Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The local controller's failure to visually scan and ensure that the runway surface was not occupied by a vehicle or other aircraft before issuing a takeoff clearance to the pilot. Contributing to this incident was the relieved controller's failure to monitor and review the position, after completing the relief briefing, to ensure that nothing had been overlooked.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On Wednesday, January 27, 2016, about 0804 eastern standard time (EST), a runway incursion occurred at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport (DTW), Detroit, Michigan when an airport operations vehicle (OPS), O373, was provided a clearance to operate on runway 22L, and Endeavor Air (Flagship) flight 3860 (FLG3860), a CRJ9, was cleared for takeoff on runway 22L. FLG3860 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Norfolk International Airport (ORF), Norfolk, Virginia, and O373 was conducting a routine runway inspection on runway 22L. There was no damage to the aircraft or vehicle, and no reported injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the incident.
About five minutes prior to the incident, the driver of O373 completed a runway inspection for runway 22R, and informed the local northwest (LNW) controller that he was proceeding to the departure end of runway 22L and would hold short; where he would wait until permission was granted for him to him to drive on runway 22L. The LNW controller responded to the driver by reiterating instructions to hold short of runway 22L at taxiway R. The driver acknowledged and complied.
At 0801:37, the LNW controller instructed O373 to, "…turn right and drive on runway two two left…" The driver responded, "…cleared to drive on runway two two left..."
The driver proceeded southbound (toward the departure end of runway 22L), made a 180 degree turn on the runway 4R numbers, then proceeded northbound (toward the approach end of runway 22L).
About 0802 the local control positions in the tower , LNW and local northeast (LNE), were combined. The LNE controller received a position relief briefing from the LNW controller, and assumed all LNE and LNW duties from the LNE workstation.
According to audio data, the local control position relief briefing began at 0802:25 and ended at 0802:40. During the briefing, at 0802:31, the LNW controller informed the LNE controller that, "…Ops 373 is driving runway two two left, ah, he is just turning northbound on it now…." At the same time, the pilot of FLG3860 transmitted on the frequency, "Flagship thirty-eight sixty ready two two left."
At 0802:44, the combined local controller (LNE/LNW) instructed FLG3860 to line up and wait on runway 22L.
At 0803:46, the local controller cleared FLG3860 for take-off on runway 22L. The pilot acknowledged the take off clearance. About 20 seconds later the airport surface detection system - model X (ASDE-X) alerted, indicating that the runway was occupied by FLG3860 and O373.
At 0804:10, the local controller transmitted, "Flagship thirty-eight sixty abort takeoff, Flagship thirty-eight sixty abort takeoff," and then instructed O373 to exit the runway to the right. The pilot and vehicle driver both acknowledged and complied with the instructions.
According to ASDE-X data, the closest proximity between the aircraft and the vehicle was about 211 feet laterally.
About 0804, the local controller transmitted, "…that was my fault, you can exit the runway to the left and do whatever you want to do right now, just advise ground on point 8 [reference to ground control frequency 121.8] when you are all collected."
The driver of O373 exited and reported off the runway, then returned to his base operations location.
About 0805, the pilot of FLG3860 exited the runway, switched to ground control frequency, and requested taxi instructions to the runway. The pilot advised the ground controller that he needed about 15 minutes before he would be ready to depart. The ground controller taxied FLG3860 to runway 22L, and advised the pilot to, "let me know when you are ready to go." About 21 minutes later, the pilot informed the ground controller that he needed to go back to the gate.
RADAR DATA
Radar data for this report was obtained from the ASR-9 sensor located at DTW.
METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION
The DTW weather for January 27, 2016 was obtained from the KDTW automatic surface observing system (ASOS). The current weather at the time of the incident was:
METAR KDTW 271253Z 25009KT 10SM -SN SCT025 BKN040 OVC170 M02/M04 A3020 RMK AO2 SLP232 P0000 T10171044=
Weather for KDTW at 0753 EST, wind from 250 degrees at 9 knots, 10 miles visibility, light snow, scattered clouds at 2,500 feet above ground level (agl), broken ceiling at 4,000 feet agl, overcast skies at 17,000 feet agl, temperature -2 degrees Celsius (C), dew point temperature -4 degrees C, altimeter 30.20 in Hg. Remarks: station with a precipitation discriminator, sea level pressure 1023.2 hPa, one-hourly precipitation of a trace, temperature -1.7 degrees C, dew point temperature -4.4 degrees C.
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# OPS16IA002