N840V

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn February 3, 2014, about 1655 central standard time, a Gulfstream Commander 690C, N840V, operated by a private pilot, was destroyed when it impacted the ground near Bellevue, Tennessee, while on approach to the John C. Tune Airport (JWN), Nashville, Tennessee. The private pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed for the flight that departed Great Bend Municipal Airport (GBD), Great Bend, Kansas. The personal flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

According to information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the airplane was based at GBD. On the date of the accident, the pilot flew the airplane from the Clarence E. Page Municipal Airport (RCE), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, where it had been undergoing maintenance, which included a 150-hour periodic inspection, to GBD. The pilot and three passengers then departed for JWN about 1445, and planned to attend a convention and trade show that was being held in the Nashville area.

The flight progressed toward Nashville and the pilot was cleared for a GPS (RNAV) approach to runway 2 at JWN, about 1628. At 1629:27, the pilot stated, "I'd like to climb and uh review the approach and uh do it again."

At 1629:28, the pilot was directed to maintain 3,000 feet and turn right to a heading of 020 degrees. The pilot acknowledged the clearance correctly; however, turned to a heading of 200 degrees. The controller reported that she did not correct the pilot because the incorrect heading did not create a conflict with any other traffic.

About 1631, the pilot stated "you can directed me back…" and reported that he had the initial approach fix (IAF) for the approach "…on my system." The pilot was subsequently provided a clearance for the GPS runway 2 approach.

At 1637, the controller asked the pilot if he was established on the approach and the pilot responded that he was. The controller then advised the pilot that the airplane was about 1/2 mile east of the final approach course, and the pilot replied, "That's correct I'm a little east of course."

At 1642, the pilot reported that he was executing a missed approach. About 1653, the pilot was cleared for a third GPS approach to runway 2 at JWN.

At 1655:37, the controller informed the pilot that radar services were terminated, instructed him to report cancellation of IFR in the air or on the ground, and advised him that traffic was ten miles in trail. The pilot did not respond, and there were no further transmissions received from the pilot.

According to radar data, during the accident approach, the airplane was on the final approach course when it veered to the left and began a descent. The airplane had turned to a heading of about 210 degrees before radar contact was lost.

The airplane impacted trees and a field adjacent to a building, about 9 miles south of JWN. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, age 62, held a private pilot certificate, with ratings for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, and instrument airplane. The pilot's logbook was not located. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on February 23, 2012. At that time, he reported a total flight experience of 3,000 hours, which included 30 hours during the previous 6 months.

According to training records, the pilot successfully completed a turbo commander 690 recurrent course during May 2013. At that time, the pilot reported 3,205 hours of total flight experience, which included 1,392 hours in multiengine airplanes, and 436 hours of instrument flight experience. In addition, he reported 719 hours flown in the accident airplane, and 20 hours flown during the previous 12 months. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe pilot was the President of an agricultural company that purchased the airplane on August 29, 2000.

The high wing, all-metal, pressurized airplane, serial number 11727, was manufactured in 1982. It was powered by two Executive Wings Inc. supplemental type certificate modified Garrett TPE331-5-511K, 715-horsepower engines, equipped with Hartzell three-bladed constant speed propeller assemblies.

According to maintenance records, the airplane's most recent inspection was a 150-hour periodic inspection, which was performed on February 1, 2014. At the time of the accident, the airframe and both engines had been operated for about 4,460 total hours since new. The airplane had been operated for about 70 hours during the 13 months that preceded the accident.

According to the pilot operating handbook, the airplane was equipped with deicing and anti-icing systems. The deice system included the wing and empennage deice boots and the propeller deice system. The function of the deice systems was to eliminate ice after it accumulated. The anti-icing system included heated stall warning, rudder horn anti-ice, rudder tab anti-ice, generator inlet anti-ice, electrically heated wind shield, and pitot-static heaters. The anti-icing systems were designed to prevent ice accumulation and should be placed in operation prior to entering flight conditions conducive to the formation of ice. Engine inlet heaters utilized hot engine compressor bleed air to prevent icing. The ice protection systems were controlled by switches in the "ICE PROTECTION" group of the cockpit overhead switch panel.

