Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control after the cockpit canopy opened during initial climb. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure to securely lock the canopy before takeoff.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn June 21, 2015, about 1532 eastern daylight time, a Czech Sport Aircraft Piper Sport, N35EP, was substantially damaged when it impacted trees and terrain after a loss of control during climb after departing from Topsail Airpark (01NC), Holly Ridge, North Carolina. The private pilot was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight, which was destined for the Albert J. Ellis Airport (OAJ), Jacksonville, North Carolina.
According to his wife, on the day of the accident, the pilot went to the airport to check on the airplane after they had lunch together. When he arrived at the airport, he met with the mechanic who was completing the condition inspection on the airplane, paid him for his services, and received a receipt. The pilot then went home but planned to return later and fly the airplane back to OAJ where it was based.
About 1500, the pilot's wife dropped him off at the airport. The temperature was in the "upper 90s;" the humidity was high, and there was little or no breeze. According to the pilot's wife, due to the airplane's "clear roof" (canopy), it would get hot inside of the airplane, and it was her husband's habit to leave the canopy up when it was hot until he was ready to depart.
The pilot's wife reported that he called her from the airplane before he took off at 1524 and advised her that it would take 45 minutes for her to reach OAJ, and he would be there in 15 minutes. He also advised her that he would meet her in the air-conditioned office of the fixed base operator (FBO) at OAJ. However, when she arrived at the FBO, he was not there.
At 1711, one of the two mechanics who had performed the condition inspection on the airplane received a call from the owner of 01NC who said that he had received a telephone call from the pilot's wife and that the pilot had not arrived at OAJ. The mechanic determined that the airplane was not at 01NC. After not finding the airplane around the area adjacent to the airport, the mechanic called 911. A search for the airplane by federal, state, and local authorities was initiated. About 2130, the wreckage of the airplane was discovered in a wooded area about 1.1 miles west of 01NC. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONAccording to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records, the pilot held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. His most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on July 24, 2013. He reported on that date that he had accrued 1,850 total hours of flight experience. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe light-sport airplane was a single-engine, low-wing monoplane of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with a fixed-tricycle undercarriage with a castering nose wheel, and was powered by a 100-horsepower, Rotax 912 ULS engine, driving a three-bladed Woodcomp ground-adjustable propeller.
The fuselage consisted of a semi-monocoque structure. The cockpit frame and canopy frame were constructed of carbon fiber. The canopy was made of Plexiglass. It was hinged at the front and was equipped with a sliding window on each side.
The fuselage also contained a ballistic recovery system (BRS) with a parachute to be deployed in case of emergency. The BRS consisted of a rocket-deploying container that was located just forward of the cockpit in the nose section of the fuselage. A cable ran from this container to an activation handle just to the right of the pilot's seat on the instrument panel. Once the activation handle had been pulled, the rocket would exit the fuselage and accelerate away from the airplane. After the parachute was completely extracted and exposed to the relative wind, it would begin to inflate, generating drag forces to decelerate the airplane. When the parachute had fully deployed, the airplane would descend at a rate of about 1,000 to 1,500 ft per minute.
According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2010. Its most recent condition inspection was completed on the day of the accident. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 74.7 total hours of operation.
According to one of the two mechanics who performed the condition inspection, on June 19, 2015, the pilot flew the airplane to 01NC on a ferry permit. The ferry permit was required because the pilot had been sick and could not fly the airplane somewhere to have the condition inspection performed when it was due.
On June 20, 2015, the two mechanics began the condition inspection. On that date, the pilot advised the mechanics that he had accidently "put oil" into the coolant fill port on top of the engine because he thought the oil level was low. The mechanics flushed the cooling system and added new coolant. The mechanics also noticed that the bushings holding the radiator onto the engine were cracked and replaced them.
The pilot told the mechanics that the engine oil had been changed 23 hours earlier and that the oil should not be changed. The mechanics then discovered that the spark plugs needed cleaning, but, after advising the pilot of the cost of new spark plugs, the pilot had them install new plugs instead of cleaning the old ones.
