Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s failure to maintain proper airspeed, which resulted in the airplane touching down too fast on the wet runway with inadequate runway remaining to stop and a subsequent runway overrun. Contributing to the landing overrun were the flight crewmembers’ failure to correctly use the appropriate performance chart to calculate the runway required to stop on a contaminated runway and their general lack of proper crew resource management.
Aircraft Information
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On September 18, 2012, about 1003 eastern daylight time (EDT), a Beech 400, N428JD, was substantially damaged when it overran runway 28 during landing at Macon Downtown Airport (MAC), Macon, Georgia. The airplane departed from Charleston Air Force Base/International Airport (CHS), Charleston, South Carolina, about 0930. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed. Both Airline Transport Pilots (ATP) and one passenger sustained minor injuries. The airplane was owned by Dewberry, LLC and operated by The Aviation Department. The corporate flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91.
According to an interview with the pilots, they arrived at DeKalb-Peachtree Airport (PDK), Atlanta, Georgia, which was their home base airport, about 0400, and then drove about 4 1/2 hours to CHS for the 0930 flight. The flight departed on time, the airspeed index bug was set on the co-pilot's airspeed for a decision takeoff speed (V1) of about 102 knots and a single-engine climb speed (V2) on the pilot's side of 115 knots. The flight climbed to 16,000 feet prior to beginning the descent into MAC. When the flight was about 11 miles from the airport the flight crew visually acquired the airport and cancelled their IFR clearance with the Macon Radar Approach controller and proceeded to the airport visually. The second-in-command activated the runway lights utilizing the common traffic advisory frequency for the airport. Both crewmembers reported that about 3 seconds following activation of the lights and the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) lights, the PAPI lights turned off and would not reactivate. During the approach, the calculated reference speed (Vref) was 108 knots and was set on both pilots' airspeed indicator utilizing the index bug that moved around the outside face of the airspeed instrument. The landing was within the first 1,000 feet of the runway and during the landing rollout the airplane began to "hydroplane" since there was visible standing water on the runway and the water was "funneling into the middle." Maximum reverse thrust, braking, and ground spoilers were deployed; however, both pilots reported a "pulsation" in the brake system. The airplane departed the end of the runway into the grass, went down an embankment, across a road, and into trees. They further added that the airplane "hit hard" at the bottom of the embankment. They also reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions with the airplane prior to the landing.
According to an eyewitness statement, a few minutes prior to the airplane landing, the airport experienced a rain shower with a "heavy downpour." The witness reported observing the airplane on approach, heard the engine thrust reverse, and then observed the airplane "engulfed in a large ball of water vapor." However, he did not observe the airplane as it departed the end of the runway. Another witness was located in a hangar on the west side of the airport and heard the airplane, looked outside and then saw the airplane with the reverse thrusters deployed. He watched it depart the end of the runway and travel into the nearby woods.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
Pilot
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records and the operator, the pilot, age 43, held an ATP certificate with a rating for multiengine land airplane, a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land, and held a type rating in the make and model of the accident airplane. He held a first class medical certificate, which was issued on August 21, 2012, that contained no waivers and no limitations. The pilot's most recent training in the accident make and model airplane was completed on December 7, 2012. The pilot reported that he had 7,350 total flight hours, of which 6,700 were as pilot in command. He reported having 4,600 total flight hours in the accident aircraft make and model, of which the entire amount was as pilot in command. He accrued 80 hours in the last 90 days of which 76 of those hours were in the accident airplane make and model, and 25 hours in the preceding 30 days.
The pilot reported during a postaccident interview that he was notified of the trip the day prior and that the flight was scheduled to depart CHS at 0930. The evening before he completed some preliminary work by obtaining weather information, notices to airman (NOTAMS) for both airports, and filed a flight plan for the flight. On the morning of the flight he woke up about 0330 and he and the copilot met each other at PDK at 0400 and drove to CHS. The pilot drove approximately 2 hours at which point they stopped, got some coffee, and then switched drivers. After arriving at the airplane, they performed their preflight inspections and about 0905 they received a text message from the passenger that he was about 5 minutes away. After loading up the passenger, his dog, and some golf clubs he had notified the passenger there was some weather in the Macon area over the airport; however, at the time of arrival, the "weather should be good." He was seated in the left front seat for the flight, which departed at 0930.
