Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot's inadequate flare during the termination of a practice 180-degree autorotation and the flight instructor's delayed remedial action, which resulted in the tail rotor contacting the ground.
Aircraft Information
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On February 3, 2014, about 1350 eastern standard time, a Hughes 369D, N8618F, operated by the Collier Mosquito Control District (CMCD), was substantially damaged during a practice 180 degree autorotation to touchdown at Naples Municipal Airport (APF), Naples, Florida. The flight instructor and airline transport pilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the local public use training flight.
According to the flight instructor, prior to the last practice "fulldown" autorotation, they had performed two running landings, two stuck left pedal maneuvers, three stuck right pedal maneuvers, and eight successful autorotations. Just like the previous eight, the helicopter responded the same during the flare but this time it suddenly lost altitude and contacted the ground. The instructor "quickly grabbed" the controls and landed the helicopter which had yawed 90 degrees to the right. The airline transport pilot then asked him what happened.
According to the airplane transport pilot (ATP), he was undergoing annual proficiency training, and after completing the simulated stuck pedal maneuvers, and run on landings, four straight in touchdown autorotations were performed, followed by 180 degree autorotations to touchdown. Two were performed successfully but, on the third one, the tail of the helicopter contacted the ground. The ATP believed that the entry to the maneuver was normal and that during the turn to achieve the rollout prior to touchdown that the helicopter was level and was "essentially" into the wind, at most 10 to 15 degrees left of the nose and landing direction. He was at the target speed of approximately 60 knots indicated airspeed, and the rotor rpm was in the "mid-green arc." The flare was initiated about 50 feet above ground level (agl) to arrest the forward motion as he had done on the previous autorotations but, at some point during the flare he felt a "bump." The procedure was continued per the profile with the forward motion having been arrested, the helicopter was leveled off and a "pitch pull" was initiated, resulting in a "normal" touchdown with little forward motion, coming to rest turned to the right from its flight path by approximately 60 degrees.
According to a witness, who was watching the helicopter doing autorotations, he "took interest" in this particular approach as the helicopter seemed to be "falling a little more rapidly and aggressively" then during the previous autorotations. At approximately 100 feet agl, he then observed the helicopter "nose up aggressively," the tail strike the ground, dirt being thrown upwards on to the top of the helicopter, and then the helicopter come to rest with the main rotor still turning.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the flight instructor held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument- helicopter. A flight instructor certificate with ratings for rotorcraft-helicopter and instrument-helicopter, and an instrument ground instructor certificate. His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on July 1, 2013. He reported that he had accrued 5,465 total hours of rotorcraft flight experience, 1,549 hours of which were in the accident helicopter make and model. He also reported that 3,884 of his total hours were as a flight instructor, and that 1,083 of those hours spent as an instructor in the accident helicopter make and model.
According to FAA and pilot records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with ratings for airplane multi-engine land, commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land, and rotorcraft-helicopter. He also held a flight instructor certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine. His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on January 29, 2014. He reported that he had accrued 4,935.3 total hours of flight experience, 1061.5 of which were in the accident helicopter make and model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
The accident aircraft was a light, single engine utility helicopter manufactured By Hughes Aircraft Corporation in 1977. It was powered by a 420 shaft horsepower, Allison 250-C20B gas turbine engine, and was constructed primarily of aluminum alloy. The main rotor was a fully articulated five-bladed system, with anti-torque provided by a 2-bladed semi-rigid type tail rotor. Power from the turboshaft engine was transmitted through the main drive shaft to the main rotor transmission and from the main transmission through a drive shaft to the tail rotor. An overrunning (one-way) clutch, placed between the engine and main rotor transmission permitted free-wheeling of the rotor system during autorotation.
The airframe structure was egg-shaped and incorporated a rigid, three-dimensional truss type structure which increased occupant safety by means of its roll bar design. The airframe structure was designed to be energy absorbing and would fail progressively in the event of impact.