The following warning was included under the Engine Inlet Anti-Ice Systems:

"Warning: When icing conditions may be encountered, do not delay operation of the engine inlet heat systems. Turn the systems on before any ice accumulates. Engine inlet heat must be on if icing conditions exist or are anticipated."

The airplane was also equipped with a Negative Torque Sensing (NTS) system which was designed to reduce drag caused by a wind milling propeller in the event of a loss of engine power by moving the blades toward the feathered position to reduce drag and yaw.

Honeywell Operating Information Letter OI331-11R11, issued on September 16, 2013, emphasized proper use of engine inlet anti-ice and provided additional information on the use of engine ignition in icing conditions. The operating letter stated in part, that engine inlet anti-ice should be used during all flight in potential icing conditions and icing conditions should be considered to exist when flying in precipitation or visible moisture (including clouds or fog) with an outside air temperature 10 degrees Celsius or 50 degrees Fahrenheit (F), or colder. In addition, "If the use of anti-ice is inadvertently delayed after encountering icing conditioning, ice may accumulate on engine and airframe inlet surfaces. In such instances, subsequent application of engine inlet anti-ice can cause ice shedding and ingestion, which may cause flameout…." METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONA weather observation taken at JWN, which was located 9 miles north-northeast of the accident site, at an elevation of 495 feet, at 1655, reported wind from 360 degrees at 5 knots; visibility 5 statute miles; overcast ceiling at 800 feet; temperature 41 degrees F; dew point 25 degrees F; altimeter 30.29 inches of mercury.

AIRMET Sierra issued at 1445, was valid at the time of the accident, and forecasted IFR conditions around the accident site with ceilings below 1,000 feet and visibilities below 3 miles. There were no AIRMETS for icing conditions valid at the time of the accident. The pilot received standard and abbreviated weather briefings from Lockheed Martin Flight Service. The last weather briefing requested by the pilot was at 1538, and included three pilot reports (PIREPs) for icing conditions in the Nashville area that were applicable to the pilot's flight.

The National Weather Service (NWS) surface analysis chart around the time of the accident depicted a frontal system located across the southeastern United States with a surface trough in the vicinity of the accident site. Station models around the accident site depicted air temperatures in the mid-20's to mid-30's F, with temperature-dew point spreads of 3 degrees F or less, a north to northeast wind less than 10 knots, cloudy skies, and fog.

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 13 (GOES-13) data indicated abundant cloud cover over the accident site with approximate cloud-top heights of 19,500 feet around the time of the accident.

A review of pilot weather reports (PIREPs) that were publicly available in the National Airspace System (NAS) for the vicinity of the accident site revealed that, from about 3 hours before the accident to about the time of the accident, there were seven PIREPs that contained icing information that ranged from trace rime to a light to moderate mixed icing, with the reported icing conditions only occurring between 2,000 and 3,500 feet.

Review of Current Icing Potential (CIP) images produced by the NWS Aviation Weather Center depicted light to moderate icing was likely at 2,000 to 3,000 feet around the time of the accident. It was noted that CIP data was intended to be supplemental to other icing advisories (e.g. AIRMETS and SIGMETS).

A witness driving around areas south and southwest of the Nashville between 1400 and 1730 reported that he noticed ice on some street signs and noted the vehicle outside temperature senor indicated 34 degrees F.

A review of recorded audio information from the Nashville terminal radar approach control (TRACON) revealed that, from about 90 to 55 minutes before the accident, the radar west controller received seven verbal PIREPs, six of which included icing information that ranged from negative icing to clear ice. None of these PIREPs were communicated to the radar west controller (who was handling the accident flight), and none were distributed publicly in the NAS. The recordings also revealed that, about the time of the accident, the Nashville tower controller received two PIREPs of moderate rime ice, and the tower cont...