Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The flight instructor's inadequate preflight planning and his decision to take off with the airplane at a high gross weight in high temperature conditions that degraded the engine’s available power and his subsequent failure to maintain airspeed while attempting to return to the departure airport, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical angle-of-attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 31, 2013, about 1310 eastern daylight time, a Diamond Aircraft Industries Inc., DA20-C1, N176MA, was substantially damaged when it impacted the ground, shortly after takeoff from the Linden Airport (LDJ), Linden, New Jersey. The flight instructor was fatally injured and a passenger was seriously injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan had been filed for the local introductory instructional flight that was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.
The airplane was owned by a limited liability company, and operated by Best-in-Flight, a flight school based at LDJ.
A witness at LDJ reported that the airplane departed from runway 27, a 4,140-foot-long, asphalt runway. The airplane's takeoff roll was longer than other DA-20s he was use to observing and it "struggled" to break ground and gain altitude. The airplane made a right turn at an estimated altitude of between 125 to 150 feet above the ground, and immediately started to lose altitude. It descended behind a building and he heard the pilot radio "mayday" over the airport's common traffic advisory frequency, stating "plane going down." He was then informed by the pilot of another airplane that the airplane had crashed. He further stated that while he could not hear the airplane's engine noise clearly because of a nearby highway, the engine noise was constant and he did not hear any power interruptions until after the impact.
Another witness, the pilot of a Mooney M20K, was holding on the runway when he observed the accident airplane lift off about two-thirds down the runway. The airplane's attitude was flat and it did not seem to be climbing. He began his takeoff roll shortly thereafter and while on the upwind climb, he noted the accident airplane was below his altitude, heading northwest on a 45-degree angle from the runway about 200 to 300 feet above the ground. He heard the accident pilot transmit "mayday-mayday-mayday" and announce either "engine trouble" or "engine out." He then heard the pilot say "turning back to the airport." He immediately thought to himself that the airplane was too low to try to turn back to the airport and that the pilot should have continued straight and attempted to land in one of the surrounding factory lots. He next observed the airplane heading back toward the airport. The airplane was in a nose high pitch attitude, when it "stalled." The right wing dipped, the airplane descended, spun a quarter-turn and impacted railroad tracks.
During an interview with a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspector, the passenger reported that the flight instructor told him that he had his feet on the brakes during the takeoff roll, and to place his feet flat on the floor, which he did. After takeoff, the flight instructor told him that the engine "wasn't making power." The flight instructor called "mayday" and was trying to return to the airport when the airplane suddenly impacted the ground.
Radar data provided by the FAA for the Newark Liberty International Airport, which was located about 5 miles northeast of the accident site revealed the accident airplane departed runway 27, and made a right turn to the north before radar contact was lost about 1 minute after takeoff. The target identified as the accident airplane did not climb above an altitude of 200 feet.
The airplane struck and came to rest on abandoned railroad tracks on the site of a former automotive factory about a 1/2-mile northwest of LDJ. The site contained several deteriorated asphalt parking lots adjacent to the south-southwest side of the railroad tracks. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe flight instructor, age 58, held a commercial pilot and a flight instructor certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on August 6, 2012.
According to the owner of the flight school, the flight instructor was hired during February 2011 and maintained a fulltime schedule as bookings permitted. The flight instructor's total flight experience at the time of the accident was about 4,400 hours, which included about 640 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The flight school reported that the flight instructor had accumulated about 200 and 45 hours of total flight experience, which included about 160 and 35 hours in the same make and model as the accident airplane, during the 90 and 30 days that preceded the accident; respectively. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe two-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear, airplane, serial number C0345, was manufactured in 2005 and primarily constructed of carbon and glass fiber reinforced polymer. It was powered by a Continental Motors Inc. IO-240-B, 125-horsepower engine, equipped with a two-bladed Sensenich wooden propeller. The airplane was certified in the utility category by Transport Canada in accordance with Canadian Airworthiness Manual Chapter 523-VLA.
Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane had been operated for about 1,985 hours since new, and 38 hours since its most recent "100hr/annual" inspection, which was performed on May 10, 2013. At the time of the accident, the engine had been operated for about 2,180 total hours. It was noted that the engine was disassembled, inspected, and repaired for a sudden stoppage during May 2008.
According to the airplane flight manual, the airplane's total fuel capacity was 24.5 gallons. According to the owner of the airplane and flight school, the airplane was "topped-off" with fuel the night before and was flown without incident for 2.6 hours prior to the accident. The airplane consumed between 4.5 and 6.0 gallons per hour (gph); however, he noted that consumption was generally "closer to 4.5 gallons" during flight school operations.
The owner further reported that performing a weight and balance calculation was part of the preflight checklist and that weight and balance forms for the airplane were available on tables in the flight school; however, flight instructors would normally ask passengers their weight and perform the weight and balance calculation mentally.
A weight and balance calculation for the accident flight was performed utilizing an airplane weight and balance form specific to the accident airplane that was available at the flight school. Based on the passenger's reported weight of 290 pounds and the flight instructor's weight during his most recent FAA medical certificate of 235 pounds, the airplane was estimated to be about 30 pounds above its maximum takeoff weight of 1,764 pounds. The airplane's center of gravity was within limits.
When asked if he would fly with a passenger that weighed about 290 pounds, the owner stated that he would not, and would use the opportunity to convince the passenger to fly in the DA-40, which was equipped with a 180-horsepower engine.
The owner felt that the accident airplane was "overpowered" with its 125 horsepower engine. He also stated that he was aware that it was "very hot" at the time of the accident and if the reported temperature at the airport was 93 degrees Fahrenheit (about 34 degrees C), it was likely over 100 degrees F on most of the airport property.
Both cockpit seats were equipped with a four-point safety belt. Each seat was equipped with two inertia reels that were secured to the aft bulkhead for shoulder restraint. The lap belts were connected via a quick release/spring loaded clip-type fitting which hooked to an attach point that was embedded in the floor of the fuselage on their respective outboard sides, and to a center tunnel attach point on their respective inboard sides. Each quick release was secured with a cotter pin. According to a representative of the aircraft manufacturer, at that time of certification, the airplane's seat and seat belt attachments were designed for a 9g forward, 1.5g sideward load, and a 190 pound occupant.
The aircraft maintenance manual, maintenance practices 100 hour inspection checklist requirements included "…Examine the safety belts for general condition and security of the metal fitting in the surrounding composite…." METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe reported weather at LDJ, which was at an elevation of 22 feet mean sea level, at 1315, was: wind 220 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 10 statute miles; sky clear, temperature 34 degrees Celsius (C); dew point 16 degrees C; altimeter 30.08 inches of mercury.
The estimated density altitude at LDJ at the time of the accident was about 2,200 feet mean sea level. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe two-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear, airplane, serial number C0345, was manufactured in 2005 and primarily constructed of carbon and glass fiber reinforced polymer. It was powered by a Continental Motors Inc. IO-240-B, 125-horsepower engine, equipped with a two-bladed Sensenich wooden propeller. The airplane was certified in the utility category by Transport Canada in accordance with Canadian Airworthiness Manual Chapter 523-VLA.
Review of maintenance records revealed that the airplane had been operated for about 1,985 hours since new, and 38 hours since its most recent "100hr/annual" inspection, which was performed on May 10, 2013. At the time of the accident, the engine had been operated for about 2,180 total hours. It was noted that the engine was disassembled, inspected, and repaired for a sudden stoppage during May 2008.
According to the airplane flight manual, the airplane's total fuel capacity was 24.5 gallons. According to the owner of the airplane and flight school, the airplane was "topped-off" with fuel the night before and was flown without incident for 2.6 hours prior to the accident. The airplane consumed between 4.5 and 6.0 gallons per hour (gph); however, he noted that consumption was generally "closer to 4.5 gallons" during flight school operations.
The owner further reported that performing a weight and balance calculation was part of the preflight checklist and ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA13FA259