The fuselage was a semi-monocoque structure that was divided into four main sections. The forward section was comprised of a pilot compartment equipped with 2 seats. Directly aft of the pilot compartment, separated by a bulkhead, a passenger/cargo compartment was in the center of the helicopter. It contained provisions for installation of a bench or individual folding type seats for two passengers. It normally contained components for a spray kit for mosquito control operations but, at the time of the accident, it had been removed for the training flights. The aft section included the structure for the tailboom attachment and engine compartment. The lower section was divided by the center beam and housed the two fuel cells. Provisions for the attachment of a cargo hook were located on the bottom of the fuselage in line with the center beam.
The tailboom was a monocoque structure of aluminum alloy frames and skin. The tailboom was the supporting attachment structure for the stabilizers, tail rotor transmission and tail rotor. The tailboom also housed the tail rotor transmission drive shaft.
The landing gear was a skid-type attached to the fuselage at 12 points and was not retractable. Aerodynamic fairings covered the struts. Nitrogen charged landing gear dampers acted as springs and shock absorbers to cushion landings and provide ground resonance stability. The skid tubes were equipped with skid shoes, and provisions for ground handling wheels were incorporated on the skid tubes.
According to maintenance records, the helicopter's most recent annual inspection was completed on December 4, 2013. At the time of the inspection, the helicopter had accrued approximately 3344.6 total hours of operation.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The reported weather at APF at 1253 about 57 minutes before the accident, included: winds 220 degrees at 12 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 2,400 feet, broken clouds at 5,500 feet, temperature 28 degrees C, dew point 22 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.05 inches of mercury.
The reported weather at APF, at 1353, about 3 minutes after the accident, included: winds 220 degrees at 12 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 2,500 feet, temperature 28 degrees C, dew point 21 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.05 inches of mercury.
AIRPORT INFORMATION
Naples Municipal Airport was a tower controlled public use airport, located 2 miles northeast of Naples, Florida. The airport elevation was 8 feet above mean sea level and there were two paved runways oriented in a 05/23, and 14/32 configuration.
There was also a turf runway located off the side of runway 05/23, which was oriented in a southwest northeast orientation, and paralleled runway 5/23. Total length of the turf runway was 1,850 long and 100 feet wide.
Two areas at APF could be used for practice autorotations, a hard surfaced taxiway, and the turf runway. At the time of the accident, due to traffic, the turf runway was in use.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
Examination of the helicopter revealed that the tail rotor blades exhibited impact damage and were twisted and bent. The tail rotor driveshaft was also twisted and bent, the horizontal stabilizer was bent, the forward and aft tail rotor drive shaft couplings were damaged, the tail rotor driveshaft dampener was distorted, and the tail rotor output shaft on the transmission was bent.
TESTS AND RESEARCH
Previous Training Accident
Review of NTSB records indicated that N8618F had been involved in a previous accident under similar circumstances (NTSB Case No. ERA10LA172), when on March 11, 2010, it had been substantially damaged following a landing at APF. The certificated commercial pilot and airline transport pilot-rated check pilot that both employed by CMCD, were not injured.
The purpose of the flight was also to complete a yearly check ride, which included all basic flight maneuvers and autorotations to landing. On the third autorotation, after touch-down, the pilot heard a "thud" and "no longer had use of the anti-torque pedals." The check pilot visually observed damage to the tail section. The helicopter was shut down and both pilots exited normally.
At the time of the accident, The weather was also similar with the APF automated weather observation, reporting winds from 130 degrees at 12 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, overcast clouds at 1,500 feet, temperature 22 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 20 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 29.83 inches of mercury.
The pilot noted that the accident could have been prevented if the cyclic was "forward to neutral on and after touchdown." And recommended in a written statement that they train in weather conditions that included light winds and minimal gust factor and to use power recovery to prevent excessive main rotor blade flapping.
As a result of this accident, CMCD began contracting with outside...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA14TA113