was spinning counter-clockwise and was approximately 75-feet-high above the ground. One of the witnesses thought the pilot was attempting to avoid the highway and drifted over toward the steel pipe storage yard. Neither witness saw any smoke or debris trailing the helicopter and did not hear the helicopter prior to impact. One of the witnesses said the helicopter descended quickly (about 30 seconds). The nose of the helicopter was pointed down toward the ground and the main rotor blades did not look like they were moving.
Another witness was working on a construction site located about a 1/4-mile from where he first observed the helicopter. He said the helicopter was hovering over a building near the accident site “real low.” All appeared to be normal. The witness lost sight of the helicopter for about 10 minutes due to work related reasons before he saw the helicopter a second time. This time, the helicopter was hovering around 100 to 150-feet-high above the ground over the steel pipe yard. The nose of the helicopter was pointed toward the north. He could not hear the helicopter from his location. The witness said that the helicopter hovered for approximately 1 to 1.5 minutes before it “leaned sideways” to the east and the “tail came around on him.” The helicopter then began to turn to the right slowly as it began a slow vertical descent in a slight nose-down and to-the-right attitude. The witness said the helicopter spun 4 to 4.5 times in a “wide-motion” as it descended “straight down” at a speed of 10-15 mph, as if the pilot was trying to correct for the situation. He said the main rotor blades were turning and deflected slightly upward, but he could not estimate how fast. He never looked at the tail rotor. The witness said from the time the helicopter entered the right turn to the time it impacted the ground it was about 10-15 seconds. Once on the ground, he could still see the main rotor blades. Approximately 30 seconds later, he saw that the helicopter had caught on fire and called 9-1-1 emergency. He did not respond to the scene.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate for rotorcraft-helicopter. His last Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first class medical was issued on December 16, 2011. According to the operator, the pilot had accrued a total of 757 flight hours, of which, 619 hours were in the R22B.
The pilot had not attended the Robinson Pilot Safety Course prior to the accident, but was scheduled to attend a future class.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
Weather reported at Ellington Field (EFD), Houston, Texas, approximately 16 miles southwest of the accident site, at 1550, was wind 130 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 miles, scattered clouds at 8,000 feet, temperature 93 degrees F, dewpoint 62 degrees F, and an altimeter setting of 30.02 inches of Mercury.
The carburetor icing probability chart from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB): CE-09-35 Carburetor Icing Prevention, June 30, 2009, shows a possibility of icing at cruise/glide power at the temperature and dew point reported at the time of the accident.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The helicopter came to rest upright on a heading of 195 degrees on a dirt road located inside a steel pipe storage yard. The entire helicopter was accounted for at the site and sustained extensive post-impact fire damage. The skids were spread and level with the belly of the fuselage. The body of the helicopter was listed to the right.
A postaccident examination was conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Investigator-in-Charge (IIC) on September 12-13, 2013.
Examination of the helicopter revealed that the cockpit area was consumed by fire. The remains of a camera bag, along with several lenses, and several unidentified electronic devices were found in the area near the collective. These devices were sent to the NTSB Recorders Laboratory in Washington DC, and no data was able to be retrieved due to thermal damage.
The removable controls were not installed at the co-pilot's station on the left side. The pilot’s left anti-torque pedal was positioned forward and the collective was mid travel. Both seat structures were fully collapsed.
Flight control continuity was established for all flight controls to the cockpit.
The main fuel tank was partially consumed by fire and the rear exterior skins were bulged and slightly deformed. A puncture hole was observed in the fuel tank and also through the firewall that sat below the tank. The puncture came from the bottom up. The #2 spark plug that sat directly underneath the puncture hole exhibited damage to the top of its ignition lead. The tank’s fuel cap was secure to the filler neck and the fuel finger-screen was absent of debris.
The auxiliary fuel tank was mostly consumed by fire. The crossover line was disconnected and exhibited thermal damage at both ends of the fuel disconnect. The fuel cap was secure to the filler neck and the fuel finger-screen was absent of debris.
The gascolator was thermally damaged. When the unit was disassembled, the gasket was found dry and brittle consistent with heat exposure. There was a small amount of debris on the fuel-screen.
The fuel system’s vent lines, hoses and tubes were all consumed by fire. No blockages or fuel were found in any of the remaining fuel lines. All of the B-nuts for the fuel supply lines were finger tight.
The fuel control located in the cockpit was observed to be in the “ON” position and the fuel-mixture control was in the full rich position. The carburetor-heat control was unlocked and raised approximately 1-inch. The governor switch was in the “ON” position and the throttle connecting rod on the collective was in the full open position.
The clutch annunciator light and the low rotor RPM warning light were examined by an NTSB Materials Engineer. Examination of the clutch light revealed that the light bulb filament heat coil stretching, indicative of the light being on at the time of impact. The low rotor RPM warning light had heat damage to the extent the bulb melted on to itself and the filament. The filament was broken but exhibited no hot coil stretching.
The skids remained attached to the fuselage and were spread apart and even ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN12FA621