Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The flight instructor’s decision to conduct a night training flight in mountainous terrain without conducting or allowing the student to conduct appropriate preflight planning and his lack of situational awareness of the surrounding terrain altitude, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On November 8, 2014, about 1822 eastern standard time, a Cessna 172S, N2152T, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and the ground in the George Washington National Forest, near Hinton, Virginia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The certificated flight instructor (CFI) was fatally injured and the student pilot received serious injuries. The instructional flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The flight had departed from the Winchester Airport (OKV), Winchester, Virginia, after reportedly performing at least one touch and go landing maneuver and the intended destination was Ingalls Field Airport (HSP), Hot Springs, Virginia.
According to the student pilot, the flight was originally scheduled in a G-1000 equipped Cessna 172; however, the night before the accident flight that airplane was not available and the flight was scheduled in an instrument flight rules (IFR) equipped Cessna 172, which was the accident airplane. The CFI requested the student pilot to plan a flight from Frederick Municipal Airport (FDK), Frederick, Maryland, to OKV for pattern work, then to Charlottesville-Albemarle Airport (CHO), Charlottesville, Virginia, with a return to FDK.
On the day of the accident the student submitted the flight plan to the CFI who did not indicate any issue with or any change to the plan. The student pilot and CFI met at 1600 at FDK, at which time the CFI told the student there would be a destination change. Instead of going to CHO, the CFI changed the destination to HSP. The CFI did not require the student pilot to conduct any preflight planning specific to the new route.
The flight departed FDK about 1700. While enroute the CFI instructed the student to navigate to the Martinsburg VOR. After reaching the Martinsburg VOR the CFI gave the student a heading toward OKV where "stop and go" landings were performed. After conducting several landings at OKV the CFI, assigned the student a heading of 240 degrees and an altitude of 3,000 feet mean sea level (msl).
The student reported that while enroute he queried the CFI about terrain elevation in the area to which the CFI replied that he did not know the specific terrain elevation because "the aircraft did not have the G-1000." The student pilot further reported there were no aeronautical charts "out for immediate reference." About 68 miles from their intended destination the CFI conducted a demonstration of the autopilot to which he established an "altitude hold at 3,000" feet. Various heading changes were demonstrated as well as a climb at 200 feet per minute and then a 500 foot per minute climb. The student pilot reported that just prior to the accident, he observed the airspeed decrease from their cruise airspeed of 120 knots to 90 knots, at which point the CFI applied full-power. Subsequently, the airplane impacted terrain. The student further reported that it was "pitch black outside" and that the engine responded "normally" to the full power application.
No flight plan had been filed, nor communication established with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Air Traffic Control prior to or during the flight.
PERSONNEL INFORMATION
Flight Instructor
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and flight school records, the CFI, age 49, held an airline transport pilot certificate issued August 5, 2010, with a rating for airplane single-engine land, multiengine land, helicopter, and a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine sea, airplane multiengine sea, and glider. He also held a flight instructor certificate for airplane single-engine, multiengine, and instrument, and glider. He held a first-class medical certificate, which was issued on December 19, 2013, and had a restriction of "must wear corrective lenses." According to a copy of his pilot logbook, the most recent recorded entry was dated October 28, 2014, at that time the pilot had 5,941.1 total flight hours with 1,182.2 hours as a flight instructor, and 410.7 total hours at night. His most recent flight review was conducted on October 9, 2014.
