Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The flight crew’s inadequate preflight inspection of the nose landing gear strut, which resulted in the nosewheel not being aligned during retraction and the subsequent loss of directional control. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the nose landing gear strut due to inadequate pressure and excessive wear.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 12, 2015, about 1144 eastern daylight time, a Gates Lear Jet 35, N80PG, call sign "Riptide 80", operated by Phoenix Air Group Inc. was substantially damaged during landing rollout, following a return to the airport after an unsafe nose landing gear indication at Newport News/Williamsburg International Airport (PHF), Newport News, Virginia. The airline transport certificated pilot and airline transport certificated copilot were not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an IFR flight plan had been filed for the public use flight contracted by the United States Navy, that departed PHF around 1115.
According to the flight crew, prior to departure at PHF, they preflighted the airplane and found everything to be normal including the nose gear strut and oleo gear extensions. On this flight the copilot was flying from the left seat and the pilot was flying from the right seat. They taxied to runway 25 and took off about 1115 without incident.
The flight crew started running the after-takeoff checklist and at "positive rate", the pilot moved the landing gear selector handle to the up position, and when he did, they felt and heard a loud "clank" come from the nose of the airplane. They also observed that the red unsafe nose gear light had illuminated. The flight crew then recycled the landing gear handle with the same result.
The flight crew elected to return to PHF because of the nose gear issue. They jettisoned fuel to get below maximum landing weight and then returned to the airport for landing. The pilot asked the air traffic controller in the control tower for permission to do a low approach to runway 20, and to visually inspect their nosewheel to make sure it was not in any other position than "straight." The flight crew then selected the landing gear handle to the down position and received three green landing gear down indications (everything normal) and completed the before landing checklist.
The flight crew executed a low approach for runway 20 and the air traffic controller advised that the nose landing gear appeared to be straight. The flight crew then kept the airplane in the landing configuration and entered a left downwind for runway 25.
During the landing, they touched down main wheels first, and held the nose off for as long as possible. Once the nose wheel touched down and weight was on the nose landing gear, the airplane suddenly turned sharply, 30° to 40° to the left. Both flight crewmembers then applied right rudder to counter the turn without effect. The airplane then partially traveled off the left side of the runway pavement and struck a concrete runway edge-light base, with its left main landing gear, turned about 180° from its original direction of travel, and came to rest on the left side of the runway, about 1,500ft from the end.
The pilot then instructed the copilot to open the main door to egress but the copilot was unable to get the door to open, so he removed the emergency exit window on the right rear side of the cabin. The pilot then completed the emergency evacuation procedures and egressed from the airplane after the copilot had egressed.
PERSONNEL INFORMATIONPilot
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and pilot records, the pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single, and multi-engine, and instrument airplane, as well as type ratings for the CL-65, G-159, LR-45, and LR-JET
His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on October 23, 2014. He reported that he had accrued 4,800 total hours of flight experience, 2,300 of which was in the accident airplane make and model.
Copilot
According to FAA and pilot records, the Copilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single-engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate with ratings for airplane single engine, and instrument airplane, as well as type ratings for the A-300, B-737, B-757, B-767, CE-500, DC-9, and LR-JET.
His most recent FAA first-class medical certificate was issued on November 24, 2014. He reported that he had accrued 22,542 total hours of flight experience, 1,867 of which was in the accident airplane make and model.
AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was a pressurized, turbofan powered, low wing monoplane, of conventional metal construction. The swept-back wings and tail surfaces were fully cantilevered. The wing was an 8-spar, wet wing design with large external fuel tanks at the tips. The spars were continuous from tip to tip (except for Spar 6 which only extended from the landing gear ribs outboard) with all loads transferred to the fuselage through four fittings on each side. It was a derivative of wings used on previous Learjet models, with the most noticeable differences being the wing tip extensions and internal modifications, incorporated to accommodate the increased gross weight of the Model 35.
It was powered by two aft fuselage mounted Garrett TFE 731-2-2B, twin spool, turbofan engines, each rated at 3,500 pounds of thrust. It was equipped with a fully retractable tricycle type landing gear with dual wheels, an anti-skid braking system, and a steerable nose wheel. Engine driven hydraulic pumps provided power for extending and retracting the landing gear, wing flaps, and spoilers. The ailerons, elevators, and rudder were manually controlled by utilizing conventional cables, bell cranks, pulleys, and push-pull tubes.
The airplane could be operated at speeds of up to .81 Mach and altitudes of up to 41,000 ft, and it had been modified from its original configuration by the installation of hardpoints under each wing, along with cabling which had been installed from inside the airplane's pressurized fuselage through the pressure vessel, and out to the hard points, enabling the airplane to carry external pods or other array.
According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976. Its restricted category special airworthiness certificate was issued on April 1, 1996. The airplane's most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was completed on January 18, 2015. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued about 11,850.5 total hours of operation.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe recorded weather at PHF, at 1154, approximately 10 minutes after the accident, included: winds 250 at 11 knots, 10 miles visibility, clear skies, temperature 31° C, dew point 21° C, and an altimeter setting of 30.02 inches of mercury.
AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was a pressurized, turbofan powered, low wing monoplane, of conventional metal construction. The swept-back wings and tail surfaces were fully cantilevered. The wing was an 8-spar, wet wing design with large external fuel tanks at the tips. The spars were continuous from tip to tip (except for Spar 6 which only extended from the landing gear ribs outboard) with all loads transferred to the fuselage through four fittings on each side. It was a derivative of wings used on previous Learjet models, with the most noticeable differences being the wing tip extensions and internal modifications, incorporated to accommodate the increased gross weight of the Model 35.
It was powered by two aft fuselage mounted Garrett TFE 731-2-2B, twin spool, turbofan engines, each rated at 3,500 pounds of thrust. It was equipped with a fully retractable tricycle type landing gear with dual wheels, an anti-skid braking system, and a steerable nose wheel. Engine driven hydraulic pumps provided power for extending and retracting the landing gear, wing flaps, and spoilers. The ailerons, elevators, and rudder were manually controlled by utilizing conventional cables, bell cranks, pulleys, and push-pull tubes.
The airplane could be operated at speeds of up to .81 Mach and altitudes of up to 41,000 ft, and it had been modified from its original configuration by the installation of hardpoints under each wing, along with cabling which had been installed from inside the airplane's pressurized fuselage through the pressure vessel, and out to the hard points, enabling the airplane to carry external pods or other array.
According to FAA and airplane maintenance records, the accident airplane was manufactured in 1976. Its restricted category special airworthiness certificate was issued on April 1, 1996. The airplane's most recent continuous airworthiness inspection was completed on January 18, 2015. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accrued about 11,850.5 total hours of operation.
WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the airplane revealed that the airplane's wing structure had been substantially damaged when the lower portion of the left main landing gear shock strut separated, the landing gear forward trunnion was torn out from its mounting location on Spar 5, and the actuator tore through the pillar in the wing structure, when the left main landing gear struck the concrete runway edge-light base. The right main landing gear then collapsed in the opposite direction of its normal direction of retraction (outward instead of inward). Further examination also revealed that the fuselage had been damaged in numerous areas along with the wing leading edges, and a mission pod which was mounted under the left wing, and both the left-wing and right-wing integral wet wing tanks had been punctured by the landing gear, resulting in a fuel spill of about 600 gallons.
Examination of the nose landing gear assembly revealed that it was fully intact, the nose wheel tire was intact, undamaged, and inflated, and though covered in mud, the nose landing gear up lock mechanism was intact. The nose landing gear actuator was also fully extended in the down and locked positi...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA15LA212