Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) inadequate procedures, which did not require specific separation between aircraft operating on nonintersecting runways where flightpaths may intersect and led to an airborne conflict between two aircraft. Contributing to the incident was the FAA's failure to correct a known procedural deficiency that had previously caused repeated hazardous intersecting flightpath events.
Aircraft Information
Analysis
On July 4, 2013, at 1712 Pacific daylight time, an airborne conflict occurred at McCarran International Airport, Las Vegas, Nevada (LAS), between Southwest Airlines flight 1196 (SWA1196) and N426QS, a Gulfstream 4 business jet. SWA1196 was executing a go-around maneuver following a visual approach to runway 25L under control of the LAS LC1 controller, and N426QS had just departed from runway 19R under control of the LAS LC2 controller.
The radar approach controller cleared SWA1196 for a visual approach to Runway 25L and instructed the pilot to contact Las Vegas Tower at 1708:14. SWA1196 turned on to the final approach course about 6 miles from the airport, but did not contact the LC1 controller until 1711:53. At that time, the aircraft was over the runway and passing taxiway A3. The pilot announced his intention to go around because the aircraft was encountering a 20 knot tailwind. The LC1 controller acknowledged the report, immediately advised the pilot of traffic "just lifting off" from runway 19R, and instructed the pilot to report the traffic in sight. At 1712:09, the LC1 controller instructed SWA1196 to fly runway heading and climb to 7,000 feet. The pilot read back the clearance and reported the traffic in sight. The controller told the pilot to maintain visual separation from the traffic. At 1712:29, the LC1 controller called the radar approach controller to coordinate the go-around, stating that SWA1196 would be climbing to 7,000 feet and had N426QS in sight. SWA1196 subsequently completed another approach and landed.
The LC2 controller cleared N426QS for takeoff from runway 19R at 1710:59, and the pilot acknowledged the clearance. At 1712:06, the LC2 controller issued a traffic alert to N426QS, stating, "…traffic alert, Boeing 737 off your left going around off 25, stay low." The pilot responded, "all right sir we're looking for him 426QS have him in sight." At 1712:17, the LC2 controller transmitted, "Gulfstream 6QS roger maintain visual separation, he's climbing to 7,000, stay low." The pilot responded, "'k we'll stay low thank you." At 1712:32, the pilot of N426QS transmitted, "and we're getting an RA we're climbing at this time 426QS." The controller replied, "…roger traffic no factor, well behind and lower than you." The controller then instructed the pilot to contact departure control.
The pilot of SWA1196 subsequently contacted the tower supervisor via telephone to discuss the handling of the go-around, expressing concern about the apparent lack of urgency on the part of the LC1 controller and the need for clearer instructions to resolve the conflict.
Preliminary review of FAA radar data showed that the minumum separation between the two aircraft was about 0.21 nautical miles laterally and 400 to 500 feet vertically.
For further information see the air traffic control group chairman's report in the docket for this case.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# OPS13IA071