Student Pilot
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and student pilot's records, the student pilot, age 51, was issued a third-class medical certificate, which was also his student pilot certificate, on September 15, 2014. According to his pilot logbook, his first entry was dated August 20, 2014, and the most recent entry was dated October 27, 2014. At the time of the most recent logbook entry, the pilot had 23.8 total flight hours with 22.5 of those in the airplane accident make and model. It also indicated that the student pilot had not performed a solo flight and 4.5 total flight hours were conducted at night.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATION
According to FAA records, the airplane, serial number 172S9446, was issued an airworthiness certificate on July 30, 2003, and was registered to Victor Tango LLC on May 12, 2006. It was powered by a Lycoming IO-360-L2A engine, Serial number L-30073-51A, 180-hp engine. It was driven by a McCauley IA 170E propeller. The airplane's most recent phase III inspection was completed on September 11, 2014. At the time of the inspection the airplane's total time in service was 4,263.3 hours and a recorded tachometer of 1,284.7 hours. The engine was overhauled and reinstalled in the airplane on September 11, 2014, and its most recent logbook entry was dated October 7, 2014, was recorded as a 24-hour oil change. At the time of the entry the engine had accrued 4,001.6 hours total time in service, 23.1 flight hours since overhaul, and had a record tachometer time of 1,307.8 hours. The tachometer was located at the accident site and indicated 1,328.2 hours.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The 1815 recorded weather observation at Shenandoah Valley Regional Airport (SHD), Staunton/Waynesboro/Harrisonburg, Virginia, approximately 18 miles to the south, included wind from 190 degrees at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 8 degrees C, dew point minus 1 degrees C; barometric altimeter 29.93 inches of mercury.
Sun and Moon Data
According to the United States Naval Observatory, on the day of the accident sunset occurred at 1709 and the end of civil twilight occurred at 1736. Moon rise occurred at 1849 with 96% of the Moon's disc would have been illuminated.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION
The airplane impacted the side of a mountain approximately 3100 feet above msl, which was about 300 feet below the top of the ridgeline. The accident location was at 38°33.14 N and 079° 00.54 W. The debris path was oriented on a 212 degree (true) heading, began with impact to a row of trees approximately 100 feet northwest of the main wreckage, and started with a section of the right aileron located about 25 feet from the main wreckage, along the centerline. A log with a fresh cut of 45 degrees with some red paint transfer was located along the debris path. The left wingtip was located about 25 feet from the main wreckage, and about 20 feet to the right of centerline. A silver metallic groundscar, on a rock, the end of the debris path centerline and a broken section of one propeller blade was found 1 foot from the groundscar. The main wreckage was located about 20 feet downhill leaning against a tree in a near vertical attitude.
Nose Section
The nose section, including the cockpit, exhibited impact crushing and the engine remained attached to the associated airframe attach points; however, both bottom mounts and the right upper mount were impact damaged. The engine remained attached to the firewall, which remained attached to the airframe; however, the engine mounting structure was bent in the negative and aft direction and was in contact with the underside of the airplane. The propeller remained attached to the engine; however, one propeller blade was impact separated approximately mid span and located near the initial impact point. The propeller exhibited chordwise scratches and curling on the outboard section; however, the tip was impact separated and unable to be located at the accident site. The No. 1 and 3 top and bottom spark plugs were removed, appeared to be light gray in color, and were normal in wear exhibiting low in use time when compared with the Champion Check-A-Plug chart. Fluid was evident at the accident site and was visibly noted as dripping from the secured fuel cap on the left wing, the right wing was devoid of fuel; however, it had been breached due to impact damage. The fluid was similar in color and smell as 100LL aviation fuel.
Right Wing
The right wing exhibited impact crush damage, along the entire span. The flaps remained attached at their respective attach points and track rollers. The flap push rod remained attached to the bellcrank, which remained attached to the flap. The flap cable exhibited tensile overload similar in appearance to broomstrawing, however, cable continuity was confirmed with all exposed areas. The inboard section of the aileron remained attached and cable continuity was confirmed from the base of the control column through the associated fracture points out to the aileron. The outboard section of the aileron was located along the debris path and had been impact separated. The right wing's fuel caps remained attached, seated correctly, and locked in position; however, the right wing fuel tank was breached and devoid of fuel.
Tail Section
Rudder continuity was confirmed from just aft of the rudder pedals through the tail section to the rudder; however it could not be determined at the rudder pedals due to aft crush damage of the forward cockpit section. The tail was fractured about fuselage station 110. The tail section was leaning to the right side of the airplane and connected by the right side sheet metal skin. The rudder and elevator remained attached; however, continuity could not be confirmed to the elevator, due to bin...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA15FA046