Co-Pilot
According to FAA records, the co-pilot held an ATP certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and also held a type rating in the make and model of the accident airplane. He held a first class medical certificate, which was issued on November 2, 2011, and it contained no waivers and no limitations. He reported 2,536 total flight hours, of which 1,485 of those hours were as pilot in command. He reported having 425 total flight hours in the accident aircraft make and model and none as pilot in command. He accrued 31 hours in the preceding 90 days, 8 hours in the last 30 days, of which 6 were in the accident airplane make and model, and 1 hour in the preceding 24 hours.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The airplane, a Beech BE-400 model, serial number RJ-13, was a low-wing, twin-engine, tail-mounted jet aircraft certificated in the transport category. According to FAA records, the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate on June 24, 1986, and was registered to the corporation on April 26, 2004, as N3113B and was changed to N428JD on November 23, 2004. It was equipped with two Pratt and Whitney JT15D-5 engines. According to maintenance records, both main tires were replaced on June 5, 2012 with a recorded Hobbs reading of 2155.7 hours and total cycles of 5747. Both left and right brake assemblies was overhauled and reinstalled on August 11, 2012, with a recorded time of 5387.6 total airframe hours and a Hobbs recording of 2177.6 hours, and at that time the airplane had 5771 total cycles. On June 15, 2011, a recorded "A" airframe inspection was accomplished with a reported total time of 5187 flight hours.
The airplane was equipped with electrically controlled hydraulically actuated fowler flaps that ran approximately the full span of each wing, and had 3 positions; 0, 10, and 30 degrees. Flap position transmitters located on the flap operating system sent a signal to the alternating current (AC) powered flap position indicator, and also to a flap asymmetry detector to stop flap operation if a 5 to 7 degree discrepancy occurred between the left and right flaps. The flap on each wing consisted of a main and aft flap, which were hydraulically actuated with one actuator per side. The main flap drove the aft flap; the left and right side of the flaps were interconnected by a cable system to ensure symmetric flap extension.
The airplane was equipped with hydraulically actuated retractable tricycle landing gear; each main landing wheel was equipped with full powered multiple segmented brakes operated by toe action of the pilot or co-pilot's rudder pedals. Application of the brake pedals at either seat position delivered pressure to the directly connected master cylinder, which transferred it to a power brake valve through mixing valves. The power brake amplified the master cylinder pressure thereby increasing the pressure to the respective main landing gear brake. An electrically controlled anti-skid system was also incorporated in the power brake system. A stationary wheel speed transducer was mounted inside each main gear axle, and it electrically sensed any change in wheel rotation speed. By design, with the system on, as a skid is detected by the stationary wheel speed transducer, an electrical signal was supplied to the system which releases brake pressure. The system continued to operate as long as the brake pressure was sufficient to result in the skidding condition, but not below approximately 10 knots.
A ground safety system was also installed, which allowed for safe operation of several systems either in flight or on ground, including thrust reverser application for ground use only. Control was accomplished by the left and right squat switches that connected or removed an electrical ground from the coils of ground safety relays, which in turn enabled or disabled their respective systems according to the position of the safety switches.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 0953 recorded weather observation at Middle Georgia Regional Airport (MCN), located approximately 9 miles to the south southwest of the accident location, included wind from 180 degrees at 6 knots, visibility 7 miles due to light rain, broken clouds at 11,000 feet above ground level (agl), temperature 22 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C and barometric altimeter 29.97 inches of mercury.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
The airport was a publically owned airport and at the time of the accident and it did not have an operating control tower. The airport was equipped with two runways designated as runway 10/28 and 15/33. Runway10/28 was reported as "in good condition" and runway 15/33 was reported as "in fair condition." Runway 10/28 was a 4,694-foot-long by 150-foot-wide non-grooved ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA12FA567