Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
Failure of the pilots of the Pitts airplane to maneuver the airplane as necessary to observe the taxi route and avoid the Cessna airplane ahead. Contributing to the accident was the local controller's failure to provide the required warning of traffic ahead to the pilots of the Pitts airplane when clearing the Pitts to taxi.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn October 20, 2013, about 1359 Pacific daylight time, a Pitts/Aviat S2C, N15TA, substantially damaged a Cessna 172S, N698SP, when it taxied into the Cessna at Livermore Municipal airport (LVK), Livermore, California, after receiving taxi clearance from the air traffic control tower. The Pitts was owned and operated by Attitude Aviation of LVK, while the Cessna was operated by West Valley Flying Club (WVFC) of Palo Alto, California. None of the two persons on board either airplane was injured. Both flights were conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed.
According to the certificated flight instructor (CFI) in the right front seat of the Cessna, he was providing a flight checkout for the private pilot in the left seat. Their flight originated from Palo Alto Airport of Santa Clara County (PAO), and they had landed uneventfully on LVK runway 25L. They exited 25L to the south at taxiway G, and then radioed LVK ground control (GC) for taxi clearance. Although GC was contacted by and responded to other aircraft subsequent to that request, GC did not respond to the Cessna crew. About 1 minute and 15 seconds later, having not received a response from GC, the Cessna crew initiated another radio call. During that transmission they heard "a lot of noise" coming from the rear of their airplane, and realized that their airplane had been struck in the empennage by the propeller of another airplane.
According to the CFI in the front seat of the Pitts, he was providing aerobatic instruction to the pilot in the rear seat. They landed uneventfully on 25R, and exited 25R to the south at taxiway G. In accordance with the local controller's (LC) instruction, the Pitts crew stopped between runways 25R and 25L, and radioed LVK GC for clearance to cross 25L. The two pilots in the Pitts watched an unspecified experimental airplane land on 25L, and saw that airplane stop and exit 25L to the south at a taxiway east of their position. LVK GC then cleared the Pitts across 25L, but the controller did not advise them of the Cessna that was holding just south of 25L on taxiway G. The Pitts taxied across 25L. Due to the tailwheel configuration and limited forward visibility of the Pitts, neither pilot in the Pitts was aware of the presence of the Cessna until their propeller struck the empennage of the Cessna.
After their airplane was struck by the Pitts, the Cessna pilots requested and received GC clearance to taxi to the ramp, which they did. The Pitts shut down in place, and the pilots exited the airplane. After some preliminary scene documentation, the Pitts was relocated clear of the traffic movement area. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONCessna Crew
The instructor held commercial and CFI certificates, including an airplane single engine instructor rating. He had approximately 965 total hours of flight experience, including about 50 hours in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was completed in June 2013, and his most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in July 2011.
The pilot under instruction held a private pilot certificate, with an airplane single-engine land rating. He had approximately 141 total hours of flight experience, including about 2 hours in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was completed in August 2013, and his most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in May 2012.
Pitts Crew
The instructor held multiple certificates and ratings, including flight instructor. He had approximately 10,500 total hours of flight experience, including about 700 hours in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was completed in September 2013, and his most recent FAA medical certificate was also issued in September 2013.
The pilot under instruction held a private pilot certificate, with an airplane single-engine land rating. He had approximately 701 total hours of flight experience, including about 63 hours in the accident airplane make and model. His most recent flight review was completed in March 2013, and his most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued in February 2013.
Pitts Crew Statements
The pilot receiving instruction taxied the Pitts across 25L. In his written statement regarding the accident, he reported that he looked both east and west for landing or departing traffic, and "looked in front but wasn't looking for an airplane." He reported that he angled slightly to his right, and that his attention was primarily focused on navigating the airplane into the limited confines of its cleared location.
The instructor also reported that the pilot angled the airplane to the right near the end of its crossing of 25L, and at first believed that the pilot was executing a clearing S-turn. The instructor believed that there was insufficient lateral pavement clearance for that maneuver, and advised the pilot to "move left," which the pilot did. The instructor then focused his attention to his right side, to monitor the pavement edge. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONCessna (N698SP)
The Cessna was manufactured in 2000, and was equipped with a Lycoming IO-360 series engine. The airplane was a four-place high wing configuration, with tricycle-style landing gear.