According to the mechanic, on the day of the accident, as part of the inspection, to the mechanics opened all the inspection panels on the airplane, closed them, and the airplane was returned to service about 1400. The mechanics then locked up the hangar and went home. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONAt 1556, the recorded weather at the New River Marine Corps Air Station (NCA), Jacksonville, North Carolina, located 16 nautical miles northeast of the accident site, included: wind 230° at 6 knots, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 5,000 ft, temperature 34°C, dew point 22°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.94 inches of mercury. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe light-sport airplane was a single-engine, low-wing monoplane of conventional metal construction. It was equipped with a fixed-tricycle undercarriage with a castering nose wheel, and was powered by a 100-horsepower, Rotax 912 ULS engine, driving a three-bladed Woodcomp ground-adjustable propeller.
The fuselage consisted of a semi-monocoque structure. The cockpit frame and canopy frame were constructed of carbon fiber. The canopy was made of Plexiglass. It was hinged at the front and was equipped with a sliding window on each side.
The fuselage also contained a ballistic recovery system (BRS) with a parachute to be deployed in case of emergency. The BRS consisted of a rocket-deploying container that was located just forward of the cockpit in the nose section of the fuselage. A cable ran from this container to an activation handle just to the right of the pilot's seat on the instrument panel. Once the activation handle had been pulled, the rocket would exit the fuselage and accelerate away from the airplane. After the parachute was completely extracted and exposed to the relative wind, it would begin to inflate, generating drag forces to decelerate the airplane. When the parachute had fully deployed, the airplane would descend at a rate of about 1,000 to 1,500 ft per minute.
According to FAA and maintenance records, the airplane was manufactured in 2010. Its most recent condition inspection was completed on the day of the accident. At the time of the inspection, the airplane had accrued 74.7 total hours of operation.
According to one of the two mechanics who performed the condition inspection, on June 19, 2015, the pilot flew the airplane to 01NC on a ferry permit. The ferry permit was required because the pilot had been sick and could not fly the airplane somewhere to have the condition inspection performed when it was due.
On June 20, 2015, the two mechanics began the condition inspection. On that date, the pilot advised the mechanics that he had accidently "put oil" into the coolant fill port on top of the engine because he thought the oil level was low. The mechanics flushed the cooling system and added new coolant. The mechanics also noticed that the bushings holding the radiator onto the engine were cracked and replaced them.
The pilot told the mechanics that the engine oil had been changed 23 hours earlier and that the oil should not be changed. The mechanics then discovered that the spark plugs needed cleaning, but, after advising the pilot of the cost of new spark plugs, the pilot had them install new plugs instead of cleaning the old ones.
According to the mechanic, on the day of the accident, as part of the inspection, to the mechanics opened all the inspection panels on the airplane, closed them, and the airplane was returned to service about 1400. The mechanics then locked up the hangar and went home. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONExamination of the accident site revealed that the airplane struck trees in a steep, nose-low attitude, and the pilot was ejected from the cockpit. The airplane then fell nose first to the forest floor below, impacted in a 90° nose-down attitude, nosed over, and came to rest inverted.
Numerous areas of crush and compression damage to the fuselage and wings were noted, and there was evidence of fuel staining on the leading edges of the wings. There was no evidence of any inflight structural failure, inflight fire, or inflight explosion.
Examination of the cockpit canopy revealed that it was detached from its mounting location and was lying underneath the aft portion of the inverted fuselage. The majority of its clear bubble was broken into multiple pieces; however, the pieces were not scattered around the accident site but were collocated with the canopy frame. One of the canopy lift struts was missing and was not recovered. The damage patterns observed on the canopy frame and cockpit sill did not match and could not be correlated with each other. The canopy latching mechanism hooks were found to be partially retracted, the canopy locking mechanism and activation han...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA15FA245