N113UW

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On March 13, 2014, about 1830 eastern standard time, US Airways flight 1702, an Airbus A320, N113UW, experienced substantial damage after the captain rejected the takeoff after rotation on runway 27L at Philadelphia International Airport, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The airplane came to rest on the edge of the runway, and the crew and passengers exited via the emergency slides. Of the 149 passengers, 2 pilots, and 3 flight attendants on board, 2 passengers reported minor injuries related to the evacuation. The airplane was substantially damaged. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from PHL to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time.

The accident occurred on the third flight of the day for the flight crew. The first two flights from Charlotte International Airport (CLT) to Tampa International Airport (TPA), then to PHL, were uneventful. The inbound flight to PHL arrived on schedule at 1649, and the accident crew changed gates and airplanes for the scheduled 1750 departure to FLL.

According to crew interviews, upon arrival at the accident airplane, the first officer, who was the pilot monitoring (PM), prepared the cockpit while the captain spoke with the dispatcher. The first officer initialized the flight management computer (FMC) with the air traffic control (ATC)-provided flight plan and manually entered the departure runway into the FMC. The ATC route clearance verification procedure is defined in the US Airways standard operating procedures (SOPs) and is performed for every flight. Both pilots stated during postaccident interviews that they verified the ATC routing loaded into the FMC while still at the gate before pushback; however, neither pilot realized that the departure runway loaded into the FMC was runway 27R instead of the assigned runway 27L.

Flight 1702 pushed back from gate B8 about 1752, and the taxi out was normal. The weather reported at 1754 was clear skies and 10 statute miles visibility, temperature 0°C, dewpoint -21°C, and winds from 290° at 18 knots with gusts to 28 knots (peak winds at 1713 were recorded from 300° and 33 knots). Automatic terminal information service information "Yankee" called for runway 27L as the departure runway. Flight 1702 had been given an expect departure clearance time of 1829, and the captain decided to conduct a single-engine taxi.

At 1754:33, flight 1702 received the final weight and balance information for the flight via the aircraft communication addressing and reporting system, and according to the first officer interview, she loaded the weight and balance information into the FMC via uplink. She could not remember if she uplinked the takeoff data or manually entered the V-speeds and FLEX (a reduced takeoff thrust setting) temperature information into the multipurpose control display unit (MCDU).

At 1808:20, flight 1702 contacted ground control for taxi instructions; the ATC ground controller advised that the departure runway was 27L and provided taxi instructions to runway 27L. At 1819:29 the tower controller advised the flight crew that they were number six for departure from runway 27L. At 1820:29, the crew started the second engine then conducted a flight control check. At 1821:22, the tower controller advised that flight 1702 would be next for departure, and the flight crew acknowledged their sequence 4 seconds later. The first officer started to read the remainder of the Taxi checklist when she got a call from a flight attendant advising that a passenger was in the bathroom. The flight attendant then told her the passenger was returning to their seat, and the first officer stated that she continued the checklist as the captain was taxiing toward runway 27L.

At 1822:35, flight 1702 was cleared to line up and wait on runway 27L. The first officer accomplished the remainder of the Taxi checklist. As the captain taxied onto runway 27L, he noticed that runway 27R had been inserted into the FMC instead of runway 27L and requested that the first officer change the runway in the FMC, which was completed at 1823:10.

At 1823:26, flight 1702 was given a heading of 230 degrees on departure and a clearance for takeoff. Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicate that the airplane had a ground speed of 0 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) for about 11 seconds before accelerating for takeoff. At 1823:34, the throttle levers initially advanced to the MAX CLIMB level and the captain's longitudinal control was moved to the airplane nose down (AND) direction at 1823:41. The throttles were advanced further to the FLEX detent by 1823:43, with the airplane moving about 46 KIAS. According to crew interviews and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, when the captain set the thrust levers in the FLEX detent at 1823:45, the crew received an electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) message and chime at 1823:47 indicating that the thrust was not set. In response, the first officer stated "engine thrust levers not set." FDR data indicate the thrust levers were briefly reduced to the climb detent then returned to the FLEX detent about 1 second later. The captain responded "they're set" 3 seconds later.