Pitts (N15TA)
The Pitts was manufactured in 2001, and was equipped with a Lycoming AEIO-540 series engine. The airplane was a two-place, tandem cockpit, biplane configuration, with conventional-style landing gear. The configuration of this airplane limited the forward visibility of the flight crew when the airplane was in the taxi attitude. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe LVK 1353 automated weather observation included wind from 240 degrees at 4 knots, visibility 10 miles, clear skies, temperature 29 degrees C, dew point 1 degree C, and an altimeter setting of 29.93 inches of mercury.
At the time of the accident, the sun was at an azimuth of 201.76 degrees True, and an elevation of 39.13 degrees. Both the sun and the accident location were generally south of the ATCT, separated by about 35 degrees of azimuth; the accident site was to the controllers' right of the sun. AIRPORT INFORMATIONCessna (N698SP)
The Cessna was manufactured in 2000, and was equipped with a Lycoming IO-360 series engine. The airplane was a four-place high wing configuration, with tricycle-style landing gear.
Pitts (N15TA)
The Pitts was manufactured in 2001, and was equipped with a Lycoming AEIO-540 series engine. The airplane was a two-place, tandem cockpit, biplane configuration, with conventional-style landing gear. The configuration of this airplane limited the forward visibility of the flight crew when the airplane was in the taxi attitude. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe collision occurred immediately south of the holding position marking on taxiway G, south of runway 25L. Both airplanes were on the taxiway centerline, facing south, and the Pitts taxied directly into the empennage of the Cessna. The propeller of the Pitts made multiple contacts and cuts in the Cessna's rudder, fin, elevator, and horizontal stabilizer, which resulted in substantial damage to the Cessna. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONFAA Guidance to Pilots re Taxiing at Tower-Controlled Airports
Relevant FAA guidance regarding the responsibility of the Pitts crew to avoid the collision was contained in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). Section 4-3-18 ("Taxiing"), paragraph b, stated that "clearances or instructions pertaining to taxiing are predicated on known traffic and known physical airport conditions. .... Although an ATC clearance is issued for taxiing purposes, when operating in accordance with the CFRs, it is the responsibility of the pilot to avoid collision with other aircraft."
FAA System Service Review (SSR)
On November 12, 2013, the FAA conducted a formal System Service Review (SSR) of the ATCT, and identified "many lapses in overall performance," including:
- While scanning was conducted by Local Control, discussion with Ground Control did not occur to determine the intentions of the Cessna on taxiway Golf prior to issuing instructions for the Pitts to cross runway 25L on taxiway Golf.
- The CPC-IT did not scan the entire movement area and did not observe N698SP on taxiway Golf or Pitts N15TA holding between the runways on taxiway Golf.
- Crew Resource Management [between local control and ground control] was not employed properly. .
- Traffic was not issued in accordance with JO 7110.65, paragraph 3-1-6.
- Ground control traffic volume was greater than the CPC-IT's ability
- Use of tower team resources: assistance was not requested from the CIC to record and broadcast the ATIS. In addition, actions should have been taken to assist Ground Control.
- The OJTI or CIC did not take proactive steps when the CPC-IT fell behind.
- The Accident Checklist was not followed nor were required accident forms completed.
- During a brief period leading up to the accident, the tower team situational awareness was not maintained.
The SSR concluded that "In summary, team breakdowns in communication and coordination were identified as primary reasons for the accident" but "determined that this was an isolated event. There were no other known situations or records where a tail-dragger and another fixed-wing aircraft collided with one another on the movement area."
The FAA citation of "an isolated event" refers specifically to the collision, and not the conditions and circumstances that led to the collision. The Pitts instructor reported that nine days after that accident, while instructing in another taildragger at LVK, the accident circumstances were essentially duplicated; his airplane was cleared to cross a runway when there was another airplane in their path on the opposite side of the runway. Although the instructor's pilot accepted the clearance, the instructor over-rode him, and likely prevented a collision. ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR14LA025