Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s continued visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions, which resulted in an in-flight collision with mountainous terrain.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On June 28, 2013, about 1040 Alaska daylight time, a twin-engine Beech Baron 95-B55 airplane, N5JG, was destroyed following a collision with terrain and post-crash fire in an area known as Broad Pass, about 15 miles southwest of Cantwell, Alaska. The airplane was being operated as a visual flight rules (VFR) cross-country flight under the provisions of Title 14, CFR Part 91, when the accident occurred. Of the three people aboard, the first pilot/airplane owner, seated in the left seat, the second pilot, seated in the right seat, and a passenger, all sustained fatal injuries. At the time of the accident, instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) were reported in the areas of Broad and Windy Pass. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the airplane's point of departure, and company flight following procedures were in effect. The flight departed the Fairbanks International Airport at approximately 1000, destined for Homer, Alaska, via Windy and Broad Pass.
The first pilot owned and operated a tour group business called "Let's Fly Alaska", through which pilots provide their own airplanes, and travel as a group on a guided tour from Washington and then throughout Alaska, before returning to their respective bases.
According to family members, the first pilot had invited the second pilot and his girlfriend to accompany him in his airplane, on the upcoming tour of Alaska. The second pilot had brokered and delivered an airplane for the first pilot, and the trip to Alaska was a thank you for his services.
A picture provided by one of the group leaders to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigator-in-charge (IIC), shows the airplane departing Fairbanks International Airport, on the accident flight with the second pilot seated in the right front seat. The second pilot was identified in the photo, during the on-scene portion of the investigation by the red shirt that he was wearing.
The first pilot was the lead airplane in a group of 18 airplanes on an aerial tour, when the accident occurred. The 18 airplanes were divided into two groups, a slow group and a fast group, which was determined by each airplane's en route cruise airspeed, and each group had a separate leader. The accident airplane served as a separate leader for the entire group, and would fly ahead of, and separate from the two groups to check weather and make arrangements at the next destination.
During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on July 1, the group leader of the fast group said the accident airplane departed approximately 10 minutes ahead of his group. As his group approached the Windy Pass area, weather conditions began to deteriorate, with low clouds, haze, and restricted visibility. He subsequently received a radio broadcast from another airplane in the area, stating that the pass was not open due to poor weather conditions, so he elected to land his group at the Healy River Airport, Healy, Alaska.
During a separate telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on June 29, the group leader of the slow group said that after hearing the fast group was landing at the Healy River Airport, he elected to land his group there also. After waiting approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour, he departed Healy River to see if the weather had improved in Windy and Broad Pass. As he approached the area around Broad Pass, weather conditions deteriorated with thick clouds to the ground, and he returned to the Healy River Airport.
During a telephone conversation with the NTSB IIC on August 7, 2014 a pilot rated witness standing on the ground at the Summit Airport about the time of the accident stated that he observed a twin-engine, piston powered Beechcraft airplane fly by the Summit Airport. He said the airplane was about 400 above ground level (AGL), and flying in and out of the clouds. Weather at the time consisted of broken clouds at approximately 250–300 feet AGL, and overcast clouds at about 350 feet AGL, with thin wispy fog hanging in the trees.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
The first pilot, age 61, held an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane multi-engine land, and rotorcraft-helicopter rating. Additionally, he held commercial pilot privileges for airplane single-engine land, and single-engine sea. He also held a type rating for a Bell 206 helicopter, and a certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single-engine land, multi-engine land, instrument airplane, rotorcraft-helicopter, and instrument helicopter. His most recent third-class medical was issued on February 10, 2012, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses.
No personal flight records were located for the first pilot, and the aeronautical experience listed on page 3 of this report was obtained from a review of the airmen Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City. On the pilot's application for a medical certificate, dated February 10, 2012 he indicated that his total aeronautical experience was about 4,900 hours, of which 30 were in the previous 6 months.
The second pilot, age 74, held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane multi-engine land, single engine land, and single engine sea, glider and instrument airplane rating. He also held a certified flight instructor certificate with airplane single engine, multi-engine, and instrument airplane, and an advanced and instrument ground instructor certificate. His most recent second-class medical was issued on June 17, 2013, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses.
No personal flight records were located for the second pilot, and the aeronautical experience listed on page 3 of this report was obtained from a review of the airmen Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records on file in the Airman and Medical Records Center located in Oklahoma City. On the pilot's application for a medical certificate, dated June 17, 2013 he indicated that his total aeronautical experience was about 10,000 hours, of which 75 were in the previous 6 months.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The six-seat, low-wing, retractable tricycle landing gear, Beech Baron 95-B55, serial number TC-1725, was manufactured in 1974. It was powered by two, Continental Motors IO-520-E engines.
The airplane was equipped with dual control yokes, and after-market vortex generators and winglets.
No airframe or engine logbooks were discovered for examination, but an aircraft status sheet was provided to the NTSB IIC. The status sheet indicated that the most recent annual inspection on the airframe and engines was completed on June 7, 2013. At the time of inspection the airplane had a total time in service of 4,805 flight hours.
METEROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The closest weather reporting facility is Healy River Airport, approximately 42 miles north of the accident site. At 1053, an aviation routine weather report (METAR) at Healy River, reported: wind variable at 3 knots, visibility, 6 statute miles in haze, few clouds at 4,700 feet, broken clouds at 7,000 feet, broken clouds at 8,500 feet, temperature, 70 degrees F; dew point 55 degrees F; altimeter, 30.03 inHG.
The FAA maintained weather cameras at Summit, approximately 6 miles northeast of the accident site. The Summit camera recorded images to the northwest, northeast, southeast and southwest. The midpoint for the field-of-view arc for the northwest camera was 320 degrees (true), northeast was 039 degrees, southeast was 149 degrees, and 221 degrees for the southwest camera; the site elevation was 2,398 feet msl.
A reference picture for the southwest camera noted the parks highway at less than 1 statute mile from the camera. A review of the images recorded about the time of the accident indicated low ceilings and visibilities in all directions, with the lowest visibilities, and what appeared to be a patchy low level ground obscuration, captured on the southwest and northwest cameras.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The NTSB IIC, along with two Federal Aviation Administration safety inspectors from the Anchorage Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), and two Alaska State Troopers reached the accident site on the afternoon of June 28.
All of the airplane's major components were found at the main wreckage site. The accident site was located in an area of brush, and tundra-covered terrain with sparsely populated spruce trees at an elevation of approximately 2,370 feet msl. Portions of the burned and fragmented airplane were scattered along a debris path oriented along a magnetic heading of 345 degrees, which measured about 726 feet in length.
An area believed to be the initial impact point was marked by a broken tree top, atop a 25 foot tall spruce tree. The initial ground scar was discernable by disturbed and burned tundra, with broken and cut brush. A broken red navigation light lens, along with small wreckage fragments was found near the initial ground scar. The distance between the initial impact point and the initial ground scar was about 70 feet.
The cockpit and fuselage were located at the main wreckage site and were extensively damage by postcrash fire.
The left wing separated from the fuselage and was fragmented.
The right wing separated from the fuselage, was fragmented and suffered extensive thermal damage.
Both engine assemblies separated from their respective engine firewalls, and sustained impact damage to the front and underside. Numerous exhaust tubes were found in the debris path with scorched and burned tundra underneath and around the exhaust tubes.
Both propeller assemblies separated from their respective engine crankshafts. All of the six propeller blades exhibited substantial bending and torsional "S" twisting. Three of the propeller blades exhibited leading edge gouging, with one of the propeller tips separating from the blade.
The airplane's main landing gear was in the retracted position.
On November 19-20, 20...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ANC13FA058