According to FDR and CVR data, the first officer did not make a required callout as the airplane's speed reached 80 KIAS. According to flight crew interviews, the captain and first officer noticed that there were no V-speeds indicated on their primary flight displays (PFDs), and FDR and CVR data show that as the airplane accelerated through 86 KIAS as an aural RETARD alert sounded in the cockpit. According to the CVR, at 1823:56, the captain asked the first officer "what did you do, you didn't load. We lost everything." At 1824:03, as the airplane continued to accelerate through 143 KIAS, the captain stated "we'll get that straight when we get airborne" and continued the takeoff roll.

The airplane continued to accelerate over the next several seconds, reaching 152 KIAS at 1824:08. At 1824:09, the first officer stated "wh*. I'm sorry", the captain's longitudinal control was brought into the airplane nose up (ANU) direction, and the pitch of the airplane began to increase as the longitudinal control was brought up to 6.9 degrees ANU over the next second as the airplane began initial rotation for takeoff. The airspeed at this point was 164 KIAS, and the nose gear weight on wheels discrete changed to "air" by 1824:10.

Over the next 4 seconds, with the nose gear discrete reading "air" and the main landing gear discrete reading "ground" the captain's longitudinal control was pushed into the airplane nose down (AND) direction, and then pulled back in the ANU direction two times, reaching the maximum of 16 degrees in the ANU direction, and a minimum of 16 degrees AND during the cyclic input. The pitch of the airplane, and vertical acceleration followed the variations in longitudinal inputs. As the vertical acceleration decreased in response to the nose down input, the flight crew reduced the thrust levers, and the captain's longitudinal control was pulled again in the ANU direction. The vertical acceleration reached a minimum of 0.121 G as the control was pulled to 16 degrees ANU, the maximum operational value, and the engine throttle lever angles were reduced to idle thrust where they remained for the rest of the recording.

By 1824:14, the nose gear weight on wheels discrete parameter changed back to "ground." During the previous 4 seconds, when the nose parameter recorded "air," the main landing gear (both left and right) weight on wheels parameter had recorded "ground," and the maximum radio altitude recorded was 6 feet above ground level (agl), which occurred for only 1 second. Once the pitch reduced to -0.4 degree, the vertical acceleration rapidly increased to 3.7 G, consistent with the gear impacting the runway surface. The pitch parameter was not valid for the rest of the FDR recording. As the vertical acceleration reached its maximum value, the captain's longitudinal input reached a maximum of 16 degrees ANU.

The captain's longitudinal control cycled in the nose up and nose down directions over the next 2 seconds. During this variation, the vertical acceleration dropped to 0.47 G, then increased to 1.2 G. As the longitudinal stick was pulled back to over 16 degrees ANU and held at the maximum value, the main landing gear weight on wheel parameters changed to "air" for the next 2 seconds, and the radio altitude began to increase to about 15 ft agl.

As the airplane reached 15 ft agl, the longitudinal control moved back to the AND position, and pitch of the airplane again reduced and the airplane began to descend back to the runway surface. The stick was moved again in the ANU direction as the airplane began to descend and, correspondingly, the airplane pitch increased again. Surveillance video obtained from the Philadelphia Airport captured the final impact with the runway. The video shows the airplane impacted the runway first with the tail, then main landing gear, and the airplane then rotated in the AND direction, resulting in the nose gear impacting the runway and subsequently collapsing.

At 1824:48, the flight crew advised the tower that they aborted the takeoff as the airplane came to rest on the left side of runway 27L. At 1829:14, the flight crew advised the PHL tower that they were evacuating the airplane. The flight attendants stated all slides deployed normally, except door 2R, which was not deployed due to smoke on the right side of the airplane, and 2L, which did not reach the ground due to the nose gear collapse.

DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT

The airplane nose gear collapsed upon impact with the paved runway, resulting in fuselage and engine cowling damage. As a result of the tailstrike, additional damage occurred to the lower aft fuselage secti...